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This dissertation contributes to the understanding of employer-employee bargaining
over hours of work, and the use of administrative data to better understand labor market
statistics.
In chapter 1, “Hours Off the Clock,” I address a simple but confounding research
question: To what extent do workers work more hours than they are paid for? The rela-
tionship between hours worked and hours paid, and the conditions under which employ-
ers can demand more hours “off the clock,” is not well understood. The answer to this
question affects worker welfare, as well as wage and hour regulation. In addition, work
off the clock has important implications for the measurement and cyclical movement of
productivity and wages. In this chapter, I construct a unique administrative dataset of
hours paid by employers linked to a survey of workers on their reported hours worked
to measure work off the clock. Using cross-sectional variation in local labor markets, I
find only a small cyclical component to work off the clock. The results point to labor
hoarding rather than efficiency wage theory, indicating work off the clock cannot explain
the counter-cyclical movement of productivity. I find workers employed by small firms,
and in industries with a high rate of wage and hour violations are associated with larger
differences in hours worked than hours paid. These findings suggest the importance of
tracking hours of work for enforcement of labor regulations.
In chapter 2, “Hours Adjustments: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data,”
coauthored with fellow graduate student Nellie Zhao, we provide the first look at admin-
istrative data on hours worked within firms. We document the extent to which part-time
work varies across industries, and confirm that part-time work is concentrated in rela-
tively low-wage service sectors. Further, we take advantage of the longitudinal nature
of our dataset and analyze the prevalence of transitions between part-time and full-time
work within the same job. We show that the share of new full-time or part-time jobs that
are created due to within-job hours changes varies greatly across industries.
In chapter 3, “Total Error and Variability Measures with Integrated Disclosure Lim-
itation for Quarterly Workforce Indicators and LEHD Origin Destination Employment
Statistics in OnTheMap,” coauthored with Kevin L. McKinney, Lars Vilhuber, and John
M. Abowd, we report results from the first comprehensive total quality evaluation of five
major indicators in the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynam-
ics (LEHD) Program Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI). We conducted the evalua-
tion by generating multiple threads of the edit and imputation models used in the LEHD
Infrastructure File System. These threads conform to the Rubin (1987) multiple imputa-
tion model, with each thread or implicate being the output of formal probability models
that address coverage, edit, and imputation errors. Design-based sampling variability
and finite population corrections are also included in the evaluation. We derive special
formulas for the Rubin total variability and its components that are consistent with the
disclosure avoidance system used for QWI. These formulas allow us to publish the com-
plete set of detailed total quality measures for QWI and LODES. The analysis reveals that
the five publication variables are estimated very accurately for tabulations involving at
least 10 jobs. Tabulations involving three to nine jobs have acceptable quality. Tabulations
involving zero, one or two jobs have substantial total variability.
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CHAPTER 1
HOURS OFF THE CLOCK
1.1 Introduction
How many hours do people work? Myriad government surveys of hours worked from
households, and hours paid from establishments exist to answer this question, though
each has drawbacks.1 How much time employees spend at work, and whether this time is
explicitly tracked and bargained for, is neither well measured nor understood. In addition
to worker welfare, the difference between hours paid and hours worked has implications
for the cyclical movement of productivity and wages. Specifically, off-the-clock work2 is
a possible explanation for the change in productivity from pro-cyclical to counter-cyclical
during the last three business cycles.
The difficulty measuring work off the clock is not only a concern for economists and
government statistical agencies, it is also essential for the understanding of firm profits
and worker welfare. In the last few years, stories in the popular press recount hourly
workers asked to show up to work and told to wait – without pay – until demand picked
up.3 Other times wage theft was more explicit, with employers doctoring reports of hours
worked to show a higher hourly wage,4 or workers asked to keep working after they had
clocked out.5 Salaried workers, too, were frequently asked to pick up some or all of
the work for colleagues who were laid off.6 The various stories are not uniform to all
1Establishment surveys of hours paid likely miss long hours for salaried workers and off-the-clock work.
Household surveys rely on accurate recall of all jobs.
2I will refer to “off-the-clock” work synonymously with ”the difference between hours worked and
hours paid”. I use this phrase only for its brevity.
3“More Workers Are Claiming ‘Wage Theft’.” The New York Times, Aug. 31, 2014.
4“Squeezed garment factories use check cashing services to mask true wages, workers say.” The Los
Angeles Times, Jul. 30, 2016.
5“Nearly 10,000 Chipotle Workers Join Class Action Wage Lawsuit.” The New York Daily News, Aug. 30,
2016.
6“All Work and No Pay: The Great Speedup.” Mother Jones, July/August, 2011.
1
workers, but they all point to the various dynamics that influence bargaining over time
in the workplace and how much work time happens off the clock. Empirical research
that documents off-the-clock work specifically, and labor compliance more broadly, is
growing, but little research using representative government datasets exists.7
In this study, I examine how shocks to labor demand and firm characteristics influence
work off the clock. I construct a unique dataset of survey responses of hours worked
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS) with administrative
data on hours paid from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household
Dynamics (LEHD) program. I adjust the ACS survey weights to account for the shift in
frame, so the analysis sample remains representative. To the best of my knowledge, this
is the first study that links hours worked to hours paid at the person-level.
The dataset allows me to first answer an elementary, but essential question: how much
do people work? The unconditional means of the analysis sample find that annual hours
paid for full-year workers is 1,946 [500.3] compared to 2,079 [504.8] hours worked.8 The
difference of a little more than 130 hours per year works out to roughly an extra three
weeks per year assuming the standard 40 hour work week. The unconditional mean log
difference is 0.079 [0.237], which is close to the log difference of means. The unconditional
means mask significant heterogeneity in differences between subgroups. In particular,
workers who self-report working less than 40 hours or exactly 40 hours per week – the
standard workweek in the U.S. – have a mean log difference between hours worked and
hours paid of 0.031 [0.268] and 0.032 [0.179], respectively. For those who self-report work-
ing more than 40 hours per week, the mean log difference is 0.210 [0.238]. These are the
first results to confirm that firms poorly track the hours of workers who work more than
the standard workweek.
7Bernhardt et al. (2013) and Milkman et al. (2012) are recent examples.
8All standard errors are in parentheses. All standard deviations are in brackets.
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After quantifying the extent of off-the-clock work, I use variation in local labor market
conditions to test whether and how shocks to labor demand effect off-the-clock work. I
regress the log difference on the unemployment rate in the commuting zone of the ACS
respondent at the time of her interview. The coefficient estimate for the effect of local labor
market conditions is −0.00191 (0.00077), indicating that tighter labor markets increase off-
the-clock work. A one percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate increases off-
the-clock work by 0.19%, or an extra 4 hours annually. Further analysis reveals that the
effect is driven by workers in production and non-supervisory occupations, low-skilled
workers, as well as workers likely paid by the hour.
Due to concerns about about the endogeneity of hours reporting and other labor mar-
ket programs that may effect labor force participation, I instrument the unemployment
rate using a shift-share predicted employment index (Bartik, 1991). The instrumental vari-
able coefficient estimates are slightly larger in magnitude, though still relatively small,
with a coefficient estimate of −0.00274 (0.00154). A negative estimate indicates that off-
the-clock work is not a viable explanation for the changing cyclicality of productivity.
Economic theory gives us insight as to why hours paid and hours worked should
diverge. The negative coefficient estimate points to firms engaging in labor hoarding. In
labor hoarding models, firms hold labor in excess of production requirements during a
drop in demand. This is usually attributed to costs of adjusting employment, such as the
difficulty of training new workers when demand picks up. In accordance with my results,
labor hoarding models find relatively sluggish employment adjustment in response to
a shock, with firms using the intensive margin to adjust labor inputs. One important
implication is that productivity is pro-cyclical.
In light of the result that off-the-clock work is probably pro-cyclical and driven by
low-skill workers, I test for explanations centered on labor compliance. Although still an
emerging literature, research finds that smaller firms are much less likely to comply with
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labor regulations. Consistent with this literature, I find that firms in the smallest firm size
category, 0-19 employees, report higher incidence of work off the clock compared to firms
with greater than 2,500 employees with a log difference of 0.0231 (0.0053). I find the effect
is driven by production and non-supervisory workers who are likely paid on an hourly
basis. I also show that off-the-clock work is concentrated in industries where wage and
hour violations are prevalent.
The results on the cyclical nature of off-the-clock work challenge a recent literature
testing for efficiency wage explanations for the counter-cyclical nature of productivity.
Lazear et al. (2015) and Burda et al. (2016) use local labor market variation to test for
greater effort in slack labor markets. Unlike this paper, they do not look for work off the
clock, rather they model greater effort per unit of time at work. The empirical strategy
in Lazear et al. (2015) employs data on a single firm with a wide geographic dispersion
of establishments, that tracks piece-rate production. Burda et al. (2016) use an empirical
strategy similar to Lazear et al. (2015), but they use the American Time Use Survey to
measure time at work actually working, which is a proxy for greater effort. In contrast
to my paper, both studies find evidence that greater local labor market slack is associated
with greater effort provision.
My estimates quantifying off-the-clock work and its implications for productivity
statistics confirm several previous papers. Aaronson and Figura (2010) also attempt to
use off-the-clock work to explain the counter-cyclical turn in productivity. They construct
time series of hours worked and hours paid from the Current Population Survey and
the Current Establishment Statistics, respectively. Although they must rely on aggregate
data, they too find little evidence for off-the-clock work biasing productivity estimates.
Eldridge and Pabilonia (2010) use the American Time-Use Survey (ATUS) and the Work
Schedules and Work at Home Supplement to the Current Population Survey to address
whether the incidence of working from home biases productivity statistics. They find
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over the time span of their sample that unpaid work at home sometimes overstates, and
other times understates the hours levels used in the BLS productivity series. The bias in
all cases is exceedingly small, and unlikely to bias productivity statistics.
Recent research uses survey and administrative data to document non-compliance
with minimum wage laws, overtime regulations, and work off the clock. Bernhardt et al.
(2013) and Milkman et al. (2012) use the 2008 Unregulated Worker Survey, and they find
that job and employer characteristics are responsible for much of the variation in non-
compliance. Ji and Weil (2015) use a unique dataset of franchisor- and franchisee-owned
establishments matched to Wage and Hour Administration investigations. They find that
franchisee-owned establishments are more likely to commit wage and hour violations.
My estimates of off-the-clock work are broadly consistent with this literature. Off-the-
clock work is most concentrated in small firms, and within industries that disproportion-
ately employ low-wage workers.
Since applied economics is moving towards the use of large administrative datasets,
the results of my study also suggest caution when using administrative data to measure
hours. Few studies have explicitly compared employer and employee reports of hours
worked.9 One exception is Mellow and Sider (1983) who use an employer validation
supplement to the CPS to glean employer and worker responses to myriad questions. For
hours, they find worker reports exceed employer reports by 3.9%, which is substantially
less than the 7.9% in the preferred specification. The difference is likely due to the analysis
sample in this study, which only considers full-time, full-year workers. Lastly, this study
contributes to the growing body of research which uses administrative data to validate
survey data.10
9See Duncan and Hill (1985), Bound and Krueger (1991), Bound et al. (1994), and Bound et al. (2001) for
an overview.
10See Abraham et al. (2013) and Abowd and Stinson (2013).
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1.2 Hours Divergence: Theory and Implications
I construct a unique dataset of hours worked and hours paid in order to try to infer the
causes, incidence, and implications of off-the-clock work. A natural question quickly
arises: why should we expect the difference between hours paid and hours worked to
reflect anything but errors in reporting? Although measurement error is no doubt present,
this section lays out established economic theories of why hours paid may diverge from
hours worked. The first two theories provide opposing predictions for the movement of
off-the-clock work over the business cycle. Efficiency wage models predict workers will
exert more effort – greater hours worked compared to hours paid – when labor markets
are slack. In contrast, theories of labor hoarding predict the opposite relationship between
off-the-clock work and macroeconomic conditions.
In addition to cyclical theories of why hours paid may diverge from hours worked, I
view the difference through an older literature on labor regulation compliance. In these
models the firm’s profit motive leads them to skirt labor laws to realize greater profits.
Firms must weigh the higher profit of non-compliance against the probability of getting
caught and the penalties of non-compliance. The Great Recession and the ensuing debate
about the declining wages and working conditions of low wage workers have brought
this topic to greater prominence in the media. Better administrative data on employment,
firms, and greater transparency and data around compliance investigations have invigo-
rated this literature.
1.2.1 Efficiency Wages & Labor Hoarding
In efficiency wage theories of the labor market, workers would like to avoid being laid
off, and firms would like workers to exert effort. At least since Kalecki (1943), who noted
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“under a regime of permanent full employment, the ‘sack’ would cease to play its role
as a disciplinary measure,” economists have studied the relationship between the labor
market and worker effort. More recent discussions of efficiency wage models pick up
with Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). In their model, the firm’s production depends on worker
effort, which firms cannot perfectly monitor. Workers would prefer to shirk rather than
exert effort. Firms offer wages in excess of the market clearing rate in order to induce
effort. The theory provides a succinct explanation of involuntary unemployment.
The model relevant for the empirical tests in this paper does not provide a theory
of unemployment. Although similar, the key is the cost to firms of replacing workers,
or alternatively the cost to workers of finding a new job.11 The driving variable is the
tightness of the labor market. As the labor market becomes more slack, the cost of job loss
increases due to worse prospects of finding a new job. Workers exert extra effort in the
form of more hours worked in order to signal their worth to employers and avoid a lay
off. In the case of hourly workers, this may be explicit off-the-clock work. For salaried
workers, these extra hours are in excess of what is “normal” under more favorable labor
market conditions.
In contrast, labor hoarding theories predict that labor productivity should be pro-
cyclical Popular in the 1960s,12 theories of labor hoarding hold that firms retain more
workers in a downturn than production explicitly requires.13 Firms may have incurred
the costs of training workers to their specific production technology, or highly skilled
workers may be scarce. In both cases firms would rather not risk laying off workers who
may be difficult to rehire, or pay the upfront cost to train new hires. To meet reduced
production targets, firms then adjust hours worked in order to meet production targets.
If firms choose to keep a worker’s labor earnings constant, hours paid may exceed hours
11Rebitzer (1987) is the most relevant paper capturing the former case. See Appendix A.1 for the latter
case.
12See Oi (1962) & Fair (1969).
13Biddle (2014) provides a nice history of the literature.
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worked. The implication for labor hoarding theory is that productivity will decline dur-
ing downturns as hours paid stays relatively constant and production declines.14
More modern theories of labor demand would interpret labor hoarding through the
lens of adjustment costs. Firms face an explicit cost to adjusting their labor on the ex-
tensive margin. Depending on the size and functional form of the costs, firms will not
always adjust employment to its optimal level in response to a shock. Firms will adjust
employment less than in the absence of adjustment costs and use hours to adjust total
labor input to its optimal level.15
Efficiency wage and labor hoarding models are not mutually exclusive. In fact, both
are likely present in any given employment relationship. The empirical approach em-
ployed in this study will not be able to separately identify the two. The empirical analysis
in this paper serves to answer the question of which is more salient for interpreting the
cyclical changes in productivity and real wages. It should therefore help guide macroe-
conomists on how best to incorporate the costs of separations to workers and firms in
their models.
1.2.2 Labor Regulation Compliance
In addition to the cyclical forces, explicit failure to comply with labor regulations is
another reason why hours worked may exceed hours paid. The Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), enacted in 1938, established the federal minimum wage, and effectively en-
shrined the 40-hour work week by requiring overtime pay of time-and-a-half for all hours
worked over 40 in a week. The literature on compliance with the FLSA centers on the
14Employer reports of hours paid are the main input to the BLS productivity series, while hours worked
is the variable of economic interest. See Eldridge and Pabilonia (2010).
15See Cooper et al. (2007), Caballero et al. (1997), and Hamermesh (1989a) for more recent examples.
Appendix A.1 describes the theory in more detail.
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firm. Firms weigh their profits from compliance against their expected profits from non-
compliance (Ashenfelter and Smith, 1979). The model leads to the conclusion that firms
need to take into account the costs of noncompliance, the odds of getting caught, the elas-
ticity of labor demand, and the spread between the prevailing wage and the minimum
wage in a given industry.16
Recent empirical research finds firm and job characteristics such as firm size, industry,
and non-hourly pay arrangements drive non-compliance with labor regulations. Bern-
hardt et al. (2013) conduct a survey of low-wage workers in major American metropolitan
areas. They survey non-compliance, but also collect detailed worker and firm character-
istics. They have two important findings. First, larger firms (greater than 100 employees)
are less likely to commit labor violations compared to firms less than 100 employees. Sec-
ond, they find that non-hourly workers are more likely to incur wage and hour violations,
and that off-the-clock work is more prevalent than straight minimum wage violations.
There are a few reasons why smaller firms may be more likely to commit labor vio-
lations. First, small firms have fewer establishments and therefore stand less of a chance
of getting caught for noncompliance if enforcement is equally probable for all establish-
ments. Second, small firms are less likely to have in-house expertise (human resource
departments) to negotiate regulations (Mendeloff et al., 2006), and are less likely to be
unionized.17 Small firms tend to have less capital and rely more heavily on labor inputs.
Thus, if they are going to cut costs, it will likely be on labor.18 Finally, the fact that small
firms have less capital reduces the costs of non-compliance. Firms that owe back wages
have the opportunity to declare bankruptcy and forsake owed back wages. The less cap-
ital a firm has, the smaller the costs to bankruptcy.19
16See also Chang and Ehrlich (1985), and Basu et al. (2010).
17Weil (1991) shows labor unions correlate with OHSA investigations.
18See Ji and Weil (2015) for a similar discussion on franchisee vs. franchisor labor compliance.
19“Few California workers win back pay in wage-theft cases.” The Los Angeles Times, April 6, 2015.
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The measurement of hours is often an important determinant for wage and hour vi-
olations. Recent changes in technology and the organization of firms make measuring
hours a challenge in wage and hour compliance. Tracking hours is important for assess-
ing off-the-clock work, overtime violations, and many minimum wage violations when
workers are not paid by the hour. New technology makes assessing hours more diffi-
cult as more work takes place at home with computers outside of normal business hours.
In addition, tracking hours for workers who may work at multiple work sites and who
may be employed by third party entities pose new challenges to enforcement agencies
(Weil, 2010). In short, the measurement of hours is invaluable for effective enforcement
of wage and hour violations, and it constitutes a significant margin through which many
violations take place.
1.3 Data
Making inferences about the differences between hours paid and hours worked requires
data on both variables. Previous estimates of the divergence between hours paid and
hours worked relied on aggregated time series data. An innovation of this paper is to
link the two variables at the person level. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first
paper to explicitly link workers’ reports of hours worked to employers’ reports of hours
paid for a representative sample of workers. The result is a survey response of hours
worked and the corresponding administrative reports of hours paid from the survey re-
spondent’s employers. To construct this difference measure, I use administrative data of
hours paid from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics
(LEHD) program linked to survey responses to the American Community Survey from
the U.S. Census Bureau.
The LEHD is an administrative file system of linked employer-employee data derived
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from state unemployment insurance systems. The data result from a unique partnership
between states and the U.S. Census Bureau, where the states provide the Census Bureau
quarterly extracts of earnings records from their unemployment insurance systems. The
core file is a job-based frame, named the Employment History File (EHF), with a unique
record represented by a person-firm-year-quarter link with any positive earnings in a
given quarter, which covers approximately 95% of all jobs in the United States.20 The
fact that the LEHD comprises a near-universe of jobs and employer-employee links is
important as it lets me account for hours paid in all jobs of the survey respondent, as well
as providing the link to survey data for hours worked.
In addition to quarterly earnings, four states provide quarterly reports of hours paid.
The states are Washington, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Oregon.21 The quarterly hours
data allow me to construct a measure of total hours paid across all jobs in the previous
year for each person. The final LEHD sample consists of a person-level measure of all
jobs paid in the previous year for each quarter from 2010 to 2013 for these states.22
Data on hours worked come from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community
Survey (ACS). The American Community Survey is a rolling monthly survey of 3.5 mil-
lion households each year. The ACS replaced the Census long form after the 2000 census
and as such, it asks questions on housing, demographic, and economic topics. I focus on
the questions on weeks paid in the past year and the usual weekly hours worked. When
combined, the two variables allow me to construct a measure of usual hours worked in
the past year across all jobs from the perspective of the employee.
20 Self-employed workers are not currently incorporated into the LEHD. For a full description of the
LEHD infrastructure files see Abowd et al. (2009).
21There does not appear to be an explicit administrative reason why some states collect hours paid in
addition to quarterly earnings.
22The states vary considerably with respect to the time of reporting. Internal rules of the LEHD program
dictate that at least three states must be used for any released results, which limits the analysis to begin in
2009 when Rhode Island first begins reporting hours until 2014 quarter one, which is the most recent hours
data available for all states.
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A point of clarification is needed regarding paid weeks worked for the annual hours
worked measure. The ACS hours worked measure conflates both hours paid and hours
worked due to the weeks worked variable including paid leave. I construct annual hours
worked as the product of usual weekly hours and weeks worked. The ACS measure of
annual hours worked includes some weeks for which the worker was paid, but for which
no work was done. I do not adjust for this in what follows because both LEHD and
ACS include paid leave. The difference in the annual hours measure therefore lets usual
weekly hours drive the variation in the difference between the two measures. Alterna-
tively, both measures could be adjusted to account for weeks worked rather than weeks
paid. Because I am interested in the difference between the two measures, adjusting both
down by the same amount will not influence the final measure of work off the clock. All
statistics showing annual hours levels reflect the lack of adjustment.
1.3.1 Sample Construction
For the final merged ACS-LEHD analysis sample, I first separately prepare ACS respon-
dents and create an analogous person-year-quarter frame for the LEHD. The ACS prepa-
ration begins by attaching a protected identification key (PIK) to each ACS respondent.
A PIK is a person-level identifier that allows one to link ACS responses to other individ-
ual datasets within the U.S. Census Bureau.23 Using an internal crosswalk, I link ACS
responses from 2010 to 2013. For each year, an ACS respondent links to a PIK at rates
between 91% and 94% per year. After deduplicating records within a year, I am left with
18.3 million ACS responses.
I merge the person-year-quarter LEHD frame and the ACS to create the final analysis
dataset. The resulting sample contains 571,000 records. The small sample is a result of
23See Wagner and Layne (2014) for a description of the U.S. Census Bureau’s PIK assignment process.
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limiting the sample of ACS respondents to those who have positive hours paid in the
previous year in the LEHD hours-reporting states from the time of their ACS interview. I
further restrict the sample to ensure that the LEHD and the ACS frames accord as close as
possible. For consistency with the LEHD, I restrict ACS respondents to those age sixteen
and over, and I require that they have no jobs in other states over the previous year by
consulting the standard LEHD EHF, which includes all available states.24 Using the ACS-
reported dominant job, I exclude federal government employees.25 I use the ACS reported
residence and exclude all respondents who neither live in an hours reporting state, nor in
a border state. It is perfectly reasonable for an ACS respondent living in North Dakota,
for example, to work in Minnesota. As a result of these restrictions, I reduce the sample
to 438,000 observations.
The final sample contains additional restrictions to negate any anticipated frame dif-
ferences, which could lead to biased measurement of work off the clock. I restrict the
sample to records who report working a full year (50-52 weeks) in the ACS, and who
report positive hours in the LEHD for every quarter in the past year. This restriction is
reasonable for a few reasons. First, the ACS sample restriction narrows weeks worked
considerably. The weeks worked variable in ACS is binned, and the bins become coarser
the fewer weeks one works.26 The LEHD restriction to working in the reference quar-
ter as well as the preceding four quarters simply ensures consistency with the ACS. Fi-
nally, I drop observations where usual weekly hours is imputed, and observations where
workers receive more than 20 percent of their income from self-employment earnings as
reported on the ACS. The final dataset contains 218,000 records.
24I also exclude respondents for whom I find jobs with zero or missing hours data. This is evidence of
unit non-response and would bias measures of work off the clock.
25The ACS-reported dominant job does not conform to the definition of a dominant job in the LEHD. For
the ACS, the dominant job is the main job in the week prior to the ACS response. Given the stability of
federal jobs in general, and the high tenure of my final sample, I use the two definitions interchangeably.
Checks for consistency find a high degree of agreement.
26There is research pointing to quality problems in hours worked for the ACS for part-time workers
(Baum-Snow and Neal, 2009). I include full-year part-time workers, though all results are robust to their
exclusion with some loss of precision.
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In order for the final analysis sample to remain representative of the United States
population, I adjust the ACS sample weights. When I merge the ACS to the LEHD uni-
verse of job records, the ACS weights are no longer representative of the U.S. population
due to differences in frame. I first use inverse probability weighting to adjust the ACS
sample weights for PIKs missing at random in the sense of Rubin (1987).27 Second, I ad-
just the sample weights to match national demographic characteristics in the 2009-2013
ACS for full-year workers excluding federal employees. I adjust based on age, gender,
race/ethnicity, and education. The resulting sampling weights allow for inferences about
the population after linking the ACS to a different universe.
1.3.2 Variable Construction
I create the final total for hours paid from the LEHD over the previous year by summing
hours over jobs and weighting the interview quarter and ending quarter by the ACS in-
terview date. For person i employed at job j at any year-quarter t between 2010 and 2013,
define h j(i),t as the gross quarterly hours for person i in job j in quarter t. I consider only
LEHD jobs between the quarter of the ACS interview (t), and four quarters prior (t − 4),
inclusive. Total hours paid over the previous year therefore include five quarters of data,
which is one too many. To calculate the final annual hours paid in the LEHD over the pre-
vious year from the survey interview date, I sum hours over all jobs, and take a weighted
average of hours in the interview quarter and the last quarter,
Hi,lehd = (1 − ρ)
∑
i∈J
h j(i),t−4
 +  3∑
t=1
∑
i∈J
h j(i),t−k
 + ρ ∑
i∈J
h j(i),t
 . (1.1)
The first term on the right-hand side of equation 1.1 is the sum of all hours paid to
respondent i across all jobs J in which the respondent worked in period t − 4. This sum
27This is also known as missing conditional on observable covariates. See appendix A.2 for details on
inverse probability weighting.
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is multiplied by the weight 1 − ρ. The middle term is the sum of hours paid at all jobs in
the three quarters immediately preceding the interview quarter. The last term is the sum
of hours across all jobs in the interview quarter multiplied by weight ρ. The weights are
based on the percentage of the interview quarter in scope for the total hours calculation.28
To construct annual hours worked in the ACS, I assume that usual weekly hours is
equivalent to average weekly hours and then multiply usual weekly hours by 50, 51 and
52 weeks to get three measures of annual hours worked. Table 1.1 provides statistics for
annual hours worked assuming a 52 week work year. This is my preferred hours measure
for several reasons. First, the final sample contains workers with relatively high tenure
(over six years), and I perform checks for continuous employment in the LEHD over
the previous four quarters from the reference quarter. Second, the ACS asks for usual
weeks worked including paid sick days, paid vacation, and military service. Given checks
for continuous employment and because the ACS weeks worked question includes paid
leave, 52 weeks seems the most reasonable measure of weeks paid that accords with the
LEHD.
The final dependent variable of interest is the log difference between annual hours
worked from the ACS, and total hours paid over the previous year from the LEHD. Recall
that the sample is restricted to full-year workers, and that ACS weeks worked is binned
for full-year workers. Denote the annual ACS hours measure Hwi,acs where w ∈ {50, 51, 52}
is the possible weeks worked. The annual LEHD hours measure is denoted Hi,lehd. The
measure of difference between hours worked and hours paid is ywi = ln(H
w
i,acs) − ln(Hi,lehd).
I construct the log difference for all three ACS measures of ACS annual hours. I then
winsorize at the 5% and 95% level in order to mitigate bias induced by extreme outliers.29
28For example, if an ACS respondent completed the survey on May 10th, the weight assigned to the
interview quarter would be equal to the 40 days in the quarter divided by 91, which is total days in the
second quarter. The weight on the end month is simply one minus the interview quarter weight.
29The following analysis has also been carried out with a dependent variable winsorized at the 1% and
99%. Results are qualitatively unchanged.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for Analysis Sample
mean sd
ACS annual hours (52 Weeks) 2,079 500.3
LEHD annual hours 1,946 504.8
Annual hours error (50 weeks, ACS) 0.030 0.251
Annual hours error (51 weeks, ACS) 0.055 0.241
Annual hours error (52 weeks, ACS) 0.079 0.237
Firm/Job Characteristics
Unemployment rate (%) 7.354 1.901
Private, for-profit firm 0.743 0.437
Supervisory, Non-production 0.275 0.447
Top Quartile, Liklihood Not Paid by Hour 0.277 0.448
Dominant job tenure (quarters) 26.96 21.0
Demographic Characteristics
Age 42.30 12.87
Male 0.519 0.500
Non-white 0.239 0.426
Bachelor’s degree or higher 0.325 0.468
Notes: N = 218, 000, with 58 commuting zones. Annual hours error is
the difference between log hours worked in the ACS and log hours
paid from the LEHD. The ACS hours paid measure is defined by
multiplying the usual weekly hours by the number of weeks paid.
Supervisory workers adhere to the Bureau of Labor Statistics defini-
tion of supervisory or non-production workers. See text for details.
Demographic, firm, and job characteristics come from a combination of the ACS and
the LEHD. Many characteristics are available in both the LEHD and the ACS. I use the
ACS for demographic characteristics, which are occasionally imputed in the LEHD. For
the residence, I use the ACS reported residence. The LEHD residence is from a fixed time
period each year, and will not necessarily correspond to the residence at the time of ACS
interview. I use firm characteristics from the LEHD dominant job30 as it comes from an
30I define the LEHD dominant job as the job with the most hours paid in the three quarters which lie
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administrative source and best hues towards my preferred definition of a dominant job. I
make use of whether or not a worker is paid by the hour. This is not available in either the
ACS or LEHD.31 I use the Current Population Survey to impute hourly/non-hourly pay
using industry, occupation, and earnings according to the ACS. I then bin the resulting
probability of non-hourly pay into quartiles for use in the empirical analysis.32
1.3.3 Summary Statistics
Summary statistics of the mean and standard errors for the final sample are found in
Table 1.1. The first two lines give the summary statistics for estimates of annual hours
worked from the ACS and annual hours paid from the LEHD. The bottom panel displays
demographic characteristics used to match the analysis sample to the U.S. population.
The restriction to full-year workers is perhaps the most salient for what follows. Note
that the average tenure in LEHD dominant jobs is a little under 27 quarters, or slightly
greater than 6.5 years.
Figure 1.1 shows the full distribution of the difference in log hours worked from log
hours paid. I use my preferred ACS hours worked measure, which assumes 52 paid
weeks. The distribution is centered slightly to the right of zero, but it is highly skewed
with a long right tail implying many more people report working more than their em-
ployers say they do. Note that the distribution is winsorized at the 95% level, which
slightly truncates the right tail of the distribution, but analysis relaxing the winsorization
to the 99% level does not alter the results.
completely within the preceding year from the date of the ACS interview.
31Deciphering salaried workers in the LEHD is not as simple as looking at low variance in quarterly
hours across quarters for a given job. Due to the abundance of weekly or bi-weekly pay periods, jobs
with constant weekly hours paid will nonetheless display quarter to quarter variance in hours paid as the
number of pay periods in a quarter fluctuates.
32See appendix A.3 for details.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of the Difference of Log Hours Worked and Log Hours Paid
Notes: Variable is the difference in log ACS hours worked from log LEHD hours paid for the analysis
sample, winsorized at the 5% and 95% level. N = 218, 000. See Table 1.1 for summary statistics.
Partitioning the distribution by a few characteristics reveals large differences between
hours worked and hours paid, particularly for those who report working more than 40
hours per week. Figure 1.2 shows the large disparity in work off the clock by workers who
self-report working more than 40 hours per week. The figure partitions the distribution of
the difference in log hours into those who self-report usually working less than 40 hours
per week (top panel), those who usually work 40 hours per week (middle panel), and
those who usually work more than 40 hours per week (bottom panel). The difference
is stark. Those who work less than 40 hours per week show a small difference in hours
worked compared to hours paid compared with those who usually work exactly 40 hours
per week, with means of 0.031 [0.268] and 0.032 [0.179], respectively. Most of the mass is
centered around zero in both distributions, with a slight right skew. In contrast, for those
who report working more than 40 hours the distribution shifts to the right with the mass
less sharply concentrated. The mean for this distribution is 0.21 [0.238].33
33For comparison, Figure A.1 in appendix A.4 shows the earnings error for the same two groups. Here,
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of the Difference of Log Hours Worked and Log Hours Paid by
ACS usual weekly hours
Notes: Variable is the difference in log ACS hours worked from log LEHD hours paid for the full sample,
winsorized at the 5% and 95% level. The variable is partitioned by whether an ACS respondent answers
that she usually works either 1) less than 40 hours per week (top panel) or 2) exactly 40 hours per week
(middle panel) or 3) more than 40 hours per week (bottom panel). Top panel N = 49, 000, middle panel
N = 108, 000, bottom panel N = 61, 000. Mean of top panel 0.031 [0.268], middle panel 0.032 [0.179] and
bottom panel 0.21 [0.238].
Figure 1.3 displays the distribution of log hours worked less log hours paid by LEHD
hours paid. I divide the annual hours paid measure from the LEHD by 52 weeks to
obtain average weekly hours paid. Figure 1.3 partitions the log difference distribution
into those who on average were paid less than 40 hours per week (top panel), 40 hours
per week (middle panel), and more than 40 hours per week (bottom panel). The top two
panels show a significant right skew in the distribution – what would be predicted from
Figure 1.2. However, firms who report paying for over 40 hours per week on average
have a more symmetric distribution with a mean of −0.020 [1.18]. In general, Figure 1.3
reinforces the finding that hours worked and hours paid accord quite closely, but that
hours worked over 40 hours per week are not well recorded by employers.
the distributions show a significant left skew, but in general they are quite similar.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of the Difference of Log Hours Worked and Log Hours Paid by
LEHD Hours Paid
Notes: Variable is the difference in log ACS hours worked from log LEHD hours paid for the full sample,
winsorized at the 5% and 95% level. The variable is partitioned by average weekly hours paid (annual
LEHD hours divided by 52). Top panel: less than 40 hours per week. Middle panel: exactly 40 hours a
week. Bottom panel: more than 40 hours per week. Top panel N = 116, 000, middle panel N = 24, 000,
bottom panel N = 79, 000. Mean of bottom panel 0.158 [1.91], middle panel 0.108 [1.09] and bottom panel
−0.020 [1.18].
The distributions of log hours worked less log hours paid suggest that hours worked is
accurately reported except for workers who report working more than 40 hours per week.
Recent studies support this finding by comparing survey responses from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) to the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). The ATUS is a time
use survey, and it is generally thought to more accurately reflect hours worked due to
its short recall period. Frazis and Stewart (2009) compare hours worked per job in the
two surveys at the person level. They find that survey responses from the CPS of hours
worked are remarkably close to the ATUS, with any overstatement confined to multiple
jobholders.34 The conclusion of these validation studies is that respondents report work
hours accurately in surveys.
34See Frazis and Stewart (2010) and Frazis and Stewart (2004) for similar results.
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1.4 Hours & the Business Cycle
1.4.1 Empirical Strategy
Differentiating between the hypothesis of extra effort from employees in the form of off
the clock work when labor markets are slack versus the competing labor hoarding hy-
pothesis is the key empirical question. The ideal design for such an analysis would ran-
domly assign different unemployment rates, or other measures of labor market slack,
to many identical self-contained economies and then observe the co-movement of hours
paid and hours worked. Such a fantasy experiment is not feasible. This paper uses vari-
ation in local labor market slack to infer the relationship between the business cycle and
the difference between hours paid and hours worked. Specifically, I use the variation in
the change in unemployment rates in commuting zones to identify hours off the clock.
This approach takes advantage of the large geographic dispersion of the United States,
which effectively partitions the country into many self-contained regional economies.35
I use the ACS respondent’s place of residence for the local labor market defined as
a commuting zone. Given the relatively small geographic area of four states and their
adjoining neighbors, I use commuting zones as the primary local labor market unit as
it classifies all counties into a commuting zone. The metropolitan statistical area (MSA)
is also an appealing geographic delineation for a local labor market as it is defined as a
collection of counties around a major (or minor) city usually including its suburbs. How-
ever, the MSA excludes some mostly-rural counties from any MSA, which leads to further
reductions in sample size.36
I use the unemployment rate to measure the local labor market from the Local Area
35Schaller (2016) is a recent example who employs a similar approach.
36Headline results are robust to to local labor markets defined by MSA.
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Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). LAUS pro-
vides local area unemployment rates derived from BLS surveys and unemployment in-
surance data. The data are available monthly for small areas including MSAs and coun-
ties. I use county unemployment rates to construct monthly commuting zone unemploy-
ment rates by averaging county unemployment rates for each county in a commuting
zone weighting the average by the labor force of each county. I then average monthly
commuting zone unemployment rates into a quarterly commuting zone unemployment
rate. I use the quarterly commuting zone unemployment rate corresponding to the quar-
ter of the ACS survey response as an indicator of labor market conditions. The LAUS
unemployment rates are known to be noisy. By averaging over the months in the refer-
ence quarter, I allow the data to accord to the underlying analysis sample, and eliminate
some of the noise.
Figure 1.4 shows the time series of quarterly unemployment rates for the two largest
commuting zones by population in the analysis sample. One commuting zone contains
Minneapolis, Minnesota and the other contains Seattle, Washington. The unemployment
rates for both commuting zones rise quickly at the onset of the Great Recession before
gradually declining. Seattle’s commuting zone increases to almost 10% at its peak before
declining to below 7% at the end of the analysis sample. Minneapolis’s unemployment
rate peaks at over 7% before 2010, and then declines to slightly below 5% at the end of
2013. For comparison, the national unemployment rate declined from 9.8% in January
2010 to 6.6% in January 2014. All results that follow should be interpreted with these
general macroeconomic conditions in mind. Although this is just two commuting zones,
Figure 1.4 shows that there is ample variation both within and across commuting zones
in the unemployment rate.37
37Figure A.3 shows the full distribution of unemployment rate changes across all commuting zones in
the analysis sample.
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Figure 1.4: Quarterly unemployment rates, Seattle, WA and Minneapolis, MN Commut-
ing Zones
Notes: Seattle, WA (CZ) refers to the entire commuting zone which contains the city of Seattle, Washington.
Minneapolis, MN refers to the entire commuting zone which contains the city of Minneapolis, Minnesota.
The shaded region marks the time frame of the analysis sample.
The specification for the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate is given by,
y52i,t = βUcz,t + δXi + ψJ j(i) + αs + ωt + φcz + i,t,cz . (1.2)
where y52i,t is the difference between the logarithm of ACS annual hours worked and the
logarithm of annual LEHD hours paid. I use my preferred 52-week measure for ACS
hours worked in the dependent variable. For this linear specification, the choice of de-
pendent variable corresponding to different weeks worked will not matter for the final
estimates. Differences in the dependent variable due to varying weeks worked only shift
the intercept of the regression line and have no effect on the slope, and therefore the coef-
ficient of interest.
The variable Ucz,t is the unemployment rate in the commuting zone of the residence
of person i in interview quarter t. The vector Xi captures demographic characteristics of
person i, while J j(i) captures job and firm characteristics of person i employed at dominant
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job j. Job characteristics include tenure, industry fixed effects and an indicator variable
for whether a worker is employed in a supervisory or non-production occupation.38
I also include fixed commuting zone effects. Denoted φcz, the inclusion of fixed com-
muting zone effects identifies the effect of the unemployment rate on the difference of log
hours using time-series variation within commuting zones. The inclusion of commuting
zone time trends in some specifications identifies the effect using de-trended time series
variation within commuting zones. I include additional controls for fixed year-quarter
and state fixed effects in the specification denoted ωt and αs, respectively. Finally, i,t,cz is
the error term.
Although commonly used in the literature, the use of local unemployment rates
presents some problems for measures of labor market slack. The unemployment rate con-
founds both supply and demand induced responses of labor force participation. Changes
in the unemployment rate may be endogenous to other variables forcing changes in work
off the clock. In this setting, where the dependent variable is the difference in log hours
worked from log hours paid, such endogenous changes are harder to envision, but it is
not implausible that changes in state or local labor programs to encourage labor force
participation may also change an employer’s unemployment insurance hours reporting
requirements.39
In order to buttress the results using the local unemployment rate, I also construct an
employment shift-share measure of plausibly exogenous labor demand. This shift-share
index commonly credited to Bartik (1991), but used extensively in local labor market anal-
yses,40 uses a local labor market’s industrial composition in a base year to predict employ-
ment growth in the local labor market in subsequent years. The intuition behind the in-
38I use the BLS definition for production and non-supervisory workers, which is defined by industry and
occupation. See U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2004) for a detailed description.
39It appears Rhode Island began requiring employers to report hours paid at the same time it began a
new labor market policy. Whether the former is in response to the latter has proven difficult to pin down.
40See Blanchard and Katz (1991) Bound and Holzer (2000) Autor and Duggan (2003) for other examples.
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strument is to fix local industrial composition, and allow national employment growth to
predict local employment growth. If drivers of national growth are applied uniformly, lo-
cal labor markets with greater concentrations of the growth industries should see greater
predicted employment growth simply due to their industrial composition. I follow Au-
tor and Duggan (2003) and construct predicted employment growth in labor market cz at
time t from base year t0 as
Gˆt,cz =
∑
k
δt0,cz,kGt,k .
The first term, δt0,cz,k, gives the share of employment in NAICS sector k in local labor
market cz at time t0, and the second term, Gt,k, is the change in log national employment
in NAICS sector k between the base year and time t. I exclude the local labor market cz
for the computation of national growth rates for each local labor market.41
1.4.2 Results
The results of the specification employed in equation 1.2 are presented in Table 1.2. All
standard errors in parentheses are cluster-robust, clustered by commuting zone (Cameron
and Miller, 2015). Columns (1) to (4) add time trends, firm/job characteristics, and demo-
graphic characteristics to the regressions, respectively. Column (4) shows my preferred
specification including commuting zone specific time trends, as well as time varying firm,
job and demographic controls. The preferred specification has a coefficient (β) of −0.00191
(0.000767), which is small but precisely measured.
The estimated sign of the coefficient suggests labor hoarding best explains the data. As
labor markets become tighter (the unemployment rate decreases), hours worked expand
faster than hours paid (the wedge between hours worked and hours paid increases). To
41National employment growth rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics CEW, and I construct local
labor market shares from the U.S. Census Bureau’s QWI, which is benchmarked to the CEW. I use 2007 for
the base year because it is the peak of previous business cycle, though results are robust to using year 2000.
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Table 1.2: The Effect of the Unemployment Rate on Work Off the Clock
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment rate (β) -0.00143* -0.00198** -0.00182** -0.00191**
(0.00075) (0.00081) (0.00075) (0.00077)
State FE X X X X
Commuting Zone Time Trends X X X
Firm & Job controls X X
Demographic controls X
R2 0.006 0.007 0.093 0.104
Notes: N = 218, 000, with 58 commuting zones. Dependent variable is the difference between
log annual ACS hours calculated at 52 weeks and log annual LEHD hours. All regressions es-
timated using ordinary least squares. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by commuting
zone. Stars on standard errors accord to p-values as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
provide a valid explanation for the counter-cyclical change in productivity, the sign on the
coefficient would be positive. The magnitude of the coefficient indicates a small cyclical
component to off the clock work. In my preferred specification, a one point decline in the
unemployment rate results in an increase in off the clock work of 0.1%. The OLS results
find a relationship that lacks a strong cyclical component, and therefore cannot explain
the cyclical change in productivity.
The instrumental variables estimates confirm the OLS results. These results are pre-
sented in Table 1.3 with my preferred specification contained in panel A, column (3).
Panel B shows the first stage results. The Bartik shift-share instrument is highly corre-
lated with the unemployment rate across all specifications. The coefficient on predicted
employment growth is −27.8 (3.99), with the sign in the correct direction (higher predicted
employment growth leads to a lower unemployment rate), and a first stage F-statistic of
48.43. The two stage least squares coefficient on the unemployment rate in column (3)
is still negative and larger in absolute value than in the OLS specification in column (2).
The coefficient on unemployment is now −0.00274 (0.00154). The instrumental variables
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Table 1.3: The Effect of the Unemployment Rate on Work Off the
Clock, Two Stage Least Squares Results
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: 2SLS Results
Unemployment rate (β) -0.00286 -0.00254 -0.00274*
(0.00177) (0.00159) (0.00154)
Panel B: First Stage Results
Bartik Shift-Share -29.07*** -27.78*** -27.80***
(3.790) (3.987) (3.994)
First stage F-Statistic 58.84 48.57 48.43
State FE X X X
Commuting Zone Time Trends X X
Firm & Job controls X
Demographic controls X
R2 0.005 0.006 0.104
Notes: N = 218, 000, with 58 commuting zones. Dependent variable is the
difference between log annual ACS hours calculated at 52 weeks and log an-
nual LEHD hours. Panel A shows two stage least squares estimates. Panel
B shows the corresponding first stage regressions. Cluster-robust standard
errors clustered by commuting zone. Stars on standard errors accord to p-
values as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
estimates come with the cost of a loss in precision with the coefficient only significant at
the 10% level. The instrumental variables results provide evidence for supply-induced
responses possibly attenuating the OLS results.
The headline results of a limited cyclical component mask heterogeneity in off the
clock work and the business cycle. Table 1.4 fits the same model given in equation 1.2,
but interacts the unemployment rate with subgroups most likely to work off the clock.42
Column (1) shows the slopes of the regression lines associated with production and non-
supervisory workers and their complement, supervisory workers. Supervisory workers
are most likely to be paid a fixed salary and seem likely candidates to be driving off the
42Table A.5 shows qualitatively similar results by running the regression separately for each group.
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clock work.43 Somewhat surprisingly, column (1) shows that it is production and non-
supervisory workers driving the results. The coefficient estimate is −0.00219 (0.00075). In
contrast, the estimate for the coefficient for supervisory workers is imprecise and slightly
positive, 0.00111 (0.00080).
Table 1.4: The Effect of the Unemployment Rate on Work Off the Clock, Heteroge-
neous Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Ucz,t * Non-supervisory -0.00219***
(0.00075)
Ucz,t * Supervisory -0.00108
(0.00108)
Ucz,t * Less than Bachelor’s Degree -0.00214***
(0.00085)
Ucz,t * Bachelor’s Degree or higher -0.00164*
(0.00095)
Ucz,t * Least likely non-hourly pay -0.00228**
(0.00079)
Ucz,t * Most likely non-hourly pay -0.00091
(0.00099)
p-value (from F-test coefficients are equal) 0.17 0.59 0.09
R2 0.104 0.105 0.103
Notes: N = 218, 000, with 58 commuting zones. Dependent variable is the difference between log
annual ACS hours calculated at 52 weeks and log annual LEHD hours. Non-supervisory is an
indicator for observations who meet the definition of a production or non-supervisory worker
according to the occupation and industry of her dominant job. Supervisory refers to the compli-
ment of non-supervisory. The definition of non-supervisory or production worker comes from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. “Least likely non-hourly pay” refers to observations who are be-
low the median in likelihood they are not paid by the hour. “Most likely non-hourly pay” refers
to observations above the median likelihood not paid by the hour. All regressions run using OLS
with the same specification as Table 1.2 column (4). Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by
commuting zone. Stars on standard errors accord to p-values as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Similar results obtain when interacting the unemployment rate by method of pay and
by skill level. Column (3) in Table 1.4 interacts the results by whether the ACS respondent
is likely paid by the hour. Workers most unlikely to be paid hourly have a coefficient on
43This is due to the duties test for exemption from overtime in the FLSA. A key component of the test is
whether an employee works in a supervisory capacity.
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the slope of the regression line of 0.00049 (0.00091). In contrast, workers most likely be
paid by the hour have an estimated coefficient of −0.00214 (0.000852). Column (2) shows
the results for workers with and without a bachelor’s degree. Although there is no a
priori reason why workers with a bachelor’s degree would be more or less likely to work
off the clock, in practice a bachelor’s degree is highly correlated with supervisory work
and non-hourly pay arrangements. The point estimate for workers without a bachelors
degree is qualitatively similar to the coefficient on non-supervisory workers, and precise,
obtaining an estimate of −0.00220 (0.00079). The results confirm that it is lower skilled
workers likely paid by the hour who are driving the results.
The preceding results show support for labor hoarding driving the cyclical component
of off the clock work, though the effect is small. Another further confirmation of the
labor hoarding hypothesis is the tenure of workers. Firms holding onto excess labor in a
downturn will be eager to deploy it once demand picks up. In contrast, in an efficiency
wage setting it seems plausible that workers with strong attachment to particular jobs
who also happen to retain their dominant job after the Great Recession are particularly
good matches with their employers, and their high tenure precludes them from feeling
threatened with layoffs.44
Table 1.5 shows the results interacting various firm and job characteristics with the
local unemployment rate. Column (1) gives the results for tenure, where the estimating
equation augments equation 1.2 with indicator variables for length of tenure one year
or less, 1-3 years, 3-5 years, and greater than 5 years. The estimated slopes show that it
is longer tenured workers driving the results with point estimates of −0.00230 (0.00786),
−0.00223 (0.00803), and −0.00170 (0.00754), for workers with 1-3 years, 3-5 years, and
greater than 5 years of tenure, respectively. These coefficient estimates are all significant,
and much larger in magnitude than for workers who have less than one year of tenure.
44This is one result of the model of Rebitzer (1987).
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Table 1.5: Regression Results for Unemployment Rate and Work Off
the Clock, Heterogeneous Effects, Additional Results
(1) (2) (3)
Ucz,t * Tenure: 1 year or less -0.00058
(0.00096)
Ucz,t * Tenure: 1-3 -0.00230***
(0.00078)
Ucz,t * Tenure: 3-5 -0.00223***
(0.00080)
Ucz,t * Tenure: +5 -0.00170**
(0.00075)
Ucz,t * Firm size: 0-19 0.00052
(0.00083)
Ucz,t * Firm size: 20-49 -0.00203**
(0.00090)
Ucz,t * Firm size: 50-249 -0.00241***
(0.00083)
Ucz,t * Firm size: 250-999 -0.00310***
(0.00086)
Ucz,t * Firm size: 1,000-2,499 -0.00147*
(0.00077)
Ucz,t * Firm size: + 2,500 -0.00238***
(0.00079)
Ucz,t * Firm age: 0-1 0.00105
(0.00124)
Ucz,t * Firm age: 2-3 0.00000
(0.00119)
Ucz,t * Firm age: 4-5 0.00000
(0.00105)
Ucz,t * Firm age: 6-10 -0.00060
(0.00103)
Ucz,t * Firm age: +11 -0.00211***
(0.00075)
R2 0.104 0.105 0.104
Notes: N = 218, 000, with 58 commuting zones. Dependent variable is the dif-
ference between log annual ACS hours calculated at 52 weeks and log annual
LEHD hours. Tenure is measured in years on the dominant job. All regressions
run using OLS with the same specification as Table 1.2 column (4). Cluster-
robust standard errors clustered by commuting zone. Stars on standard errors
accord to p-values as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.5 also shows that off the clock work is concentrated in large, old firms. The re-
sults suggest a labor hoarding model where firms work the excess labor they have kept
during a downturn harder during the ensuing recovery.45 The results further suggest
that although likely paid a salary, higher skill workers likely have better outside options
and are better able to resist pressures to vary hours according to cyclical labor market
pressure.
1.4.3 Robustness Checks
The first robustness check tests for sensitivity of the results to the specification of the de-
pendent variable. The first two columns of Table 1.6 run regression 1.2 using alternate
specifications of work off the clock. Column (1) shows the results using the disparity
between hours worked and hours paid according to Tornqvist et al. (1985).46 This mea-
sure is defined if either hours measure is equal to zero, and is roughly equivalent to the
log measure of the percent difference. I also do not winsorize this variable. Column (2)
uses a binary indicator variable for the dependent variable, which equals unity if hours
worked in the ACS exceeds hours paid from the LEHD. This makes equation 1.2 a linear
probability model. The point estimates on the unemployment rate for columns (1) and (2)
are −0.00183 (0.00080) and −0.00505 (0.00204), respectively. The estimates are precise, and
indicate that the results are not sensitive to the specification of the dependent variable.
45Table A.6 shows the correlation between off the clock work and firm employment growth. There is little
correlation. This is not inconsistent with a model of firms with large fixed adjustment costs who work their
existing workforce as long and hard as possible before eventually adjusting.
46Formally, this is yalti =
Hi,acs−Hi,lehd
1
2 (Hi,acs+Hi,lehd)
. Within the economics literature, this measure is usually credited to
Haltiwanger et al. (1996).
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The next threat to identification comes from recall bias. The ACS asks the respondent
for usual weekly hours over the previous year. My measure of work off the clock assumes
“usual” weekly hours is equivalent to average weekly hours, to respondents.47 Hours are
growing in the analysis sample as the unemployment rate trends down between 2010
and 2013. It is possible that workers simply report their usual hours right around the
time of interview, and not over the previous year. If this is the case, then my results
will show a positive relationship between work off the clock and tightening of the local
labor market – exactly what I find. To test for this, in column (3) of Table 1.6 I use the
difference between log hours worked and log hours paid in the interview quarter.48 If
ACS respondents understand usual hours to mean hours over the previous year, this new
measure should yield a positive coefficient – the average over the previous year will be
smaller than the interview quarter. If respondents are giving usual hours in the interview
quarter, the point estimate on the unemployment rate should be close to zero and/or
imprecisely measured. The positive estimate in column (3) of 0.0182 (0.0023), suggests
that respondents interpret usual weekly hours as asking for average hours in the analysis
time frame.
Table 1.6, column (4) tests whether the results are sensitive to the measure of labor
market slack. The Local Area Unemployment Statistics from the BLS are model based,
and known to be noisy. In column (3) I use the year-over-year job growth rate for the
commuting zone calculated using the approximate log change credited to Haltiwanger
et al. (1996). The year over year growth rate is measured from one year prior to the in-
terview quarter. The data come from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) from the
U.S. Census Bureau. The QWI are the public-use version of the LEHD, and are therefore
derived from administrative unemployment insurance data. The coefficient estimate us-
47The exact question is (capitalization as in original), “During the PAST 12 MONTHS, in the WEEKS
WORKED, how many hours did this person usually work each WEEK?”
48I use the log of gross hours in the interview quarter for hours paid and the log of usual weekly hours
scaled by the number of weeks in the quarter for hours worked.
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ing the year over year job growth rate is 0.0024 (0.0041). The estimate is precise and the
sign of the coefficient is in the correct direction. That is, a positive coefficient for local
employment growth is consistent with a negative coefficient for the local unemployment
rate.49
Another potential problem with my specification is that some jobs may not be reported
to the unemployment insurance system at all. If the ACS respondent includes the hours
from these jobs in usual weekly hours, this could bias the results to look like labor hoard-
ing.50 The construction of the analysis sample makes this scenario unlikely, but I test for
off the books work by interacting the unemployment rate by full time status and multi-
ple job holding.51 The assumption is that workers who hold multiple jobs and/or work
part-time are more likely to pick up short, informal jobs that are not reported to the un-
employment insurance system. The results are given in columns (5) and (6) of Table 1.6.
The coefficients for the slope of part-time workers and multiple job holders are 0.00044
(0.001199) and −0.00155 (0.00154), respectively. Neither estimate is precise, though the
coefficient on multiple job holders suggests that it is not implausible off the books work
may be influencing the results.
49Results are robust to sensitivity of included commuting zones, and the later inclusion of Oregon in
2012, though with a loss of precision in the latter case. Due to disclosure risks, these results are not able to
be released at this time.
50From the perspective of a statistical agency calculating productivity, this distinction between “off the
books” and “off the clock” is likely irrelevant.
51I calculate multiple job holding summing the number of jobs in the LEHD over the previous year.
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1.5 Hours & Labor Compliance
1.5.1 Empirical Strategy
Somewhat surprisingly, this paper finds that off the clock work has a small pro-cyclical
component, which is driven by low-skill workers likely paid by the hour. Non-
compliance with labor market regulations offers a possible explanation for these results.
Non-compliance can either be explicit, by paying workers under the table, or refusing
to pay over-time for hours worked over 40 hours per week. There are also subtle ways
this can arise. For example firms may mis-classify employees who should be non-exempt
as exempt, and shift more hours to these workers. To test this theory, we need to use the
characteristics of firms. In particular, theory and survey evidence suggest that small firms
are more likely to engage in non-compliance behavior due to lower costs of bankruptcy,
diminished reputation, and lower productivity firms.52
The relevant facts presented in Section 1.2 indicate that off-the-clock work, and wage
and hour violations often times operate through the (mis)management of hours of work.
Even in the case of minimum wage violations, non-hourly pay frequency and its associ-
ated ambiguity of work hours is correlated with FLSA violations. In this section I test for
whether hours-based evidence for work off the clock is present in my representative mi-
crodata. I use ordinary least squares regression and follow the specification of Bernhardt
et al. (2013) using survey data, as well as Ji and Weil (2015) who use administrative data.
Before analyzing firm characteristics in greater depth, I study the following specifica-
tion in order to ensure that key variables behave roughly as expected. The model is,
y52i,t = δXi + ψJ j(i) + αs + ωt + i,t,cz , (1.3)
52Milkman et al. (2012) and Mendeloff et al. (2006) provide recent examples.
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where the vector Xi captures demographic characteristics of person i, while J j(i) captures
job and firm characteristics of person i employed at dominant job j. The specification is
close to equation 1.2, except for the omission of commuting zone effects. The empirical
strategy used to identify off the clock work for labor compliance does not rely on variation
in local labor market conditions. I therefore drop the commuting zone effects as well as
commuting zone time trends.
In addition to the standard firm and individual controls, I augment the model with
indicators for firm size. Both Bernhardt et al. (2013) and Ji and Weil (2015) emphasize the
role played by firm size in labor violations. I therefore augment equation 1.3 vector J j(i)
with bins for firm size given by,
B∑
b=1
ψb1{kb ≤ f irmsize j(i) < kb+1} ,
where b indexes the bins with B total bins, and k is the set of bounds defining the bins
with B+ 1 bounds. The indicator function takes a value of one if f irmsize j(i) – the firm size
of the LEHD dominant job – falls within the specified firm size category. The firm-person
match which constitutes a job in the LEHD uses a definition of a firm as a state-level tax
reporting entity. It is not uncommon for a larger national entity to be the real owner of
a firm, with the state distinction a product of the state-based nature of unemployment
insurance records. The LEHD remedies this by bringing in firm size from the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). All firm size categories use the LBD’s
definition of a firm taking into account inter-state ownership.
1.5.2 Results: Firm Size
The estimation results for equation 1.3 are given in Table 1.7. My preferred specification
given in column (1) lines up well with prior research. Workers with a bachelors degree,
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men, and workers whose main job is with a private, for profit firm are more likely to
report more hours worked than hours paid. Two curious results are that the model indi-
cates that people of color report fewer hours worked than hours paid, and U.S. citizens
slightly more hours worked than hours paid. The higher incidence of work off the clock
for U.S. citizens is likely due to the fact that previous survey evidence included workers
who are not able to legally work in the U.S. The analysis sample includes only workers
who are found in the administrative data. Inclusion in the UI data generally necessitates a
social security number suggesting that non-citizens in the sample are likely different than
non-citizens in purely survey data. For workers of color, the difference in sign has no easy
explanation, other than previous results found only a tenuous relationship between race
and labor compliance.
The coefficients of greatest interest are on the indicator variables for supervisory work-
ers and on the quartiles of likelihood a worker is not paid by the hour. It is generally
assumed that employers pay little attention to the hours for supervisory workers because
they are exempt from overtime and usually not paid by the hour. In such cases one should
expect hours worked to exceed hours paid. The coefficient on the indicator for supervi-
sory workers in the main specification in column (1) is 0.00909 (0.0050) indicating that
supervisory workers, all else equal, work 0.9% more hours than those for which they
are paid over the course of the year. At first glance this seems low, but it is important
to realize that this indicator, based on BLS definitions of supervisory workers, is highly
correlated with my imputation of non-hourly pay probability.
I measure non-hourly pay probability and its association with work off the clock by
indicators for quartiles of probability of non-hourly pay. In Table 1.7 column (1) the indi-
cators for quartile of non-hourly pay are measured relative to the lowest quartile, where
workers most are likely to be paid by the hour. The results indicate that workers most
likely to be in non-hourly pay arrangements are the most likely to report more hours
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Table 1.7: Characteristics of Work Off the Clock: OLS
Results
(1) (2)
Private, for-profit firm 0.0125*** 0.0135***
(0.00281) (0.00497)
Not White -0.0270*** -0.0483***
(0.00563) (0.00306)
Hispanic -0.00869* -0.00969
(0.00522) (0.00624)
Male 0.00445** 0.00830***
(0.00180) (0.00142)
U.S. Citizen 0.0319*** 0.0203***
(0.00584) (0.00269)
Bachelors degree of higher 0.0486*** 0.0572***
(0.00175) (0.00316)
Supervisory Worker 0.00909* -0.00970*
(0.00502) (0.00566)
Second Quartile -0.0463***
(0.00346)
Third Quartile -0.0355***
(0.00538)
Top Quartile 0.0136**
(0.00591)
Firm Controls X X
Year-Quarter FE X X
State FE X X
Demographic Controls X X
Observations 218,000 67,000
R2 0.073 0.096
Notes: Dependent variable is the difference between log an-
nual ACS hours calculated at 52 weeks and log annual LEHD
hours. Quartile is the quartile of likelihood paid non-hourly.
Supervisory worker is defined by observation’s industry and
occupation according to BLS definition of production and
non-supervisory workers. Column (2) subsets the regression
to only observations in the top quartile of likely non-hourly
pay. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by state-firm.
Stars on standard errors accord to p-values as follows: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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worked than hours paid. The coefficient in this case is 0.0136 (0.0059). Column (2) in the
same table fits equation 1.3 using OLS but subsets the data to only include those in the top
quartile of likelihood of non-hourly pay. Results are in general qualitatively unchanged,
though the coefficient on the indicator for supervisory flips sign – it is now negative – in-
dicating the limited explanatory power of this distinction in comparison to the pay type,
although these two effects are difficult to distinguish.
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Table 1.8 presents the summary statistics for the analysis sample by firm size. First,
ACS and LEHD average annual hours generally increase as firm size increases, though
the mean difference between log hours worked and log hours paid decline slightly as
firm size increases. Characteristics of firms and workers employed show more variation
by firm size. Slightly more than 85% of firms in the smallest firm size category (0-19)
work at private, for profit firms compared to slightly more than 75% in the largest firm
size category (firms with more than 2,500 employees). In addition, workers in the smallest
firms are much more likely to be paid by the hour. Firms with 0-19 employees employ
17.6% of workers in the analysis sample in top quartile of non-hourly pay probability
compared to 32.0% and 32.2% in the largest two firm size categories, respectively. Finally,
22.6% of workers in the smallest firms have at least a bachelors degree compared to 39.3%
in the largest firm size category.
The results of including firm size in equation 1.3 are given in Table 1.9. The coefficients
correspond to the indicator variables of their respective firm sizes. All coefficients should
be interpreted as the increased (decreased) difference in hours worked compared to hours
paid in firms with 2, 499 employees or more. The results in column (2) show that workers
whose primary job is in small firms appear to work more hours than they are paid. The
coefficient on the 0-19 employment category is positive at 0.0231 (0.0053) and precise. The
same results are displayed graphically in Figure 1.5.
One potential issue with this specification is the worry that firm size bins are arbitrar-
ily chosen. In addition, I have continued to use the winsorized difference in logs as the
measure of off the clock work. I check for the robustness of both of these concerns in addi-
tional specifications. The first two columns of Table 1.10 use finer firm size bins and reach
largely similar conclusions. The results from column (2) are also presented graphically in
Figure 1.6. The coefficients on all three firm size bins with employment less than 20 em-
ployees are significant and positive, and of similar magnitude to the coefficients in Table
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Table 1.9: Off the Clock Work by Firm Size,
Coarse Firm Size Bins
(1) (2)
0-19 0.0358*** 0.0231***
(0.0057) (0.0053)
20-49 0.0132** -0.0002
(0.0063) (0.0097)
50-249 0.00117 0.0009
(0.0057) (0.0046)
250-999 -0.0070 -0.0075
(0.0063) (0.0050)
1,000-2,499 0.0180** 0.0032
(0.0083) (0.0066)
Firm controls X
Year-Quarter FE X
State FE X
Demographic controls X
R2 0.003 0.116
Notes: N = 218, 000. Dependent variable is the dif-
ference between log annual ACS hours calculated
at 52 weeks and log annual LEHD hours. All co-
efficients reported in reference to largest firm size
group; firms with employment greater than or equal
to 2,500. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered
by state-firm. Stars on standard errors accord to p-
values as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1.9. The exception is the coefficient on the smallest firm size bin, 1-4, is a little less than
twice the next two firm size bins. Coefficients in this specification should be interpreted
again in reference to the largest firm size, which is now firms with employment greater
than 10,000. In addition to the finer firm size categories, columns (3) and (4) in Table 1.10
show results for the same specification but using Haltiwanger et al. (1996) measure of
differences in hours worked compared to hours paid. Even though this measure is not
winsorized, it shows quantitatively similar results to previous specifications.
The finding that smaller firms are associated with higher self-reported hours worked
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Figure 1.5: Regression Coefficients for LEHD Firm Size Categories
Notes: Boxes are regression coefficient point estimates and lines are 95% confidence intervals. All results
are relative to the largest firm size category, +2,500 employment. See Table 1.9 column (3).
Figure 1.6: Regression Coefficients for BDS Firm Size Categories
Notes: Boxes are regression coefficient point estimates and lines are 95% confidence intervals. All results
are relative to the largest firm size category, +10,000 employment. See Table 1.10 column (2).
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compared to hours paid is consistent with the current literature on non-compliance, but
masks some of the story. Recall that the previous results center around low-skill workers,
who are more likely to be paid an hourly wage. To test whether the firm size results
are being driven by supervisory (likely exempt) or non-supervisory workers, I run the
same specification with the firm size indicators, but now I interact the firm size indicator
variables with an indicator for supervisory employees.
I plot the results graphically in Figures 1.7 and 1.8. The results are also available in
Table A.2 column (1). All results are shown relative to non-supervisory workers in the
largest firm size category. What the two Figures make clear is that the greater off the
clock work in the smallest firm size category appears to be driven by workers in non-
supervisory jobs. Figure 1.7 plots the estimated coefficients and their associated 95% con-
fidence intervals for all firm sizes interacted with supervisory workers. The key point
from this Figure is the uniformity and statistical significance of almost all coefficients.
The estimated coefficients range from 0.0198 to 0.599. Given the near uniformity across
firm size categories, it seems unlikely that supervisory workers are driving the results by
firm size.
In contrast, the estimated coefficients on non-supervisory workers depict a different
pattern. Figure 1.8 plots these coefficients, which are also available in Table A.2 column
(1), top panel. The estimated coefficients are uniformly small, and an estimate of zero
cannot be rejected at the 5% confidence level. The estimate for the smallest firm size
category is the only positive point estimate, 0.0294 (0.0294). The pattern on the coefficients
for the firm size indicators follows the same pattern as firm size overall. The results
provide support for the predictions of fewer hours reporting in smaller firms, and wage
and hour compliance. The effect is not driven by supervisory or non-production workers,
rather by production or non-supervisory workers.
Figures 1.9 and 1.10 provide further evidence for non-supervisory workers explaining
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Table 1.10: Off the Clock Work by Firm Size, Fine Firm Size Bins
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1-4 0.0586*** 0.0418*** 0.0505*** 0.0425***
(0.0096) (0.0086) (0.0106) (0.0095)
5-9 0.0302*** 0.0142** 0.0295*** 0.0205**
(0.0080) (0.0070) (0.0093) (0.0081)
10-19 0.0241*** 0.0164*** 0.0250*** 0.0228***
(0.0078) (0.0063) (0.0092) (0.0074)
20-49 0.0119 -0.0018 0.0125 0.00247
(0.0081) (0.0101) (0.0095) (0.0110)
50-99 0.00165 0.0012 0.0052 0.0071
(0.0079) (0.0060) (0.0091) (0.0070)
100-249 -0.0013 -0.0021 0.0000 0.0012
(0.0078) (0.0057) (0.0091) (0.0067)
250-499 -0.0057 -0.0065 -0.0029 -0.00278
(0.0082) (0.0061) (0.0096) (0.0071)
500-999 -0.0104 -0.0116* -0.0081 -0.0088
(0.0089) (0.0066) (0.0101) (0.0075)
1,000-2,499 0.0167* 0.0013 0.0182* 0.0033
(0.0097) (0.0072) (0.0109) (0.0080)
2,500-4,999 -0.0036 -0.0091 0.0000 -0.0052
(0.0118) (0.0105) (0.0136) (0.0117)
5,000-9,999 -0.0042 -0.00117 -0.0006 0.0013
(0.0103) (0.0081) (0.0113) (0.0086)
Firm controls X X
Year-Quarter FE X X
State FE X X
Demographic controls X X
R2 0.004 0.116 0.002 0.099
Notes: N = 218, 000. Dependent variable for columns (1) and (2) is the difference
between log annual ACS hours calculated at 52 weeks and log annual LEHD
hours. For columns (3) and (4) dependent variable is Haltiwanger et al. (1996)
change. All coefficients reported in reference to largest firm size group; firms
with employment greater than 10,000. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered
by state-firm. Stars on standard errors accord to p-values as follows: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1.7: Regression Coefficients for Firm Size: Supervisory Workers
Notes: Boxes are regression coefficient point estimates and lines are 95% confidence intervals. All results
are relative to the largest firm size category, +2,500 employment, for production and non-supervisory
workers. See Table A.2 column (1), bottom panel.
the firm size effect. Figure 1.9 shows the results of firm size interacted with an indicator
for the bottom half of hourly pay distribution. The coefficients are similar in magnitude
to the coefficients interacting firm size with and indicator for non-supervisory workers.
Turning to Figure 1.10, the case of the top half of the probability of hourly pay distribution,
the results are again similar to non-supervisory workers in Figure 1.8. This is somewhat
curious as we would expect non-hourly workers to be driving the variation. Due to the
imputation of pay status, this cannot be explicitly ruled out. It is possible that those who
are unlikely to be paid hourly are driving the variation. What is clear is that the results
indicate that small firms overwhelming report more hours worked than hours paid, and
that the results are driven by low-skill production and non-supervisory workers.
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Figure 1.8: Regression Coefficients for Firm Size: Non-supervisory and Production Work-
ers
Notes: Boxes are regression coefficient point estimates and lines are 95% confidence intervals. All results
are relative to the largest firm size category, +2,500 employment, for production and non-supervisory
workers. See Table A.2 column (1), top panel.
1.5.3 Results: Industry
In addition to firm size, industry is often a strong predictor of hours off the clock. More
generally, one implication of true failure to record and track employee hours should be
wage and hour violations. Table 1.11 displays the top ten NAICS three-digit industries
ranked by their share of all Department of Labor investigative actions where a viola-
tion was found to have occurred between 2010 and 2013. The top ten industries account
for 62.6% of all violations, and comprise 36.1% of private employment, on average, be-
tween 2010 and 2013. Violations are further concentrated in the top three industries: Food
Services & Drinking Places, Specialty Trade Contractors (roofers, for example), and Ad-
ministrative & Support Services (temporary employment services, janitors, and security
guards). In general, low-wage service industries account for the majority of wage and
hour violations.
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Figure 1.9: Regression Coefficients for Firm Size: Worker’s Likely Paid a Salary, Top 50%
Notes: Boxes are regression coefficient point estimates and lines are 95% confidence intervals. All results
are relative to the largest firm size category, +2,500 employment, for production and non-supervisory
workers. See Table A.2 column (2), bottom panel.
If the difference between hours worked and hours paid is indicative of employers
working low-wage workers more than they report, this should be concentrated in the
industries displayed in Table 1.11. To test this hypothesis, I create three indicator vari-
ables that evaluate to unity if an ACS respondent’s LEHD dominant job is in one of the
top ten, top five, or top three NAICS 3-digit industries by share of enforcement actions,
respectively. I fit equation 1.3 separately for each of the three indicator variables includ-
ing demographic, job, firm, and local labor market controls. The hypothesis is that the
progression to industries with higher concentrations of wage and hour violations should
yield increased incidence of off the clock work.
The results of this exercise are displayed in Table 1.12. The first column shows the
results of the indicator variable, denoted “High Incidence of Violation”, for the top ten
industries. The coefficient estimate is 0.0016 (0.0037), indicating workers report working
0.16% more hours in these industries, although with little precision. Moving to column (2)
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Figure 1.10: Regression Coefficients for Firm Size: Worker’s Likely Paid a Salary, Bottom
50%
Notes: Boxes are regression coefficient point estimates and lines are 95% confidence intervals. All results
are relative to the largest firm size category, +2,500 employment, for production and non-supervisory
workers. See Table A.2 column (2), top panel.
and concentrating on the top 5 industries, the estimate is now precise and 1.54% (0.0037)
higher than in other industries. Finally, column (3) focuses on the top 3 industries, which
account for over a third of enforcement actions. Again, the coefficient estimate is precise
and increases, as expected, with workers in these industries reporting working 3.04%
(0.0035) more than they are paid.
1.6 Conclusion
This study uses a unique dataset of person-level survey responses of hours worked linked
to the person’s employer reports of hours paid. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
first study in United States linking hours worked to administrative reports of hours paid
at the person-level. I interpret this as a measure of work off the clock. I use the measure
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Table 1.11: Industries with Largest Share of Wage and Hour Violations, 2010-2013
Share of Wage and
Hour Violations (%) Overall share (%), QCEW
Industry (NAICS, 3-digit) Actions Employees Establishments Employment
Food Services & Drinking Places (722) 22.8 22.6 6.5 8.9
Specialty Trade Contractors (238) 6.0 5.8 5.5 3.2
Administrative & Support Services (561) 5.9 10.2 5.1 6.8
Social Assistance (624) 5.2 3.6 3.6 2.4
Accommodation (721) 5.0 3.7 0.7 1.6
Nursing & Residential Care Facilities (623) 4.8 5.0 0.8 2.9
Ambulatory Health Care Services (621) 3.9 3.2 6.3 5.7
Gasoline Stations (447) 3.3 1.4 1.2 0.8
Food and Beverage Stores (445) 3.2 2.0 1.6 2.6
Construction of Buildings (236) 2.6 1.9 2.6 1.1
Total
Cumulative share of total (%) 62.6 59.4 33.9 36.1
Cumulative count 34,100 398,000
Mean count (2010-2013) 2,980,000 39,400,000
Notes: Wage and Hour violations from U.S. Department of Labor, Wage & Hour division. Sample is all compliance actions
with findings beginning and ending between 2010 and 2013, and where at least one wage and hour violation occurred.
Employees is share of all affected employees in actions with findings of at least one violation. Shares of establishments
and employment are the average shares between 2010-2013. Data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly
Census of Employment and Wages of all private establishments.
Table 1.12: Off the Clock Work by Industry
(1) (2) (3)
Top 10 Top 5 Top 3
High Incidence of Violation 0.0016 0.0154*** 0.0304***
(0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0035)
R2 0.137 0.137 0.138
Notes: N = 218, 000. Dependent variable is the difference between log
annual ACS hours calculated at 52 weeks and log annual LEHD hours.
“High Incidence of Violation” is an indicator variable, which evaluates
to unity if the LEHD dominant job is in the top 10, 5, or 3 NAICS 3-
digit industries ranked by incidence of wage and hour violations. See
Table 1.11 for ranking and details. All regressions estimated using OLS,
and include firm, job, demographic, and local labor market controls.
Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by state-firm. Stars on stan-
dard errors accord to p-values as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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to test various theories of employer-employee bargaining.
I differentiate efficiency wage and labor hoarding theories of hours bargaining by test-
ing the association of off the clock work with cross-section variation in local labor market
slack. The hypothesis that greater work time off the clock may have a significant impact
on measured productivity is not supported by the empirical findings of this study. The
results find support for labor hoarding, though the effect is small. I find further evidence
that the cyclical component of work off the clock is driven by low-skill workers likely
paid by the hour.
The results also contribute to the emerging literature on labor compliance, and specif-
ically on more explicit determinants of work off the clock. In line with previous studies,
I find evidence that smaller firms are more likely to have employees report higher hours
worked compared to hours paid. The results indicate that for the smallest firms, work off
the clock is driven by production and non-supervisory employees.
At a broader level this study argues that hours of work should become a more promi-
nent topic in labor economic research. The measurement of hours is important for the
study of wages and productivity, and the often times casual tracking of hours by firms
and workers leads to failures of labor market compliance. Finally, this paper also ad-
vises caution when using data on hours. The greater emphasis the economics profession
is placing on administrative data combined with casual hours reporting by firms may
produce misleading results when using administrative data on hours. More stringently
tracking hours worked for both hourly and non-hourly workers would be an appropriate
policy response. This will help both administrative data collection and analysis, and may
also have the beneficial effect of greater wage and hour compliance.
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CHAPTER 2
HOURS ADJUSTMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM LINKED EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
DATA
2.1 Introduction
Part-time employment represents a non-trivial segment of the United States labor market.
In June 2015, about 27.6 million individuals in the U.S. were working part-time, account-
ing for about 18.4% of employment.1 While the majority of part-time employment is
voluntary, about 24.6% is not.2 Further, since the early 2000s, part-time employment has
been on the rise, with almost all of the increase concentrated during the two recessions of
the 2000s (Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Full-Time and Part-Time Workers
Notes: Authors’ calculation from the basic monthly files of the Current Population Survey. All time series
are MA-smoothed.
1This statistics is calculated from the basic monthly files of the Current Population Survey. Part-time
employment is defined as workers who work less than 35 hours a week. See Kalleberg (2000) for a summary
on the rise in nonstandard employment relationships in the U.S.
2There are various reasons why individuals may seek part-time employment. Zabalza et al. (1980) show
that part-time work is important in understanding the behavior of workers around retirement. Part-time
employment allows for workers to partially withdrawal from the labor market by moving from full-time to
part-time. Higgins et al. (2000) analyze how women use part-time employment when balancing work and
life, noting that there are both good and bad part-time jobs.
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While much of the rise in part-time work after the 2001 recession was in voluntary
part-time work, this was not the case after the Great Recession. Figure 2.2 plots the share
of part-time employment attributed to involuntary part-time workers. Notice that invol-
untary part-time work increased drastically during the Great Recession and has remained
persistently high. While most of the variation in involuntary part-time work is cycli-
cal, Valletta et al. (2016) find that more persistent features of the labor market, mainly
changes in the industry employment shares of aggregate employment and population
demographics, are also important in explaining the rise in the incidence of involuntary
part-time work.3 This increase in involuntary part-time work is concerning because of
the disadvantages associated with this type of work arrangement for the employees who
hold these jobs.4
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Figure 2.2: Part-Time Employment by Type
Notes: Authors’ calculation from the basic monthly files of the Current Population Survey. All time series
are MA-smoothed.
3See Hijzen and Venn (2011), Valletta and Bengali (2013), Cajner et al. (2014), Canon et al. (2014),
Borowczyk-Martins and Lale´ (2015), and Valletta and van der List (2015) for further analyses on the re-
cent rise in involuntary part-time employment. There has also been interest on estimating the contribution
the Affordable Care Act has on this rise in part-time employment. Even and Macpherson (2015) finds that
the impact has been negligible.
4For example, Lettau (1997) documents that for the same job, part-time workers are paid a lower wage
rate than full-time workers. Further, part-time workers also receive much lower benefits per hour. Aaron-
son and French (2004) identify a part-time wage effect. They argue that an hours decline causes a wage
decline, resulting in a 25% wage penalty for men who cut their work week from 40 to 20 hours. They do
not find such an effect for women.
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To see how workers transition between full-time work, part-time work, and unem-
ployment, we match the CPS basic monthly files from month-to-month following the al-
gorithm of Shimer (2012). Figure 2.1 plots the transition rates from full-time employment,
part-time employment, and unemployment. First, notice that during the Great Reces-
sion, both full-time and part-time workers experienced a large increase in the probability
of entering unemployment. Further, the Great Recession had a pronounced impact on
the movement of full-time workers with a drastic decline in workers staying in full-time
employment and an increase in the movement of workers from full-time into part-time
employment. Finally, notice that, since the mid-2000s, part-time workers are less likely
to transition into full-time employment and more likely to stay in part-time work. Far-
ber (1999a) shows that job losers are significantly more likely than non-job losers to be
in both temporary and involuntary part-time jobs. Further, he also finds evidence that
temporary and involuntary part-time jobs are part of a transitional process back to regu-
lar full-time employment after job loss. Thus, this decline in mobility between full-time
and part-time employment may have long-term consequences for workers who lost jobs
in this last recession.
While these statistics from the CPS highlight the importance of understanding the
growing role of part-time employment in the U.S., it is unclear how firms decide to hire a
worker into a full-time position. Do firms have a tendency to increase hours of work from
part-time to full-time employment if they need more full-time workers? Or are part-time
and full-time positions treated as separate workforces, resulting in firms hiring a new
worker to fill a new full-time position? To start such a discussion, we provide the first
look at administrative data on hours worked within firms.5
5These questions are similar to the ones analyzed in studies on the different types of adjustment costs
firms face. However, these studies largely rely on firm level data from manufacturers. See, for example,
Hamermesh (1989b), Hamermesh and Pfann (1996), Caballero et al. (1997), Hall (2004), Cooper et al. (2004),
Cooper et al. (2007), Cooper and Willis (2009), Lee and Mukoyama (2012). As our analysis will show,
manufacturing firms are quite different from those in the service industries.
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Figure 2.3: Transitions to and from Full-Time and Part-Time Employment
Notes: Authors’ calculation from the basic monthly files of the Current Population Survey. Monthly files
are matched following the algorithm in Shimer (2012). All time series are MA-smoothed.
First, we document the extent of part-time work across industries. As observed in
household surveys, we confirm that part-time work is concentrated in in the relatively
low-wage service sectors. Next, we take advantage of the longitudinal nature of our
dataset and analyze the prevalence of transitions between part-time and full-time work
within the same job.6 We show that the share of new full-time or part-time jobs that are
created due to within job hours changes varies greatly across industries.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data
and presents some basic descriptive statistics on the dataset. Section 2.3 discusses how
the composition of part-time and full-time jobs differs across industries. Section 2.4 de-
fines the transitions of workers into full-time and part-time work used to decompose jobs
within a period by the origin employment state of the worker. The section presents results
6There is a large body of work that studies worker and job flows. See, for example, Davis and Halti-
wanger (1990), Davis and Haltiwanger (1999), Burgess et al. (2000), Davis et al. (2012), Lazear and Spletzer
(2012). We add an hours dimensions and analyze how workers flow into part-time and full-time jobs.
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on how the relative importance of these different channels on creating new full-time and
part-time jobs differs across industries. Finally, section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data
To understand how transitions into and out of part-time jobs differs across industries, we
use linked employer-employee administrative data from the U.S. Census Bureau. The
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data are a result of the Local Em-
ployment Dynamics (LED) partnership between state partners and the U.S. Census Bu-
reau. State partners provide the U.S. Census Bureau with linked employer-employee
earnings records from state-administered unemployment insurance programs. At its
core, the Employment History File (EHF) is a job-based frame, which consists of an em-
ployer identifier, an employee identifier, year, quarter, and gross quarterly earnings for
the employee. The data allow us to track jobs, workers, and/or firms over time as well
as worker’s job-to-job transitions. States also provide characteristics on employers, and
the U.S. Census Bureau leverages its own data to create a file of employee characteristics
including age, sex, race, ethnicity and education. The LEHD programs uses the microdata
to produce public-use data products. Unless otherwise noted, for everything that follows,
we use the underlying confidential microdata.7
In addition to the core infrastructure files, which make-up the LEHD microdata, four
states provide data on gross quarterly hours worked. The state are Washington, Min-
nesota, Rhode Island, and Oregon. Washington and Minnesota begin reporting hours
from the early 1990s, Rhode Island begins reporting quarterly hours to the Census Bu-
reau in 2009Q4, and Oregon begins reporting hours in 2011Q1. Although we have hours
data from Washington going as far back as 1990Q1, all results using this hours data must
7See Abowd et al. (2009) for the full documentation of the LEHD infrastructure files.
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Table 2.1: LEHD States with Employer Reported Hours
State First YYYY:Q Last YYYY:Q Jobs Jobs (%) GDP Growth (%) ∆ u rate
2012:2 QWI Employment 2009:4 - 2013:4
Washington 1990:1 2013:4 2,759,995 2.15 1.79 -3.77
Oregon 2011:1 2013:4 1,592,991 1.24 2.13 -3.60
Minnesota 1998:1 2013:4 2,618,048 2.04 2.13 -3.27
Rhode Island 2009:4 2013:4 436,278 0.34 0.41 -2.17
United States 1.77 -3.0
Notes: Minnesota has a hole in hours reporting from 2002:1 to 2008:1. Data for jobs and share
of jobs come the 2016Q1 vintage of the Quarterly Work Force Indicators from the U.S. Census
Bureau. GDP growth is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Economic Accounts.
Changes in unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemploy-
ment Statistics program. Real GDP growth is calculated at an annualized rate.
be from 2009Q4 onwards. This is because, as part of the LED partnership, all results us-
ing the LEHD microdata must use at least three states in order to be released. Table 2.1
summarizes the span of hours reporting for each state.
Although a small portion of jobs, the four hours reporting states are broadly repre-
sentative of the labor market recovery. The fourth and fifth columns of Table 2.1 show
beginning-quarter employment for each hours reporting state from the Quarterly Work-
force Indicators (QWI) for 2012Q2. Due to the significant seasonality in part-time work,
we use the second quarter as the reference quarter to eliminate skewed results due to
the holiday season (quarter four), or the summer (quarter three). The hours reporting
states unsurprisingly represent a small share of jobs, with Washington being the highest
in our sample accounting for 2.15% of national employment. Our sample spans 2009Q4
to 2013Q4, which roughly corresponds to the labor market trough of the Great Recession
with the following four years of the recovery. Column 5 of Table 2.1 shows annualized
real GDP growth rates for the four states and for the United States. With the exception of
Rhode Island, the other three hours reporting states saw GDP growth roughly in line with
the U.S. as a whole. Column 6 shows the ensuing decline in unemployment rates in the
hours reporting states. Again, Rhode Island is the outlier with the other hours reporting
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states seeing slightly larger declines in their unemployment rates compared to the U.S. as
a whole.
Figure 2.4: Industry Composition of Employment, 2012
Notes: Authors’ analysis of Quarterly Work Force Indicators (QWI) from the U.S. Census Bureau. Hours
States include Minnesota, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington. “No Hours States” include remaining
states plus the District of Columbia. Beginning-Quarter Employment is the definition of a job. Final
sample is the released LEHD analysis sample with full-quarter employment the definition of a job.
The job composition of the hours reporting states is also broadly reflective of the U.S.
job composition. Figure 2.2 shows the share of beginning-quarter jobs from the QWI
in each NAICS sector by the pooled hours reporting states and the rest of the United
States plus the District of Columbia. Again, we use 2012Q2 as the reference quarter. The
distribution of jobs across industries is relatively close to the remaining states. The hours
reporting states have a greater percentage of jobs in manufacturing and health care, with
the remaining jobs almost uniformly distributed across the remaining NAICS sectors.
The result is slightly less jobs in the remaining sectors. Combined with GDP growth
and the change in unemployment rates, the composition of jobs indicates that the four
hours reporting states are not inconsistent with the labor market composition of the U.S.
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in general.
2.2.1 Sample Construction
Unlike the LEHD infrastructure files, which are actively curated and cleaned by dedicated
staff, the hours records have not been subjected to the same level of quality assurance. The
precise details regarding the cleaning of the hours data prior to constructing our analysis
sample are described in an unreleased, confidential Appendix.8 After this initial data
cleaning, we aggregate the hours and earnings information to the PIK-YEAR-QUARTER-
SEIN level. This means that a firm in our analysis is defined as an SEIN and a job is a
PIK-SEIN pair.9
We limit the analysis to stable employees, using the definition of full-quarter employ-
ment in Abowd et al. (2009) to select for such jobs. Specifically, let yi, j,t be earnings paid to
person i at firm j in period t, where t is a year-quarter. A person i is full quarter employee
at a firm j in a period t if he is employed at that same job the period before and the period
after:
fi, j,t =

1 if yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0
0 otherwise
After identifying full-quarter employees at a firm j in period t, we then further restrict the
sample to individuals age 18-70 in the period of full-quarter employment.10 Limiting our
analysis to only full-quarter employees is certainly restrictive, especially since part-time
jobs may include temporary positions that do not last more than a few months. However,
given that we do not know the precise start and end dates of jobs, this restriction means
8In general, the quality of the hours data are quite good, and they have an exceptional degree of corre-
spondence to the main infrastructure files.
9This only affects records in MN, which are reported at the PIK-YEAR-QUARTER-SEIN-SEINUNIT
level. For the other three states, the records are already at the PIK-YEAR-QUARTER-SEIN level.
10Note that applying the age restriction after the full-quarter employment restriction means that an indi-
vidual can be a full-quarter employee at age 18 and at age 70.
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we are less likely to mistakenly classify an employee as being part-time due to being
only partially employed in a quarter than if we were to include all workers with positive
earnings in our analysis.
The cut-off for full-time versus part-time work is important for all results to follow.
We denote a job with less than 400 hours in a quarter as a part-time job, and any job
greater than or equal to 400 hours a full-time job. We selected the cut-off to minimize
the number of full-time jobs wrongly classified as part-time, with the trade-off that some
part-time jobs will in some quarters be denoted as full-time. Misclassification arises due
to fluctuations in the number of weeks per quarter. This affects workers who are paid
either on a weekly or a bi-weekly basis—a large share of employees in the U.S. In March
2013, Burgess (2014) finds that 36.5% of U.S. private business pay their employees bi-
weekly and 32.4% pay their employees weekly. For workers paid on a weekly basis, the
number of pay periods per quarter fluctuations between 12, 13, and 14. For workers paid
on a bi-weekly basis, the number of pay periods per quarter fluctuates between 6 and
7, or between 12 and 14 weeks of paid work. The Current Population Survey denotes
anyone who works less than 35 hours per week as part-time. An individual employed
at 34 hours a week in a 12 week quarter works 408 hours. Therefore, we set our cut-off
for part-time work at 400 hours per quarter. Using 400 hours as a cut-off, we preclude
any full-time workers from misclassification, but part-time workers who work the full
quarter and with usual weekly hours between 29-33 will fluctuate between full- and part-
time depending on the weeks paid in the quarter. In general, there is no “right” cut-off at
quarterly frequencies. We find using 400 hours results in a reasonable split between full-
and part-time jobs, and we include sensitivity checks for our results.
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2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.2 presents aggregate statistics on hours worked for the jobs in our sample from
2011Q1 to 2013Q4. Specially, we report the quarterly counts of firms, workers, and jobs;
the total earnings paid and total hours worked across all jobs; and hours worked per job
and hours worked per worker. Notice that the worker and job counts do not match and
hours worked per worker is always higher than hours worked per job. This is because
individuals in our dataset can and do hold multiple jobs in a quarter. While there is a lot
of seasonal variation in employment, jobs, and hours that we make no attempt to correct
for here, the year-over-year changes in quarter 2 highlight the labor market recovery with
employment, jobs, and total hours worked all increasing. Notice however that hours per
job and hours per worker have remained fairly constant.
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics on Analysis Sample
YYYY:Q Firms Workers Jobs Total Earnings Total Hours Hours per Job Hours per Worker
2011:Q1 261,000 4,440,000 4,700,000 $60,000 1,920 408 432
2011:Q2 349,000 5,710,000 6,010,000 $74,000 2,610 434 456
2011:Q3 356,000 5,750,000 6,050,000 $77,700 2,660 439 462
2011:Q4 348,000 5,710,000 6,010,000 $77,300 2,610 434 457
2012:Q1 348,000 5,790,000 6,110,000 $78,800 2,580 422 446
2012:Q2 352,000 5,790,000 6,100,000 $76,000 2,650 435 458
2012:Q3 358,000 5,850,000 6,160,000 $77,700 2,630 426 449
2012:Q4 347,000 5,800,000 6,100,000 $80,400 2,660 436 459
2013:Q1 348,000 5,860,000 6,180,000 $79,900 2,600 421 444
2013:Q2 352,000 5,840,000 6,150,000 $77,000 2,670 434 457
2013:Q3 358,000 5,890,000 6,210,000 $79,600 2,660 428 452
2013:Q4 349,000 5,710,000 6,010,000 $79,700 2,630 438 461
Notes: Columns 1, 2, and 3 report the counts of firms (SEIN), workers (PIK), and jobs (PIK-
SEIN) in our sample across the four states that report hours. Columns 4 and 5 report the sum
of earnings paid ($1,000,000 dollars) and hours worked (1,000,000 hours) across all jobs. Note
that earnings are reported in real 2013Q1 dollars, deflated using the CPI. Column 6 reports
hours worked per job, which is computed as the ratio of total hours worked and total number
of jobs. Column 7 reports hours worked per worker, which is computed as the ratio of total
hours worked and total number of workers. All numbers are rounded to three significant
digits.
Table 2.3 presents the same statistics as in the aggregate table but by NAICS sector for
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2012, averaged over the four quarters.11 Figure 2.2 compares the industry composition of
the jobs in our analysis sample to those reported in QWI for the hours reporting states. In
terms of the distribution of jobs across industries, selecting for full-quarter employment
does not drastically change the industry composition of our jobs. Notice that hours per job
varies a lot across industries from 335 hours per job (Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation)
to 556 hours per job (Mining). The five NAICS sectors with the highest and lowest hours
per job are:
Sectors with highest hours per job
556 hrs 21 Mining
516 hrs 31-33 Manufacturing
512 hrs 22 Utilities
493 hrs 42 Wholesale Trade
489 hrs 52 Finance and Insurance
Sectors with lowest hours per job
335 hrs 71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
340 hrs 82 Other Services
344 hrs 72 Accommodation and Food Services
358 hrs 61 Educational Services
410 hrs 62 Health Care and Social Assistance
Recall that our cutoff for part-time is set at 400 hours per quarter. Notice that almost all
of NAICS sectors with the lowest hours per job are below this cutoff, while all the NAICS
sectors with the highest hours per job are well above this cutoff. To better understand the
role part-time jobs play in each of these industries, we classify our jobs into part-time and
full-time jobs.
11See Table B.2 for some basic industry statistics from the 2012 Economic Census for reference.
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2.3 Part-Time and Full-Time Jobs
As discussed in Section 2.2, we define part-time jobs as those where the employee worked
less than 400 hours in a quarter. Specifically, let hi, j,t be hours worked by individual i at
firm j in period t. This individual is a part-time employee in period t if he is working less
than 400 hours during his period of full-quarter employment. Otherwise, he is a full-time
employee.
PTi, j,t =

1 if yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0 and hi, j,t < 400
0 otherwise
FTi, j,t =

1 if yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0 and hi, j,t ≥ 400
0 otherwise
Table 2.4 presents statistics on part-time and full-time jobs in our final sample of jobs.
About 30.55% of jobs each quarter are part-time, which account for about 15.65% of hours
worked. Since we restrict our analysis to full-quarter employees, we are going to miss
short-term jobs that are likely to be part-time. Therefore, the share of jobs that are part-
time reported in Table 2.4 is likely to be a lower bound. Looking at year-over-year changes
we see that full-time work, both in terms of the number of jobs and the number of hours,
has been increasing. On the other hand, part-time work seems to have plateaued. There
was growth in terms of both jobs and hours from 2011Q2 to 2012Q2, but none from
2012Q2 to 2013Q2. Once again, hours per job for both full-time and part-time jobs re-
mains fairly constant.
The above statistics were also computed by NAICS sector in 2012, averaged over the
four quarters (Table 2.5). Across industries, there is a large amount of variation in the
fraction of jobs that are part-time, from as low as 8.29% (Utilities) to 58.7% (Accommoda-
tion and Food Services). Figure 2.5 plots the share of jobs that are full-time and part-time
by industry. For all the industry level plots in this paper, the NAICS sectors are organized
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Table 2.4: Part-Time vs. Full-Time Jobs in Analysis Sample
Share Total Total Share Hours per Hours per
YYYY:Q FT Jobs PT Jobs PT Jobs FT Hours PT Hours PT Hours FT Job PT Job
2011:Q1 3,130 1,580 33.5% 1,580,000 342,000 17.8% 505 217
2011:Q2 4,210 1,800 29.9% 2,200,000 405,000 15.6% 523 225
2011:Q3 4,230 1,830 30.2% 2,280,000 379,000 14.3% 539 207
2011:Q4 4,220 1,790 29.8% 2,210,000 403,000 15.4% 523 226
2012:Q1 4,150 1,960 32.1% 2,150,000 427,000 16.6% 518 218
2012:Q2 4,280 1,820 29.8% 2,240,000 412,000 15.5% 523 227
2012:Q3 4,230 1,930 31.4% 2,220,000 411,000 15.6% 524 213
2012:Q4 4,330 1,760 28.9% 2,260,000 398,000 15.0% 522 226
2013:Q1 4,200 1,980 32.1% 2,160,000 439,000 16.9% 515 222
2013:Q2 4,330 1,820 29.6% 2,260,000 411,000 15.4% 522 226
2013:Q3 4,300 1,910 30.8% 2,250,000 405,000 15.2% 524 212
2013:Q4 4,300 1,710 28.5% 2,250,000 382,000 14.5% 523 223
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the number of full-time and part-time jobs (1,000 jobs) in our sample. Column 3 reports
the share of jobs that are part-time. Columns 4 and 5 report the total hours worked (1,000 hours) in full-time and part-
time jobs. Column 6 reports the share of hours worked at part-time jobs. Columns 7 and 8 report totals hours worked
per full-time and per part-time job.
and color-coded following the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ further aggregation of NAICS
sectors into groupings called “Supersectors.”12 The five NAICS sectors with the highest
and lowest shares of part-time jobs are listed below.
Sectors with highest share of part-time jobs
58.7% 72 Accommodation and Food Services
51.4% 81 Other Services
51.2% 71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
49.1% 61 Educational Services
36.6% 62 Health Care and Social Assistance
Sectors with lowest share of part-time jobs
8.29% 22 Utilities
8.97% 31-33 Manufacturing
10.0% 21 Mining
10.4% 55 Management of Companies and Enterprises
11.8% 52 Finance and Insurance
The above results confirm what has already been noted in household surveys, that
part-time employment tends to be concentrated in the service sectors. In the next section,
we take advantage of the longitudinal structure of LEHD and analyze the work histories
of the part-time and full-time employees to shed insight on if and how transitions into
part-time and full-time jobs are similar or different.
12See Table B.1 for the aggregation. See also http://www.bls.gov/sae/saesuper.htm.
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(a) Full-Time (b) Part-Time
Figure 2.5: Fraction of Jobs Full-Time and Part-Time by Industry
Notes: The figures plot the fraction of jobs that are full-time and the fraction of jobs that are part-time by
industry in 2012. The counts of full-time and part-time jobs are first averaged over the quarters, then shares
were computed.
2.4 Transition Dynamics of Part-Time and Full-Time Jobs
To start, we first present the precise definitions of the transitions used to decompose the
employees in a period t by how they came to be employed in their part-time or full-time
position. Recall that an person i is a stable employee at a firm j in a period t if he is
employed for the full quarter:
fi, j,t =

1 if yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0
0 otherwise
In a period t, stable employees at a firm j can be decomposed by either tracking where
they came from or where they are moving to. In particular, we can classify workers by
the transitions they made from t − 2 to t − 1, how they flowed into stable employment at
a firm, or by their transitions from t + 1 to t + 2, how they flow out of stable employment
at a firm.
Starting with the transitions from t − 2 to t − 1, a worker who is stable employed at
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a firm j in period t can either be a new hire or a stayer. Specifically, an individual i is a
stable new hire at a firm j in period t if he is full-quarter employed in period t, but was
not working at firm j in period t − 2:
hires,ini, j,t (t − 1|t − 2) =

1 if yi, j,t−2 = 0 and yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0
0 otherwise
And an individual i is a stable stayer at a firm j in period t if he is full-quarter employed
in period t and was working in period t − 2:
stayers,ini, j,t (t − 1|t − 2) =

1 if yi, j,t−2 > 0 and yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0
0 otherwise
Similarly, tracking the transitions of workers from t + 1 to t + 2, stable workers can either
be leavers in period t or stayers. Specifically, an individual i is a stable leaver at a firm j
in period t if he is full-quarter employed in period t, but is no longer working for firm j
in period t + 2:
leavers,outi, j,t (t + 2|t + 1) =

1 if yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0 and yi, j,t+2 = 0
0 otherwise
Finally, an individual i is a stable stayer at a firm j in period t if he is full-quarter employed
in period t and is also working in period t + 2:
stayers,outi, j,t (t + 2|t + 1) =

1 if yi, j,t−2 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0 and yi, j,t+2 > 0
0 otherwise
These stable transitions are summarized in Table 2.6 below.
Define N j,t as employment at firm j in period t, andN j,t as the set of full-quarter work-
ers i employed at firm j in period t. The above transitions allow us to decompose the
stable workforce at a firm j at time t in two ways:
N j,t =
∑
i∈N j,t
1{hires,ini, j,t (t − 1|t − 2) = 1} +
∑
i∈N j,t
1{stayers,ini, j,t (t − 1|t − 2) = 1}
=
∑
i∈N j,t
1{leavers,outi, j,t (t + 2|t + 1) = 1} +
∑
i∈N j,t
1{stayers,outi, j,t (t + 2|t + 1) = 1}
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Table 2.6: Stable Worker Transitions
t − 2 t − 1 t t + 1 t + 2
fi, j,t —– yi, j,t−1 > 0 yi, j,t > 0 yi, j,t+1 > 0 —–
hires,ini, j,t (t − 1|t − 2) yi, j,t−2 = 0 yi, j,t−1 > 0 yi, j,t > 0 yi, j,t+1 > 0 —–
stayers,ini, j,t (t − 1|t − 2) yi, j,t−2 > 0 yi, j,t−1 > 0 yi, j,t > 0 yi, j,t+1 > 0 —–
leavers,outi, j,t (t + 2|t + 1) —– yi, j,t−1 > 0 yi, j,t > 0 yi, j,t+1 > 0 yi, j,t+2 = 0
stayers,outi, j,t (t + 2|t + 1) —– yi, j,t−1 > 0 yi, j,t > 0 yi, j,t+1 > 0 yi, j,t+2 > 0
Notes: Decomposing the stable workers at a firm j in period t based on either inflows
from t − 2 to t − 1 or outflows from t + 1 to t + 2.
where 1{·} is the indicator function. Given this decomposition of the workforce, we can
rewrite the total labor input at a firm j in period t, H j,t ≡ ∑i∈N j,t hi, j,t , in the following
way:
H j,t =
∑
i∈N j,t
[
1{hires,ini, j,t (t − 1|t − 2) = 1}hi, j,t + 1{stayers,ini, j,t (t − 1|t − 2) = 1}hi, j,t
]
=
∑
i∈N j,t
[
1{leavers,outi, j,t (t + 2|t + 1) = 1}hi, j,t + 1{stayers,outi, j,t (t + 2|t + 1) = 1}hi, j,t
]
This decomposition allows us to decompose jobs and hours worked into those attributed
to new hires and those attributed to workers who were already employed at the firm.
Using hours and work history information, these transitions can be further decom-
posed into movements into full-time and part-time employment. Specifically, given the
hours worked in time t, new hires can be decomposed into hires into part-time employ-
ment and hires into full-time employment. Further, given the longitudinal structure of
LEHD, we can also track whether the worker was employed at another firm in the pe-
riod prior to hiring. If the worker made positive earnings elsewhere in the quarter prior
to being hired by firm j, we say the worker was hired from employment. If not, then
the worker was hired from nonemployment. Leavers to employment or nonemployment
from part-time and full-time jobs are defined similarly. Finally, stayers are workers with
two consecutive quarters of full-quarter employment. Given the hours information in
both these quarter, we can infer the transition dynamics of these workers between full-
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time and part-time employment. The exact definitions of these detailed transitions are in
Appendix B.1, however they are also summarized in Table 2.7 below.
Table 2.7: Worker Transitions Supplemented with Hours and
Work History Information
t − 2 t − 1 t
PTi, j,t —– —– hi, j,t < 400
FTi, j,t —– —– hi, j,t ≥ 400
Full-Time Employment: FTi, j,t = 1
hires,ini, j,t (FT|E) yi, j′,t−2 > 0, j′ , j —– hires,ini, j,t = 1
hires,in,ui, j,t (FT|NE) yi, j′,t−2 = 0,∀ j′ —– hires,ini, j,t = 1
stayers,ini, j,t (FT|PT) —– hi, j,t−1 < 400 stayers,ini, j,t = 1
stayers,ini, j,t (FT|FT) —– hi, j,t−1 ≥ 400 stayers,ini, j,t = 1
Part-Time Employment: PTi, j,t = 1
hires,ini, j,t (PT|E) yi, j′,t−2 > 0, j′ , j —– hires,ini, j,t = 1
hires,in,ui, j,t (PT|NE) yi, j′,t−2 = 0,∀ j′ —– hires,ini, j,t = 1
stayers,ini, j,t (PT|PT) —– hi, j,t−1 < 400 stayers,ini, j,t = 1
stayers,ini, j,t (PT|FT) —– hi, j,t−1 ≥ 400 stayers,ini, j,t = 1
Notes: Decomposing the stable workers at a firm j in period t based on
either inflows from t−2 to t−1 or outflows from t+1 to t+2 while incorpo-
rating information on both hours worked and the worker’s employment
history.
Before decomposing employment in each industry by all possible origin states, we
start by presenting statistics on new hires. In particular, Table 2.8 reports the fraction
of new hires that are to full-time jobs and the complementary fraction of new hires that
are to part-time jobs. Pooled, new hires are about evenly split between full-time and
part-time jobs: 54.6% of new hires are to full-time jobs and 45.5% are to part-time jobs.
However, this mix between full-time and part-time jobs among new hires varies quite a
bit by industry (Figure 2.6). The sectors with the highest and lowest share of new hires
that are to part-time jobs are:
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Sectors with highest share of hires to PT
71.0% 72 Accommodation and Food Services
69.3% 61 Educational Services
68.6% 71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
62.6% 81 Other Serives
53.5% 44-45 Retail Trade
Sectors with lowest share of hires to PT
12.4% 55 Management of Companies and Enterprises
13.5% 21 Mining
16.3% 31-33 Manufacturing
16.8% 52 Finance and Insurance
19.2% 22 Utilities
Notice that the differences between sectors in the fraction of new hires that are part-time
jobs is very similar to the fraction of jobs in an industry that are part-time. In other words,
the general shape of Figure 2.6 mimics that of Figure 2.5.
Table 2.8: Fraction of New Hires Full-Time and Part-Time by Industry
Code Industry Title Full-Time Jobs Part-Time Jobs
Aggregate 54.6% 45.4%
11 Agriculture 55.2% 44.8%
21 Mining 86.5% 13.5%
22 Utilities 80.8% 19.2%
23 Construction 64.4% 35.6%
31-33 Manufacturing 83.7% 16.3%
42 Wholesale Trade 79.4% 20.6%
44-45 Retail Trade 46.5% 53.5%
48-49 Transportation and Warehousing 65.4% 34.6%
51 Information 76.7% 23.3%
52 Finance and Insurance 83.2% 16.8%
53 Real Estate Rental and Leasing 58.7% 41.3%
54 Professional Services 73.7% 26.3%
55 Management of Companies 87.6% 12.4%
56 Administrative Support 59.7% 40.3%
61 Educational Services 30.7% 69.3%
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 51.1% 48.9%
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 31.4% 68.6%
72 Accommodation and Food Services 29.0% 71.0%
81 Other Services 37.4% 62.6%
92 Public Administration 59.1% 40.9%
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the percentage of new hires that are full-time and part-time,
respectively. Note that each row sums to 100%.
Table 2.9 provides the aggregate decomposition of full-time and part-time jobs into
hires and stayers.13 The percent of jobs that are new hires is about twice as high for part-
time jobs (13.3%) than it is for full-time jobs (7.01%). This is consistent with part-time
13The transitions to full-time employment are plotted in Figure B.1. The transitions to part-time employ-
ment are plotted in Figure B.2.
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Figure 2.6: Fraction of New Hires that are Part-Time by Industry
Notes: This figure plots the fraction of new hires that are to part-time jobs by NAICS sector.
jobs being more transient and temporary than full-time jobs. This ordering that a higher
fraction of part-time jobs tends to be new hires also holds within industries (Table 2.10).
Table 2.9: Transitions of Full-Time and Part-Time Em-
ployees
Full-Time Jobs Part-Time Jobs
Number of jobs 4,250,000 1,870,000
(69.40%) (30.60%)
% of jobs new hires 7.01% 13.3%
% of jobs stayers 92.99% 86.7%
Notes: Row 1 reports the number of jobs in 2012, averaged over
the quarters, that are full-time and part-time. The shares are re-
ported in parentheses. Row 2 reports the percentage of full-time
and part-time jobs that are new hires, respectively. Row 3 reports
the percentage of full-time and part-time jobs that are stayers.
Note that rows 2 and 3 sum to 100%.
Employment can be further decomposed using hours and work history information.
See Table 2.10 for the full set of transitions into full-time and part-time work by industry.
Pooled, 85.1% of full-time jobs are continuations of an existing full-time job, while 68.6%
of part-time jobs are continuations of an existing part-time job. This means that full-
time work is a more persistent employment state than part-time work. Once again, this
72
observation also holds within industry.
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What is perhaps more interesting is the relative importance of the extensive and in-
tensive margin when it comes to the newly hired full-time and part-time workers. Ta-
ble 2.11 presents the fraction of new full-time (part-time) jobs that comes from increases
(decreases) in hours for an already existing job and the fraction that comes from new
hires either from employment or nonemployment.14 Pooled, the extensive versus inten-
sive margin of creating new full-time or part-time jobs seem equally important: 52.9% of
new full-time jobs come from a within job increase in hours, while 57.3% of new part-time
jobs come from a within job decrease in hours. This relative importance of the two mar-
gins does vary by industry. For full-time jobs, the fraction of new full-time jobs that are
within job hours changes varies from 32.4% (Wholesale Trade) to 83.7% (Educational Ser-
vices). The sectors with the highest and lowest share of new full-time jobs coming from
within jobs increases in hours are:
Sectors with highest share of PT to FT
83.7% 61 Educational Services
64.8% 92 Public Administration
62.2% 62 Health Care and Social Assistance
61.0% 72 Accommodation and Food Services
59.3% 22 Utilities
Sectors with lowest share of PT to FT
32.4% 42 Wholesale Trade
32.5% 56 Administrative Support, Waste Management, Rem.
33.6% 51 Information
34.2% 54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
34.4% 21 Mining
The sectors with the highest and lowest share of new full-time jobs coming from within
jobs increases in hours are:
Sectors with highest share of PT to FT
83.7% 61 Educational Services
64.8% 92 Public Administration
62.2% 62 Health Care and Social Assistance
61.0% 72 Accommodation and Food Services
59.3% 22 Utilities
Sectors with lowest share of PT to FT
32.4% 42 Wholesale Trade
32.5% 56 Administrative Support, Waste Management, Rem.
33.6% 51 Information
34.2% 54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
34.4% 21 Mining
14See Figure B.3 for the corresponding plots.
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When hiring new full-time workers along the extensive margin, few industries dis-
play a higher tendency to hire from nonemployment rather than from employment.15
However, some industries do seem to have a higher tendency to hire from employment
rather than from nonemployment. The top five industries that are more likely to hire from
employment when using the extensive margin are:
Sectors with largest difference between E to FT and NE to FT
36.9% − 20.3% = 16.6% 48-49 Transportation and Warehousing
39.3% − 24.0% = 15.3% 52 Finance and Insurance
40.4% − 27.3% = 13.1% 42 Wholesale Trade
37.7% − 25.0% = 12.7% 53 Real Estate Rental and Leasing
35.3% − 24.4% = 10.9% 31-33 Manufacturing
For part-time jobs, the fraction of new part-time jobs that are within job hours changes
varies from 35.3% (Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation) to 86.5% (Utilities). The sec-
tors with the highest and lowest share of new part-time jobs coming from within jobs
decreases in hours are:
Sectors with highest share of FT to PT
86.5% 22 Utilities
81.1% 55 Management of Companies
78.3% 31-33 Manufacturing
77.6% 21 Mining
74.1% 52 Finance and Insurance
Sectors with lowest share of FT to PT
35.3% 71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
37.4% 81 Other Services
37.8% 72 Accommodation and Food Services
41.5% 56 Administrative Support, Waste Management, Rem.
45.4% 53 Real Estate Rental and Leasing
Unlike hiring for new full-time jobs where some industries have a tendency to hire from
employment, new hires for part-time jobs are almost just as likely to come from employ-
ment as they are to come from nonemployment. Therefore, job-to-job transitions into
full-time employment probably have a job ladder motive while those to part-time jobs do
not.16
Finally, Table 2.12 reports the hours per job associated with each transition to full-time
and part-time work. While new hires and individuals who stay in their employment state
(FT to FT or PT to PT) work about the same number of hours per job, workers who change
15Mining is the only one with 26.2% of new full-time jobs being hires from employment and 39.4% being
hires from nonemployment.
16See Topel and Ward (1992) and Farber (1999b).
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Table 2.11: New Transitions to Full-Time and Part-Time Employment
Transitions to New FT Transitions to New PT
Code Industry Title PT to FT E to FT NE to FT FT to PT E to PT NE to PT
Aggregate 52.9% 25.7% 21.4% 57.3% 21.7% 21.0%
11 Agriculture 48.2% 25.8% 26.1% 53.9% 25.4% 20.7%
21 Mining 34.4% 26.2% 39.4% 77.6% 7.77% 14.7%
22 Utilities 59.3% 25.0% 15.6% 86.5% 6.29% 7.18%
23 Construction 48.8% 25.4% 25.8% 63.6% 17.0% 19.4%
31-33 Manufacturing 40.3% 35.3% 24.4% 78.3% 10.2% 11.5%
42 Wholesale Trade 32.4% 40.4% 27.3% 65.6% 16.5% 17.9%
44-45 Retail Trade 56.2% 22.6% 21.3% 53.0% 21.3% 25.7%
48-49 Transportation and Warehousing 42.9% 36.9% 20.3% 57.6% 23.7% 18.8%
51 Information 33.6% 34.9% 31.5% 62.7% 18.8% 18.5%
52 Finance and Insurance 36.6% 39.3% 24.0% 74.1% 13.7% 12.2%
53 Real Estate Rental and Leasing 37.3% 37.7% 25.0% 45.4% 27.8% 26.9%
54 Professional Services 34.2% 35.5% 30.3% 59.9% 18.3% 21.8%
55 Management of Companies 37.0% 30.3% 32.7% 81.1% 9.34% 9.56%
56 Administrative Support 32.5% 35.8% 31.7% 41.5% 28.9% 29.6%
61 Educational Services 83.7% 6.91% 9.34% 67.7% 14.6% 17.7%
62 Health Care and Social Assistance 62.2% 21.3% 16.5% 63.7% 20.4% 15.9%
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 54.4% 21.6% 24.0% 35.3% 35.4% 29.3%
72 Accommodation and Food Services 61.0% 21.0% 18.1% 37.8% 33.1% 29.1%
81 Other Services 50.7% 26.4% 22.9% 37.4% 35.7% 26.9%
92 Public Administration 64.8% 19.3% 16.0% 73.2% 13.3% 13.5%
Notes: The denominator for transitions to new full-time jobs is the sum of new hires (either from employment or nonemploy-
ment) and stayers who transition from part-time to full-time employment. The denominator for transitions to new part-time
jobs is the sum of new hires (either from employment or nonemployment) and stayers who transition from full-time to part-
time employment.
hours within a jobs do not. In particular, workers who transition from part-time to full-
time within a job work slightly fewer hours per job than do the rest of full-time workers.
And workers who transition from full-time to part-time within a job work slightly many
more hours per job than do the rest of part-time workers. Consistent with other studies on
hours adjustments, between job hours changes (new hires) are much higher than within
job hours changes.17
17See Altonji and Paxson (1986, 1988).
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Given these differences in hours worked per job for intensive versus extensive margin
changes, addition analysis would need to be done to ensure that the intensive margin
changes are not due to changes in classification. However, the differences are quite large
and hours worked per job for these intensive margin changes are around 100 hours above
and below the cutoff. This is a fairly substantial number of hours worked in a quarter,
making it unlikely that all of these intensive margin changes are due to misclassification.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper uses administrative data on hours worked from LEHD to study how workers
transition into part-time and full-time jobs. We confirm that part-time jobs are particularly
concentrated in relatively low-paying service sectors, while full-time jobs are concentrat-
ing in high-paying sectors like manufacturing. While part-time jobs face higher turnover
than full-time jobs, not all part-time work appears to be temporary hires. In some in-
dustries, the most likely channel through which workers enter full-time employment is
through part-time work. While in others, workers are more likely to be new hires. Thus,
this paper highlights how worker transitions into full-time and part-time work differs
greatly across industries.
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CHAPTER 3
TOTAL ERROR AND VARIABILITY MEASURES WITH INTEGRATED
DISCLOSURE LIMITATION FOR QUARTERLY WORKFORCE INDICATORS AND
LEHD ORIGIN DESTINATION EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS IN ONTHEMAP
3.1 Introduction and Summary
We compute the first comprehensive estimates of total variation for two Longitudi-
nal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) products from the U.S. Census Bureau:
the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI), which are public-use tables displayed in
QWI Explorer, and the workplace-based LEHD Origin-Destination Employment Statis-
tics (LODES), which are the public-use tables displayed in OnTheMap (OTM) when a
workplace report is requested. These labor market indicators are produced from a com-
prehensive integrated administrative record system known as the LEHD Infrastructure
File System, which is based primarily on the linkage between employers and employees
provided by state-regulated unemployment insurance (UI) wage records. The theoretical
universe to which these records correspond is all statutory jobs in the economy – pri-
vate and public (excluding federal employees).1 There is also a benchmark census of all
such jobs in the universe: the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) from
the Bureau of Labor Statistic (BLS). We use this census, which is also integrated into the
LEHD Infrastructure File System as the finite population that the QWI and LODES tabu-
lations estimate. In principle, the published indicators are subject to errors from coverage,
sampling, edit, and imputation. By addressing all of these sources of error in our assess-
ment of total variability, we have created the first comprehensive total quality measures
for these data.
1Although federal employees are now covered in both QWI and LODES, they are excluded from this
evaluation.
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Coverage errors are addressed in two ways. First, each wage record is linked to the as-
sociated employer record from the putative universe of employers (QCEW). When there
is a link, estimated employment from the two sources is compared. A tentative weight
is constructed to adjust the LEHD Infrastructure File System estimate of employment.
When there is not a link, an entity is added to the LEHD infrastructure version of the
QCEW, called the Employer Characteristics File (ECF), to account for this absence. At
the end of the processing, a final weight is computed that benchmarks all employment
to the BLS published state-level employment totals for the same universe. The effect of
this procedure is to transmit the coverage errors into the edit and imputation procedures
used to complete the firm level tabulation variables when there is a linkage failure in the
data integration. Details of these record-linkage procedures are discussed in Abowd and
Vilhuber (2005), Benedetto et al. (2007), and Abowd et al. (2009).
Every job in the universe must have completed data for all the publication variables.
The LEHD Infrastructure File System has a fully-integrated collection of probability mod-
els that generate multiply-imputed values for all missing data items in the system. Most
details are supplied in Abowd et al. (2009) – in particular, the models for imputing missing
demographic and workplace characteristics.2 The system uses the methods first proposed
by Rubin (1987) and expanded in Little and Rubin (2002) for analyses using multiply-
imputed missing data. The total variance statistics described in this paper are based on
specially adapted versions of the Rubin measures generated using the approved QWI dis-
closure avoidance method: input noise-infusion as described in Abowd et al. (2009) and
Abowd et al. (2012).
Users of these total variability measures have several options. The measures are in-
tended to provide the information needed to construct approximate confidence inter-
vals at all levels of stratification for five key publication statistics: total employment,
2Abowd et al. (2009) does not document the replacement to the demographic variable imputation meth-
ods that were incorporated in 2010. Those methods are documented in Appendix C.1.
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beginning-quarter employment, full-quarter employment, total payroll, and average
monthly earnings of full-quarter employees. We give detailed guidance on how to use
our results to calculate confidence intervals for arbitrary published employment totals
and earnings.
The Rubin measures are also designed to summarize the extent to which the vari-
ability due to the edit and imputation procedures, as distinct from the variability due to
sampling in the underlying data, contributes to total variation. Total variability consists of
both between variance generated primarily by edit and imputation, and within variance,
which consists to some extent of variability due to sampling. However, the sampling
variance is small since in principle we should have the population of firms and jobs.
We also distinguish and account for variability due to sampling and structural zeros.
In the language of Bishop et al. (1975), a structural zero occurs whenever there is no
reported activity in a cell – that is, no business exists in the cell – and a sampling zero
occurs when the cell is at risk to have positive employment (because a business exists)
but does not. We treat the probability that a job will be classified in a particular detailed
category of the publication tables as potentially random within a fixed population of state
jobs. This set of assumptions allows us to model the equivalent of sampling variability as
if it were generated by a particular multinomial model.
All five indicators we study are published every quarter in the QWI, stratified by own-
ership, sub-state geography, detailed industry, worker age, gender, race, ethnicity, and
education. The publication tables also cross-classify many of these stratifiers. Beginning-
of-quarter employment is the primary tabulation variable in LODES for display in On-
TheMap, which is released annually with many of the same stratifiers as in the QWI and
sub-state geography down to the block level. Constructing measures of total variability
for these indicators is complicated by three related factors. First, the QWI and LODES
are produced in separate production streams although they share the core LEHD Infras-
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tructure File System and, therefore, are subject to the same sources of variation. Neither
production stream saves all the inputs required to calculate total variability. Second, the
QWI are revised quarterly, and revised indicators are released for the complete history of
the series. Third, the workplace-based statistics produced by the LEHD program for both
QWI and LODES/OTM use a confidentiality protection system based on input noise-
infusion that constrains the calculation of total variability measures and complicates the
release of these measures in a user-friendly format.
Because the QWI production system does not store the implicate threads needed to
compute the total variability statistics, the analysis in this paper is based on a re-creation
of the production statistics from the research files corresponding to a particular vintage
of the QWI. The research code does not exactly match the production code. In particular,
there are discrepancies in the counts between the production and research values of the
statistics for which we compute total variability measures. Even if the research code did
exactly reproduce the publication statistics from one release of QWI, the next quarter’s
release would not agree exactly for most of the historical data because of the continuous-
revision design of QWI. The user must take care when calculating confidence intervals for
the published values using the total variability measures tabulated here. There are two
available strategies, both of which are discussed in this paper. The user can download
a table of total variability measures with the same structure as the tabulations for which
confidence intervals are required. In this case, there will be some discordance between
the value of the indicator found in the publication tables and the value that was used to
calculate the total variability measures. We document when these discrepancies can be
important: unsurprisingly, mostly for cells with small tabulation counts. We also provide
detailed tables that can be used directly to construct approximate confidence intervals.
Overall, these comprehensive measures of the total quality of QWI and LODES tabula-
tions for five critical variables provide substantial evidence that the system is producing
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reliable data. This summary discusses the qualitative results for the main employment
indicator used by both QWI and LODES/OTM, beginning-of-quarter employment.
Both QWI and LODES/OTM were designed to allow detailed sub-state geography
and industry tabulations. Such a system, of necessity, must be robust to the presence of
many cells with very small tabulations and many zeros. We document that the vast major-
ity of zeros result from no reported activity, meaning that the value is exactly zero and is
treated as a structural zero. Since QWI and LODES are population tabulations, structural
zeros have no variability, which is imposed in our analysis. Some zeros are estimated,
and those zeros have total variability. Cells with small published employment totals (for
any of the employment measures) do have substantial estimated total variability.
The smallest tabulation values (cells containing counts of one or two) often have
90% confidence intervals of less than plus or minus one, so that they sometimes include
zero and three. These values are usually suppressed in QWI but they are released in
LODES/OTM. The suppression in QWI is justified because the full hierarchical tabula-
tion is published, reducing the need for custom aggregations; however, QWI users and
QWI Explorer, the Census Bureau’s own analysis tool for these data, do generate custom
tabulations. These custom tabulations must populate the cells with suppressed items us-
ing some algorithm. There are no suppressions in LODES/OTM, which completes the
data using a synthetic data model based on the posterior predictive distribution of small
cell counts (one or two) within a given tract stratified by most of the variables for which
LODES tabulations are published. Regardless of the model used, there is still substantial
uncertainty in these small tabulations, as our results confirm. Almost all 90% confidence
intervals are tighter than the interval zero to five, while the vast majority are less than
plus or minus two. Publication of these small tabulations in spite of their substantial rel-
ative uncertainty is justified by the flexibility they allow for generating custom tabulation
areas, most of which end up with much larger estimated employment totals. These cus-
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tom tabulations would be substantially biased by using zero as the estimate when the
publication value of a component is suppressed.
For cells where the tabulations are in the range of three to nine, our results indicate that
the 90% confidence interval is rarely wider than plus or minus three, and for most tables
is less than plus or minus one. For cells where the tabulations are in the range of 10 or
more, it makes more sense to summarize the results in terms of percentage variation; i.e.,
use the coefficient of variation implied by the total variability measure and the estimated
count. For tabulations in the range of 10 to 99 jobs, the 90% confidence intervals are rarely
larger than plus or minus 25% and are usually in the range of plus or minus 10% to 25%.
For tabulations in the range 100 to 999, the widest 90% confidence intervals are plus or
minus 20%, and the vast majority of cells in this range have confidence intervals of plus
or minus less than 10%. For the largest tabulation areas, 1,000 or more, the widest 90%
confidence intervals are approximately plus or minus 5%, and the intervals are usually in
the range of plus or minus 1.5%.
The other dimension along which we assess the total variability is the Rubin miss-
ingness ratio, which quantifies the proportion of the total variability that arises from the
multiple imputation procedures. This is also known as “fraction of missing information”
as in Little and Rubin (2002). The complement of the Rubin missingness ratio measures
the proportion of total variability that it is due to sampling and other intrinsic sources of
randomness in the indicator; that is, the proportion of total variability that would remain
if no records required any edits or imputation. As we noted above, the edit and imputa-
tion procedures used in QWI and LODES/OTM also induce variability due to sub-state
coverage errors.
The Rubin missingness ratio provides a reasonable way to assess the effects of data ed-
its and imputations for both demographic characteristics (age, gender, race, ethnicity, and
education) and workplace characteristics (industry and county). When age and gender
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are the only two stratifiers used in the publication table, missing data account for about
44% of total variability. When race and ethnicity are the only two stratifiers, missing data
account for between 80% and 95% of total variability. When gender and education are the
only stratifiers in the publication tables, missing data account for over 95% of total vari-
ability. When workplace industry and county are the only stratifiers in the publication
tables, missing data account for between 0% and 80% of total variability. It is important
to note that even when the Rubin missingness ratio is large, the 90% confidence intervals
implied by the total variability measure remain as summarized above. The missingness
ratios are a guide to where improvements in the data quality either through the use of
measured data from other sources or through better imputation algorithms can reduce
total variability the most.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides back-
ground on the missing data problem, and the methods for multiply imputing worker
and establishment characteristics. Section 3.3 provides formal models for estimating to-
tal variability and its associated components in a manner that is fully consistent with the
required disclosure avoidance procedures. To the best of our knowledge, these formulas
have never been derived or published before. Section 3.4 discusses the detailed results
and provides guidance for computing confidence intervals. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Background on QWI, LODES, and the Multiply Imputed Charac-
teristics
The QWI are a public-use data product of the U.S. Census Bureau. Every quarter, local
labor market statistics are released by worker demographics, workplace geography, and
other employer characteristics. Unlike many labor force statistics derived from surveys of
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workers or employers, the QWI are produced from job-based administrative data, where
a job is the link of a statutory employee to a statutory employer. This linkage allows
the QWI to provide tabulations of labor force statistics by worker and employer charac-
teristics, such as county employment by firm size and gender. In addition, the unique
identifiers for the employer and worker allow the QWI to tabulate longitudinal statistics,
such as hires, separations, and turnover.
The LODES are similar to the QWI in that they originate from the same job-based
frame. However, the LODES data provide geographic detail for both place of work and
place of residence, but only release a subset of the labor force statistics in the QWI, and
are published annually with statistics derived using the first day of the second quarter of
the year (April 1st) as the reference date. The core employment variable, beginning-of-
quarter employment, called B below, is used for both the QWI and LODES tabulations.3
The QWI and LODES are based on the LEHD Infrastructure File System. The origi-
nal production version of this system is documented in Abowd et al. (2009). The LEHD
infrastructure files are made possible through the Local Employment Dynamics state-
federal cooperative agreement where participating states provide the U.S. Census Bu-
reau quarterly extracts of earnings records from their respective UI systems as well as an
extract from the QCEW, as specified by a similar federal-state cooperative arrangement
between the states and the BLS.
The UI earning records are used to construct a job-based frame for the QWI and
LODES. An in-scope job occurs when a worker produces at least one dollar of UI-covered
earnings at a non-federal establishment in a given quarter. The LEHD Infrastructure File
System then combines this information with additional survey and administrative data
to derive individual characteristics such as age, gender, place of birth, race, ethnicity, and
3Publication tables for the QWI can be found here: http://qwiexplorer.ces.census.gov/. Pub-
lication maps for LODES/OTM can be found here: http://onthemap.ces.census.gov/.
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education, as well as establishment characteristics, such as workplace address and North
American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes. The LEHD Infrastructure File
System was developed using model-based edit and imputation procedures. Every miss-
ing data element has been multiply-imputed using an integrated set of models described
in Abowd et al. (2009). There are ten implicates for every missing item. Implicates are de-
noted by l = 1, . . . , L. The missing data models for most of the variables used in this paper,
including birth date, gender, race, ethnicity, education, workplace geography, workplace
NAICS, firm age, and firm size, have been substantially improved and modified since
the 2009 article was written. Because the LEHD Infrastructure File System is rebuilt ev-
ery quarter from all historical records, the analysis in this paper incorporates all of those
model improvements.
The LEHD program receives unemployment insurance records from states without
any individual characteristics. The individual characteristics are added to the LEHD
data from a variety of Census Bureau surveys and federal administrative data. The five
multiply-imputed worker characteristics are birth date, sex, race, ethnicity, and educa-
tion. The variables are imputed into discrete categories and the imputation process pro-
ceeds starting with variable(s) having the least amount of missingness, taking advantage
of what is commonly known as a monotone missing data pattern. At each stage, impu-
tations from the earlier rounds are used in the current stages imputation model. First,
missing birth date and sex are imputed followed by missing race and ethnicity. Missing
education is imputed last. Appendix C.1 contains detailed documentation of the individ-
ual characteristics imputation.
In addition to worker characteristics, a separate process imputes the establishment for
each job spell in the LEHD data. States send the linked employer-employee data at the
employee-firm-state level. In addition, the states send a list of all known establishments
owned by the firm within a state. This list includes establishment characteristics such as
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industry and geography, as well as the employment counts at each establishment within
a quarter. However, with the exception of Minnesota, explicit identifiers linking an em-
ployee to an establishment do not exist. In order to produce labor market statistics for
detailed industries and geographies, the link allocating a worker to an establishment is
multiply imputed.4
The QWI and the workplace component of LODES are confidentiality protected us-
ing a noise-infusion method applied to the underlying micro-data. Every establishment
(identifiers: SEIN, SEINUNIT) in the database has been assigned a unique fuzz factor, δ j,
where j indexes establishments that satisfy the conditions documented in Abowd et al.
(2009, 2012). The method for applying this fuzz factor to the publication statistics depends
upon whether the publication statistic is based on a magnitude (including counts for an
establishment), ratio, or other more complicated statistic. In addition, small magnitude
values in the QWI are suppressed with the flag “5: Does not meet Census Bureau publi-
cation standards” and significantly distorted publication values are labeled with the flag
“9: Significantly distorted.” In LODES, values that would be suppressed in QWI are syn-
thesized using an approved probability model that is based on the posterior predictive
distribution of the suppressed values conditional on tract-level establishment employ-
ment data.
The total variability statistics described in this paper apply to data for all private em-
ployers and the current all-employer category in the QWI and LODES data, which ex-
cludes federal employees. Statistics that include only federal employees are covered by
a different protection procedure. Statistics that aggregate all-employer data (excluding
federal employment) with federal employment data must combine the two types of data
4The data from Minnesota is used to fit a hierarchical Bayesian model of establishment assignment. The
probability of an employee working at a given establishment is estimated in this hierarchical structure with
the first part conditioning on the employment size of an establishment, and the second part conditioning
on the distance between an employee’s residence and an establishment. The model is fit jointly on each of
three firm size categories, and the estimated model parameters are used to generate 10 draws of feasible
establishments for each job. For further details see Abowd et al. (2009).
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from their respective public-use releases.
We extend the QWI noise-infusion methods to cover the protection of the Rubin total
variance measure for statistics based upon multiply-imputed missing data. This measure
combines the conventional quality measure for published statistics – the design-based
sampling variance, corrected for ex post departures from design and finite populations –
and a measure that captures the contribution of the model-based missing data imputation
procedures: the between-implicate variance of the publication statistic.
3.3 Noise-Infusion Protected Total Variance Measures
This section derives the formulas for noise-infusion protected Rubin total variance mea-
sures. To the best of our knowledge, these formulas have never been derived or published
before. We restrict our analysis to five core labor force statistics published in the QWI:
• Beginning-of-quarter employment, B, which is equal to the sum of all workers who
had positive earnings at an establishment in the current quarter as well as the pre-
vious quarter.
• Full-quarter employment, F, which is defined as the sum of all workers who had
positive earnings at an establishment in the current quarter in addition to the previ-
ous and subsequent quarters.
• Average monthly earnings of full-quarter employees, Z W3.
• Total flow-employment, M, defined as the sum of all workers who have positive
earnings at an establishment at any time in the quarter.
• Total payroll, W1, which is the total earnings earned by workers in a quarter.
Beginning-of-quarter employment for quarter 2 (April 1-June 30) is also the primary tab-
ulation variable in LODES/OTM.
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The relevant population is a state.5 At the state level, the QCEW measure of all em-
ployment (excluding federal workers) is considered the population. Quarterly weights
for the QWI benchmark B to the QCEW month 1 employed population. All statistics de-
fined below are calculated for a given state-year-quarter. Similar to the actual QWI, total
variability statistics are produced for the period beginning in 1990, quarter 1 (1990:1).
The total variability measures discussed in this paper refer to the QWI release labeled
R2014Q4, which covers 1990:1 through 2012:1. All states except Massachusetts, North
Carolina, and Colorado are included in the R2012Q4 release. Similar to the actual QWI,
total variability statistics are produced for the period beginning in 1990, quarter 1 (1990:1).
The total variability measures discussed in this paper refer to the QWI release labeled
R2014Q4, which covers 1990:1 through 2012:1.6
We adopt, without modification, the noise-infusion methodology described in Abowd
et al. (2009) and elaborated in Abowd et al. (2012) to which the reader is referred for more
details. The system adds multiplicative noise to tabular output produced from the LEHD
Infrastructure File System. The multiplicative noise factors for each establishment are
drawn from a two-sided symmetric ramp distribution centered at the value one. The
draws from the distribution distort the original input by at least a minimum percentage,
and by no more than a maximum percentage. Both of these values are Census confi-
dential. This system is a substantial generalization of the method originally developed
by Evans et al. (1998). As applied in the production of the QWI and LODES/OTM, the
release statistics are dynamically consistent – the same noise factor is used for an estab-
lishment in every quarter of data.
The system also provides protection to employers as well as establishments – all es-
tablishments for the same employer within a given state have noise distortion factors on
5For simplicity, we include Washington, D.C. when we say “state.”
6Refer to the table here http://download.vrdc.cornell.edu/qwipu/starting_dates.html
for the exact start dates for each state. The estimated total variability measures described in this paper can
be downloaded here: http://doi.org/10.3886/E100590V1.
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the same side of unity. The system can provide protection to magnitude measures (the
only problem considered by Evans et al. (1998)), ratios, and differences. Employment
counts within demographic categories are treated as magnitudes. The protection method
for ratios requires that the publication tables include either two magnitudes (e.g., total
employment and total payroll) or one magnitude and one ratio (e.g., total employment
and average quarterly earnings).7 We use the ratio form of the QWI noise-distortion pro-
tection below.
Multiplicative noise infusion provides confidentiality protection in the following for-
mal sense. The originally reported values of the tabulation variables are never used in the
formation of the magnitudes (establishment-level counts) and ratios that are tabulated.
Tabulations based upon a small number of establishments (at the limit one) or a small
number of employees (at the limit one) contain uncertainty induced by the distribution of
the noise factor. This uncertainty limits a users ability to infer attributes to within a range
that is confidential. Finally, the physical location of a workplace is not treated as confi-
dential because it is defined as the location where the employee must report for work,
and is therefore public.
3.3.1 Population Definitions
To calculate the components of total variance, every quarter we require estimates of the
total population, NWB, and the total sample size, NUB. To be consistent with the overall
data protection scheme, we must calculate these from the fuzzed data as
NWB =
∑
∀ j
BUj w jδ j ≡
∑
∀ j
B∗j and (3.1)
NUB =
∑
∀ j
BUj δ j ≡
∑
∀ j
BU∗j , (3.2)
7We do not use the protection method for differences in this paper.
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where BUj is the unweighted establishment-level beginning-quarter employment for es-
tablishment j, w j is the QWI establishment weight, δ j is the unique QWI establishment
fuzz factor, B∗j is the fuzzed-weighted establishment-level count, and B
U∗
j is the fuzzed-
unweighted count establishment-level count. Summing over all firms gives us estimates
of NWB and NUB (excluding federal establishments). NWF , NUF , F∗j , F
U
j , and F
U∗
j are defined
similarly for full-quarter employment, as well as NWM, NUM, M∗j , M
U
j , and M
U∗
j for total
employment. The population estimate NWB has been benchmarked to the QCEW month-
1 employed population via the QWI weights. This procedure is also discussed in Abowd
et al. (2009). There is no QCEW population count for full-quarter employment nor to-
tal employment. However, NWF and NWM are treated here as the appropriate estimate of
the population total for F and M, respectively. Since Z W3 is computed over the same
set of input records as F, its fuzzed-weighted and fuzzed-unweighted population and
total sample counts are identical to NWF and NUF . W1 is calculated using earnings for all
workers, thus, NWM and NUM are the correct population and sample size for this statistic.
In principle, for all the missing data models, there should not be any between-
implicate variance in NWB, NUB, NWF , NUF , NWM and NUM because missing records are cor-
rected using the weights and only missing items on actual records are imputed. Therefore,
it should not make any difference which implicate is used to compute these population
and sample totals. We computed population totals separately for each implicate and at-
tempted to verify the absence of between-implicate variation in the total fuzzed-weighted
and fuzzed-unweighted counts. In practice, there is a small amount of between-implicate
variance in the population totals – less than 0.04% for B and less than 0.03% for F as
measured by the coefficient of variation. This result is tabulated in detail in Appendix
Table C.11 for the beginning-of-quarter population and in Appendix Table C.12 for the
full-quarter population. The between-variance measures are also computed for each es-
tablishment type (private and all, excluding federal). These results are also displayed in
Appendix Tables C.11 and C.12. Between-implicate variation in the sub-population totals
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is consistent with the benchmarking but is also minimal.
3.3.2 Total Variability Models for B, F, and M
Let Bk be any cross-classification of beginning-of-quarter employment such that NWB =∑
∀k Bk. For each implicate l, the fuzzed-weighted count for category k is computed as
B(l)∗k =
∑
(i, j)∈{def k}
b(l)i, jw jδ j (3.3)
where b(l)i, j is the LEHD infrastructure indicator variable that defines person i as a
beginning-of-quarter employee of establishment j in the lth implicate (implicitly, for date
t), {def k} is the set that defines membership in category k for the pair (i, j), and w j is the
QWI weight for establishment j. F(l)∗k and M
(l)∗
k are defined comparably using the LEHD
infrastructure indicator variables f (l)i, j and m
(l)
i, j, respectively, and the same weight and fuzz
factor as in the equation for B(l)∗k .
For each implicate, the estimated proportion of NWB represented by B
(l)∗
k in each cell k
is
p(l)∗k =
B(l)∗k
NWB
. (3.4)
The estimated count in cell k can be rewritten as
B(l)∗k ≡ c(l)∗k = NWB × p(l)∗k . (3.5)
The released statistics are the averages taken over the implicates
B∗k ≡ c¯k∗ =
1
L
L∑
l=l
c(l)∗k and (3.6)
B∗k
NWB
≡ p¯k∗ = 1L
L∑
l=l
p(l)∗k . (3.7)
Exactly comparable formulas are used for F∗k and M
∗
k .
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For each implicate, the finite-population-corrected, ex-post-design-weighted sampling
variance of the proportion is estimated by assuming that the counts are sampled from a
multinomial population and that the missing infrastructure records (equivalent of non-
response or coverage errors) are corrected by the QWI weights. Only fuzzed inputs are
used in the calculation. Hence, the estimator for the within-implicate variance of the
proportion is
vp(l)∗k =
 p(l)∗k
(
1 − p(l)∗k
)
NUB
 (NWB − NUBNWB − 1
)
. (3.8)
For each implicate, the finite-population-corrected, ex-post-design-weighted sampling
variance of the count is estimated with
vc(l)∗k = N
2
WB
 p(l)∗k
(
1 − p(l)∗k
)
NUB
 (NWB − NUBNWB − 1
)
. (3.9)
Again, only fuzzed inputs are used. Notice that the finite population correction (the last
term) is not at the cell level. Due to problems with an unknown population count of
employment flows within the quarter, we use the state level population correction for all
cells. This implicitly assumes that the ratio of the sample to the population is the same as
beginning-of-quarter employment, where the population is known.
The Rubin between-variances for the proportions and counts are
bp∗k =
1
L − 1
L∑
l=1
(
p(l)∗k − p¯∗k
)2
and (3.10)
bc∗k =
1
L − 1
L∑
l=1
(
c(l)∗k − c¯∗k
)2
. (3.11)
The Rubin average within-variances for the proportions and counts are
v¯p∗k =
1
L
L∑
l=1
vp(l)∗k and (3.12)
v¯c∗k =
1
L
L∑
l=1
vc(l)∗k . (3.13)
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The Rubin total variances are
tvp∗k = v¯p
∗
k +
(
L + 1
L
)
bp∗k and (3.14)
tvc∗k = v¯c
∗
k +
(
L + 1
L
)
bc∗k . (3.15)
For completeness, we also calculate the Rubin missingness ratio as
mrp∗k =
(
L+1
L
)
bp∗k
tvp∗k
, (3.16)
and similarly for mrc∗k.
All formulas for full-quarter employment and total employment, F and M, are com-
parable – substituting f (l)i, j for b
(l)
i, j, F
(l)
k for B
(l)
k , NWF for NWB, and NUF for NUB in the case of
F, with analogous substitutions for M. Because NWF and NWM are not benchmarked by
the QCEW but are based on the weights for beginning of-of-quarter employment, there
may be negative finite population corrections that we replaced with the smallest positive
finite-population correction factor based on B.8
3.3.3 Total Variability Model for Z W3
The cells for Z W3∗k are the same mutually-exclusive and exhaustive cells as used for F
∗
k .
For any implicate l, the fuzzed-weighted estimate of average monthly earnings is calcu-
lated as
Z W3(l)∗k =
1
F(l)k
∑
(i, j)∈{def k}
z w3(l)i, jw jδ j, (3.17)
where F(l)k is the unfuzzed-weighted full-quarter employment for cell k. To compute the
sampling variance of Z W3(l)∗k , we use the fuzzed-weighted uncorrected sum of squares,
8This procedure is essentially the same as the method used for finite population corrections in the Amer-
ican Community Survey (Starsinic, 2011).
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calculated as
uss(l)∗k =
∑
(i, j)∈{def k}
(
z w3(l)i, j
)2
w jδ j . (3.18)
For each implicate, the finite-population-corrected, ex-post-design-weighted sampling
variance of the average monthly earnings for full-quarter employed workers is estimated
with
vz(l)∗k =
1
F(l)uk
uss(l)∗k
F(l)k
−
(
Z W3(l)∗k
)2 (NWF − NUFNWF − 1
)
(3.19)
where F(l)uk is the unfuzzed-unweighted count of full-quarter employment in cell k, and
vz(l)∗k is only computed when F
(l)
k is positive. Notice that the formula for the within-
variance for each implicate is a conditional sampling variance, given membership in cell
k. In all cases unfuzzed-weighted values are used in the denominator and fuzzed val-
ues (weighted or unweighted) are used in the numerator. This is consistent with the
approved QWI noise-infusion system and prevents cancellation of the fuzz-factor when
only one establishment populates the cell. Because the average, Z W3(l)∗k , is computed ac-
cording to equation 3.17 and the mean uncorrected sum of squares is computed using the
same denominator as Z W3(l)∗k , the term
(
uss(l)∗k
F(l)k
−
(
Z W3(l)∗k
)2)
in equation 3.19 can be neg-
ative. This situation arises for small values, generally less than three, of F(l)k when the
discrepancy between the fuzzed count F(l)∗k and the unfuzzed count F
(l)
k is relatively large.
When this happens, the term
(
uss(l)∗k
F(l)k
−
(
Z W3(l)∗k
)2)
is set to zero attributing all variation to
the between-implicate variance.
The quantities for the Rubin total variance can now be computed for Z W3(l)∗k . The
publication statistic is
Z W3∗k ≡ ¯z w3∗k =
1
L
L∑
l=1
Z W3(l)∗k . (3.20)
The between-implicate variance is
bz∗k =
1
L − 1
L∑
l=1
(
Z W3(l)∗k − ¯z w3∗k
)2
. (3.21)
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The average within-implicate variance is
v¯z∗k =
1
L
L∑
l=1
vz(l)∗k . (3.22)
Finally, the Rubin total variance is
tvz∗k = v¯z
∗
k +
L + 1
L
bz∗k (3.23)
We also calculate the Rubin missingness ratio for average monthly earnings of full-quarter
employees using the formula equivalent to equation 3.16.
3.3.4 Total Variability Model for W1 (Total Payroll)
The cells for total payroll, W1∗k, are the same mutually-exclusive and exhaustive cells as
used for M∗k . For any implicate l, the fuzzed-weighted estimate of total payroll is
W1(l)∗k =
∑
(i, j)∈{def k}
w1(l)i, jw jδ j (3.24)
where w1(l)i, j is the gross payroll in cell k. To compute the sampling variance of W1
(l)∗
k , we
use the average payroll per worker multiplied by an estimate of the number of workers in
cell k, W1(l)∗k = M
(l)∗
k × Z W1(l)∗k . First, we require the fuzzed-weighted estimate of average
quarterly earnings, which is calculated as
Z W1(l)∗k =
1
M(l)k
∑
(i, j)∈{def k}
w1(l)i, jw jδ j (3.25)
where M(l)k is the unfuzzed-weighted employment flow for cell k. We also have the fuzzed-
weighted uncorrected sum of squares, calculated as,
mss(l)∗k =
∑
(i, j)∈{def k}
(
w1(l)i, j
)2
w jδ j (3.26)
For each implicate, the finite-population-corrected, ex-post-design-weighted sampling
variance of total payroll is estimated with
vw(l)∗k =
(
M(l)∗k
)2
M(l)uk
mss(l)∗k
M(l)k
−
(
Z W1(l)∗k
)2 (NWM − NUMNWM − 1
)
(3.27)
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where NWM and NUM are the fuzzed-weighted count and the fuzzed-unweighted counts of
population flows, respectively. The denominator in the first term, M(l)uk , is the unfuzzed-
unweighted cell count. The numerator of the first term scales the sample mean to give the
sample variance of a count. Just as with Z W3∗k, the middle term in 3.27 may be negative,
which we then set to zero and attribute all variance to between-implicate variance.
The quantities for the Rubin total variance can now be computed for W1∗k. The publi-
cation statistic is
W1∗k ≡ W¯1∗k =
1
L
L∑
l=1
W1(l)∗k . (3.28)
The between-implicate variance is
bw∗k =
1
L − 1
L∑
l=1
(
W1(l)∗k − W¯1∗k
)2
. (3.29)
The average within-implicate variance is
¯vw∗k =
1
L
L∑
l=1
vw(l)∗k . (3.30)
Just as in equation 3.23, the Rubin total variance is
tvw∗k = ¯vw
∗
k +
L + 1
L
bw∗k . (3.31)
We also calculate the Rubin missingness ratio for average monthly earnings of full-quarter
employees using the formula equivalent to equation 3.16.
3.3.5 Reconciling Total Variability Measures Using Published Values
of B, F, M, Z W3, and W1
Once we compute the five QWI statistics, we perform quality checks and modify the
within- and between-variance so they are consistent with public-use values. For reasons
previously discussed, we compute the final total variability statistics using a research
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process distinct from the production process used to compute the QWI public-use statis-
tics.9 The resulting QWI statistics differ in some circumstances from the official public-use
statistics, with the most discord occurring in the smallest public-use cells. To scale the in-
ternally calculated total variability statistics to the publicly released statistics, we assume
the coefficient of variation is equal in both the public-use and internally calculated total
variability statistics. In order ensure the reasonableness of this assumption, we edit the
coefficient of variation of the QWI statistic when it deviates substantially from similar
cells within the same aggregation level, and with the same size QWI statistic.
For each table, we merge a public-use table of QWI statistics with our corresponding
internal calculations of the five QWI statistics and their associated total variability mea-
sures. Next, we bin each internally calculated employment measure, respectively, by ag-
gregation level and into centiles of employment. We calculate the 5th and 95th percentiles
of the coefficient of variation for each bin. Within each bin, we consider cells below the
5th percentile and above the 95th percentile of the coefficient of variation outliers, and we
replace their within- and between-variance with the within- and between-variance of the
median of coefficient of variation of the bin. We also replace the internal statistic with the
value of the corresponding median of the coefficient of variation of the bin. Note that the
public-use statistic is always preserved and is the reference statistic for all total variability
measures. Appendix C.2 provides a more detailed summary of the procedure.
Before computing the released total variability measures consistent with the public-
use QWI, we account for, and flag, the presence of sampling zeros. The public-use QWI
contains only cells where at least one statistic is computable for the given cell, which
means there is at least one UI-covered job in that cell. The frame for the QWI, however,
is establishments whether they have positive UI-covered jobs in a quarter or not. Thus,
9To recap, research computing uses a snapshot of a single collection of vintages of the LEHD infrastruc-
ture file system that were used to compute one release of the data, in this case R2012Q4. Some production
system edits are not captured in this snapshot. Similarly, some research system edits are not reflected in the
production system.
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it is possible that a given cell will have no released QWI statistics, but nonetheless be at
risk for positive employment. This is a sampling zero. In contrast, some cells will never
have positive employment or observed firm activity, and we denote these structural zeros
because they are not at risk to have any employment in the cell. We flag these two types of
cells for advanced users and impute variance measures for the sampling zeros. Appendix
C.3 gives a detailed summary of the procedure.
After checks for the quality of the final statistics, we create the released statistics us-
ing the edited data and their corresponding statistics when necessary. We only release
total variability statistics for unsuppressed statistics in the public-use data. For each total
variability statistic, we scale the within- and between-variance by the square of the ratio
of the public-use statistic to the internally computed statistic. As long as the public-use
value is close to the value we calculate, otherwise we use a representative value from
another bin. This follows from our previously stated assumption of equal coefficients
of variation within a cell. The total variance, missingness ratio, and degrees of freedom
are recalculated from the scaled within- and between-variance. The final file contains the
same identifiers, QWI statistics, and status flags as the public-use tables. In addition, it
includes the five total variability statistics rounded to three significant digits whenever
the public-use statistic is present. The only additional records in the total variability files
beyond what is in the public-use QWI are the sampling zeros, which receive variability
measures as described in Appendix C.3. The original, unscaled total variability statistics
will be used whenever either the public-use or internally calculated statistic are zero.
3.4 Results
We summarize the results in Table 3.1 for all total employment, EmpTotal, Table 3.2 for
all beginning-of-quarter employment, Emp, in Table 3.3 for all full-quarter employment,
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EmpS , Table 3.4 for all total payroll, Payroll, in Table 3.5 for all average monthly earnings
of full-quarter employees, EarnS . Tables showing the same statistics for only private
establishments are shown in Appendix Tables C.6 to C.10. In addition to summaries of
the statistics defined above, we also summarize the distribution of the coefficient of total
variation, which is the square root of the total variance divided by the estimated statistic
for EmpTotal, Emp, EmpS , EarnS , and Payroll. For Emp this formula is
cvc∗k =
√
tvc∗k
Emp∗k
(3.32)
The same equation holds for the four other statistics using their respective total variances
in the numerator and the corresponding statistic in the denominator.
3.4.1 Interpretation of the Tables
Tables 3.1-3.5 have the same structure.10 The major row label is the level of QWI tabula-
tion. For example, the row labelled “Age x Gender” refers to the collection of tabulations
stratified by year, quarter, ownership (private), state, age category, and gender. The pub-
lished QWI data conform to the schema listed here: http://lehd.ces.census.gov/
doc/QWIPU_Data_Schema.pdf. Refer to this page for categories of the stratifying vari-
ables. The minor row label characterizes the publication cell by its size. For Table 3.2 the
size classes are based on the values of beginning-of-quarter employment. For Tables 3.1
and 3.4 the size classes are based total employment, and for Tables 3.1 and 3.5, the classes
are based on full-quarter employment. The complete set of size classes we summarize is:
• Zero measured value, after rounding, which means that the estimated value is zero.
• 1-2, which means that the estimated value is in the interval [1,2] after rounding.
• 3-9, which means that the estimated value is in the interval [3,9] after rounding.
10Appendix Tables C.6 to C.10 also follow this structure.
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• 10-99, which means that the estimated value is in the interval [10,99] after rounding.
• 100-999, which means that the estimated value is in the interval [100,999] after
rounding.
• +1000, which means that the estimated value is in the interval [1000,max] after
rounding.
The column labeled “Proportion of Cells” shows the proportion of all cells in the ma-
jor row category that lie within the minor row category size class. For example, the value
1.000 in Table 3.1, for the Age x Gender publication tables in the +1000 size class indicates
that all the cells in the year x quarter x ownership (all) x state x age category x gender pub-
lication tables have at least 1,000 employees in the cell for the publication period 1990:1
through 2012:1. The column labeled “Number of Cells” gives the total number of cells
published for this major row category in the indicated count range. Using the same row
as an example, the value 46,480 means that there are this many unique cells in the year x
quarter x ownership (all) x state x age category x gender publication tables for the same
period.
For Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 the next column is “Median Count,” which is the median
value of the tabulation variable EmpTotal, (respectively, Emp, EmpS ) in the cells covered
by that row. Using the same example row in Table 3.1, the value 91,515 is the median
value of total employment in the 46,480 age x gender cells summarized in that row. For
Table 3.5, the next column is “Median Average Monthly Earnings,” which is the median
value of average monthly earnings for all of cells tabulated in a row of the table. For
Table 3.4, the next column is “Median Payroll.” For all five tables, we report medians
rather than averages for most statistics. We compute all tabulations over all tabulated
cells used for that row. Upon careful review of the summary tables, we found outlier
cells to have undo influence on summary statistics based on averages. We therefore use
medians, which believe best summarizes the “typical” cell for a given stratification.
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For Tables 3.1-3.5, the next column “Median Total Variation” reports the median value
of the Rubin total variation for the cells tabulated in that row. In Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3
this is the median value of tvc∗k from equation 3.15 variable EmpTotal (respectively, Emp,
EmpS ). In Table 3.4 this is the median value of tvw∗k from equation 3.31, and from Table 3.5
it is the median value of tvz∗k from equation 3.23. The values tabulated in this column are
the overall summary measures of data quality for the five released total quality measures.
For Tables 3.1-3.5, the next column “Median Rubin Missingness Rate (Percent)” re-
ports the median value of the missingness ratio stated as a percentage. The reported
statistic is the median value in a cell over all cells used in the indicated row. See sub-
section 3.4.3 for a discussion of the interpretation of this data quality statistic.
Again for Tables 3.1-3.5, the next four columns report the “Quantiles of the Coefficient
of Variation, where the coefficient of variation is defined in equation 3.32. These columns
restate the square root of the Rubin total variation statistic as a ratio to the estimated
value of the publication statistic. These statistics on the coefficient of variation can be
used to assess the proportionate total variation around the published value arising from
all sources of error. See the discussion in sub-section 3.4.2.
The final three columns of Tables 3.1-3.5, “Approximate median 90% Confidence Inter-
val Margin of Error” report the Rubin approximate degrees of freedom and the margins of
error of the median 90% approximate confidence intervals. The “margin of error” is one-
half of the 90% confidence interval width. For EmpTotal, Emp, and EmpS , we compute
the approximate degrees of freedom using the moment-matching formula from Rubin
and Schenker (1986)
d f ∗k = (L − 1)
(
1 +
L
L + 1
v¯c∗k
bc∗k
)2
(3.33)
where the appropriate within-variance (equation 3.13) and between-variance (equation
3.11) is used in the numerator and denominator, respectively. To compute the approxi-
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mate degrees of freedom for confidence intervals for EarnS , we use the within-variance
from equation 3.22 and the between variance from equation 3.21 in equation 3.33. In all
cases, L = 10. The same logic applies to Payroll with its corresponding equations. The
margin of error for the count is computed by multiplying the square root of the average
total variance by the t-statistic value for probability 0.05 with the degrees of freedom indi-
cated in the “df” column. The margin of error for the percent is calculated by multiplying
the average coefficient of variation by the same t-statistic, then expressing the result as a
percentage.
The engaged reader may notice a seeming anomaly when viewing the summary me-
dian degrees of freedom in Tables 3.1-3.5. The median degrees of freedom for the Industry
x County, employment sizes 3-9 row, reside at our imposed upper bound and appear cu-
rious compared to the other rows. This is especially true compared to the row above.
The Industry x County, employment sizes 1-2 row has a much smaller median degrees
of freedom, in line with the other rows in the summary tables. Upon further inspection,
this is not an error and the apparent anomaly lies with the suppression rules in the QWI
public-use tables and the preponderance of multi-unit employers in a given cell. In the
case of the latter, recall that there is no multiple imputation of county or industry in the
QWI. The only source of between variance at the Industry x County level is through the
imputation of a workplace to a worker – called the unit-to-worker impute in the tech-
nical documentation. Cells with employment in the range 3-9, have few firms, and the
distribution of firms skews towards single-establishment firms. These firms have no unit-
to-worker impute, and are not a source of between variance generating the upper bound
on the degrees of freedom. The other important aspect is the suppression of most cells
in the public-use data that contain employment counts of 1-2. In the cell counts in Tables
3.1-3.5 one sees a sharp dip in the cell count. This is not a representative sub-population
of cells, which leads to anomalous looking summary results. When one looks at Table
3.4, Payroll, for which items are never suppressed, one sees that the median degrees of
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freedom is also at the upper bound, which is what we would expect given their small
employment size.
We interpret the approximate median 90% confidence interval margins of error for the
counts as providing evidence about the overall reliability of counts of EmpTotal, Emp,
and EmpS for cells that lie in the indicated count range. For example, the margin of error
for the count associated with the Age x Gender cell in Table 3.2, +1000 row is 94, and the
average value of Emp in that row is 70,233. The approximate 90% confidence intervals are
70,233 +/- 94. The approximate confidence interval margins of error for counts are most
useful for assessing the reliability of estimates in the range zero (after rounding) to nine,
although we provide them for all count ranges.
We interpret the approximate average 90% confidence intervals stated in percentages
as providing evidence on the relative reliability of counts of EmpTotal, Emp, and EmpS .
Using the same row as an example, we have the relative 90% confidence interval of 70,233
+/- 0.13%. The approximate confidence interval margins of error stated in percentages are
useful for assessing the reliability of estimates in the range 10 to 1,000 and over – that is,
for the cells containing the vast bulk of employment.
3.4.2 Computing Confidence Bounds for Published Estimates of
EmpTotal, Emp, EmpS , Payroll, and EarnS
In this subsection, we explain how to use the distribution files to compute more accurate
90% confidence intervals for published QWI and LODES data.11 The distribution files
contain total variation measures, computed using equation 3.15) for EmpTotal, Emp, and
EmpS , and equation 3.23 for EarnS , and equation 3.31 for Payroll. The components of the
11Found here: http://doi.org/10.3886/E100590V1.
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confidence intervals used to compute the results in Tables 3.1-3.5 can be replaced by the
comparable quantities in the distribution files to improve the accuracy of the confidence
intervals.
Find the appropriate distribution table (corresponding to a major row label in Tables
3.1-3.5) and the appropriate rows of the distribution file (corresponding to the desired
values of the stratifying variables). Take the square root of the total variation measure to
form confidence intervals for the reported values of EmpTotal, Emp, and EmpS , Payroll,
and EarnS . Divide the square root of the total variation measure by the level of the pub-
lished value to form percentage confidence intervals. Derive the within variance using
the total variance and the missingness ratio as
v¯c∗k =
(
1 − mrc∗k
)
tvc∗k , (3.34)
where the appropriate value of the missingness ratio and the total variance should be
used for the different statistics, respectively. Derive the between variance using total
variance, within variance and the total number of implicates according to the formula
bc∗k =
L
L + 1
(
tvc∗k − v¯c∗k
)
, (3.35)
where L = 10. Finally, compute the approximate degrees of freedom according to equa-
tion 3.33.
To form a more accurate confidence interval for the level of the published indicator,
multiply the square root of the total variance for that measure by the appropriate value
from the t-distribution with the degrees of freedom indicated by equation 3.33 and the
desired confidence level. To form a more accurate confidence interval for the percentage
variation of the published indicator, divide the margin of error calculated for the level by
the value of the published statistic. We recommend using confidence intervals calculated
from employment counts for cells with tabulations from zero to nine. We recommend
using confidence intervals calculated from the percentage variation in employment for
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cells with tabulations of 10 or more. For confidence intervals on average monthly earnings
of full-quarter employment, we recommend using percentage variation.
Users of LODES/OTM can use Table 3.2 to estimate approximate confidence intervals
for workplace employment counts published in OTM or calculated directly from LODES.
Find the major row label in Table 3.2 that most closely approximates the stratification
used in the LODES/OTM workplace summary. Generally, that will be one of the ta-
bles with detailed “county-level” geographic stratification combined with demographic
or firm-level variables. There is no QWI equivalent for the earnings category stratification
available in LODES. Once the closest suitable QWI table has been selected, select the row
with the count range that corresponds to the employment count for which a confidence
interval is desired. For employment counts of zero to nine, use the count margin of error
to form an approximate 90% confidence interval. For employment counts of 10 or more,
use the percentage margin of error to form an approximate 90% relative confidence inter-
val. If other levels of confidence are required, use the degrees of freedom estimate in the
same row to look up the correct t-statistic for the desired confidence level, then compute
count margins of error using the square root of the average total variation in the row or
compute percentage margins of error using the average coefficient of variation in the row.
3.4.3 Discussion of the Interpretation of Missingness Ratios and Data
Quality
The Rubin total variance measure is the appropriate statistic to summarize the total qual-
ity of the published indicators for total employment, beginning-quarter employment, full-
quarter employment, total payroll, and average monthly earnings of full-quarter employ-
ees. It is clear from Tables 3.1-3.5 that total variation declines monotonically, in percentage
terms, as the number of jobs in the tabulation value increases. This is hardly surprising,
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but careful attention to the magnitudes of these percentage total variations (in the co-
efficient of variation columns) shows that for even the most detailed tables and for the
stratifiers associated with the largest missingness ratios, the tabulations are very reliable
when based on job counts of at least 10, and moderately reliable for job counts of three
to nine. This conclusion remains valid even if the very pessimistic assessment of total
variation (the 95th percentile of the distribution of the coefficient of variation) is used.
The missingness ratio, therefore, is not a measure of total quality. Instead, it is an in-
dicator of which components of the infrastructure used to compute the QWI and LODES
can be most improved by investments in data that reduce the amount of edit and impu-
tation required to estimate that component.
Two components stand out in this regard: education in comparison with worker age
and gender. Education is imputed for the vast majority (about 87%) of the individuals
in the LEHD infrastructure based on a multistage ignorable missing data model. By con-
trast, worker age and gender are imputed for less than seven percent of the individuals.
And race and ethnicity are imputed for about 18% of the individuals. Looking closely at
the average coefficients of variation for the Age x Gender x Industry x County table in
comparison with the Gender x Education x Industry x County table, we see that for every
count range, the Age x Gender table has less total variation than the Gender x Education
table. The explanation is that the missingness ratio never falls below 91% for the Gender
x Education table, whereas it varies between 41% and 71% for most of the Age x Gender
table. The statistics confirm that the quality of the Gender x Education table can only be
improved by reducing the contribution from missing data. The analysis also confirms
that even with very large missingness ratios, the Gender x Education tabulations have
acceptable total variation for tabulations involving at least 10 employees.
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3.5 Conclusion
We have conducted the first comprehensive total quality analysis of five major publica-
tion variables in the Quarterly Workforce Indicators, namely the two key employment
indicators and the most widely used earnings indicator. The beginning-of-quarter em-
ployment variable from QWI is also the primary tabulation variable in the LEHD Origin-
Destination Employment Statistics; hence, our analysis is also applicable to workplace
tabulations directly from LODES or displayed in OnTheMap. Our analysis reveals that
the very smallest tabulations (estimated zeros and counts of one or two) are not particu-
larly reliable in the sense that they could easily range from zero to three. Tabulations of
three to nine are more reliable in the sense that the 90% confidence bound is generally less
than plus or minus four. Tabulations involving 10 or more jobs are very reliable having
percentage variation that declines from a worst case of plus or minus 31% (count range
10-99, tables involving education) to a best case of plus or minus less than one percent
(count range +1000, tables involving firm age).
To the best of our knowledge, no other widely used statistical system based on ad-
ministrative records has produced a comprehensive total variation analysis to which the
results in this paper can be compared. As compared to survey-based estimates like those
derived from the American Community Survey, for example, the QWI employment and
earnings tabulations have accuracy comparable to the PUMA and small state accuracy
of the ACS (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015) even though the QWI total variability measures
include the errors from coverage, edit, imputation, and sampling while those from the
ACS include only sampling variability.
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3.6 Summary Tables
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX: HOURS OFF THE CLOCK
A.1 Models of Efficiency Wages and Labor Hoarding
A.1.1 Model of Increased Worker Effort
The model is intentionally simple, and as such does not present a formal theory of un-
employment determination, or any equilibrium outcomes. What it does is clarify the
continuous implicit bargain between workers and firms, and give intuition for the differ-
ence between hours worked and hours paid. The model is similar to the one presented
in Lazear et al. (2015), but here effort takes the form of hours worked above what is ex-
plicitly recorded by employers. Workers are assumed to be paid a fixed salary implying
that their wage is really a gross earnings measure quoted over a fixed period that does not
vary with hours worked. Employer-recorded weekly hours are therefore an estimate usu-
ally determined by prevailing laws and/or employer knowledge. In the United States, it
is typical for a salaried employee to be quoted a salary on a yearly basis (usually paid
every two weeks or twice per month), with 40 hours per week that is loosely monitored
by the employer. Workers therefore have some latitude to choose the hours they actually
work in a given week, trading off their distaste for work against employers’ expectations
of output.
In the model, time is discrete and workers are already matched with firms for a ne-
gotiated period earnings measure, which I assume is fixed. Workers are exempt from
overtime and employers assume workers put in at least the statutory overtime limit of h¯
hours. Employers would like to terminate employees deemed to be shirking. Employ-
ers monitor worker effort and they use observed hours as a proxy, whether perfectly
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observed, or a noisy measure. For example, a worker who chooses not to show up to
work stands a high risk of being fired. Conversely, a worker who chooses to put in more
hours likely produces more, and sends a (possibly) valuable signal to employers about
her ability to produce, which reduces her probability of being fired. I define the function
P(h) : R+ → [0, 1] ⊂ R, which maps hours worked to the probability a worker retains her
job in a given period. The probability of retention is an increasing and concave function
of hours worked with P(0) = 0 and P′(h) > 0, P′′(h) < 0.
Putting forth effort is costly for workers, both because work is generally unpleasant,
and because workers are paid a lump sum regardless of how many hours they actually
work. Therefore, workers would prefer to work as little hours as possible. I capture the
cost to workers of putting forth greater effort by the function c(h) : R+ → R+. The costs
to greater working hours are increasing and convex with c(0) = 0 and c′(h) > 0, c′′(h) > 0.
In addition to the direct costs of more hours, workers must also weigh the costs of unem-
ployment. More specifically, the costs of losing one’s job in times of greater labor market
slack are much greater than when labor markets are tight, and the probability of contact-
ing and finding a suitable job is much higher. Define the unemployment rate by u, which
both employers and workers take as given. Further, define the option value of search from
unemployment by R. Although this sounds like the beginnings of a rudimentary search
model, no formal theory of of the aggregate determination of vacancies, unemployment
and search will be presented here.
Workers choose the optimal hours to work conditional on the explicit costs of working
and the indirect costs of aggregate labor market conditions. The problem of the worker is
max
h
V(h) = P(h) [W − c(h)] + (1 − P(h))(1 − u)R , (A.1)
where W is the gross earnings in the period, and V(h) is the asset value to the worker of
holding the job. The worker chooses the optimal hours of work to maximize A.1. Using
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the first order condition and the implicit function theorem yields the following equation,
∂h
∂u
= −P
′(h)R
∂2V(h)
∂h
> 0 . (A.2)
The inequality follows from the fact that W − c(h) > (1 − u)R in order for the employment
relationship to continue. Higher unemployment leads to greater hours worked.
Intuitively, hours increase in order to the decrease the probability of being fired, due
to the decrease in the payoff from unemployment. The second term in equation A.1 gives
the value of outside employment, R. As the probability of ascending to employment de-
creases – as u increases – workers put forth more hours to avoid unemployment. With the
employer’s report of hours paid fixed at h¯, higher unemployment rates lead to a greater
spread between hours worked and hours paid.
A.1.2 Model of Labor Hoarding
The labor hoarding model is best conceptualized using a model of labor demand with ad-
justment costs to employment. I describe the problem and the result loosely through the
“gap approach” (Caballero and Engel, 1993; Caballero et al., 1997). Consider a firm whose
production technology in a period uses only total labor inputs f (mt), with fm (·) > 0, and
mt = etht, where et is total employment and ht is average hours worked. I assume there is
an upper bound on the average hours worked per worker in a period so that firms seek
to employ more than one worker. Further, define h¯ as the long-run average hours per
employee in the firm. For the purposes of this discussion, we can assume h¯ = 40 and
that these are recorded by the firm as hours paid regardless of actual hours worked. Pro-
duction faces aggregate shocks At drawn from a probability distribution F (A). I assume
only that the probability distribution and production function are such that fA (·) > 0,
which implies that negative aggregate shocks should lead to decreased production in the
absence of adjustment costs.
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Consider a firm faced with negative aggregate demand shock in the next period. Sup-
pose the current period’s employment as et−1 and without a loss of generality that ht−1 = h¯.
Following the gap approach, define e∗t as the frictionless optimal employment target for
next period given the realization of the negative aggregate demand shock. This is the
optimal employment for the firm if for the current period, and the current period only,
the firm did not have to pay any costs to adjust employment. Given the nature of the
production function, it holds that e∗t ≤ et−1, and et ∈
[
e∗t , et−1
]
. In other words, the optimal
employment level given the shock will be bounded above by the current employment
level, and bounded below by the optimal frictionless level. The firm would like to get as
close to its optimal production level as possible, but in most cases the optimal employ-
ment level will lie above the frictionless level. Thus, firms will adjust average hours down
in order to further decrease production beyond what was possible by only adjusting la-
bor yielding ht ≤ ht−1. The same logic, but in the opposite direction holds for a positive
aggregate demand shock.
Putting this altogether, we see that a negative aggregate demand shock leads to less
hours worked. Note that in this model employment and hours move in the same di-
rection in response to a negative aggregate demand shock. The empirical results posit a
relationship between labor market slack and the difference between hours paid and hours
worked. Given the model, we need to assume the unemployment rate is negatively cor-
related with aggregate demand shocks. That is, a positive demand shock produces non-
positive movement in the unemployment rate. This assumption seems straightforward.
To wrap up, a negative aggregate demand shock raises unemployment and forces
firms to cut production as well as raising the unemployment rate. Employment cannot
fall to its frictionless level so firms reduce hours worked to get closer to the optimal level
of output. As long as hours paid stay near constant, this produces the desired empirical
test of greater labor market slack and a non-positive gap between hours worked and
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hours paid.
A.2 Details on Inverse Probability Weighting
The ACS links to the LEHD via a protected identification key (PIK). A PIK is a random
number mapped to a social security number, which serves as an internal Census Bureau
person-level identifier. PIK assignment is usually assumed to be correct, however survey
responses who fail to receive a PIK are known to be missing at random in the sense of
Rubin (1987).
Following (Meyer and Goerge, 2011) who point out that PIKs appear to be missing at
random, I use inverse probability weights to correct the ACS weights for PIKs missing
at random. I fit a probit model with a rich set of characteristics to predict the probability
of receiving a PIK. Using the fit model, I estimate the predicted probability for each cell,
and then multiply the ACS weights by the inverse of the probability of receiving a PIK for
each cell. Results obtained using weights adjusted in this manner differ very little from
when they are omitted. At no point do the qualitative findings change.
The terms of my data use for this project preclude the disclosure of ACS estimates
without commingled LEHD data. As such, I am not able to disclose the probit estimates
for the inverse probability weighting. The variables are summarized in Table A.4. How-
ever, I am able to describe the key parameters qualitatively. In general, the included
covariates and results adhere closely to those used in Meyer and Goerge (2011).
The probability of receiving a PIK increases with age, likely due to greater work ex-
perience. The same holds true with education. The probability of receiving a PIK in-
creases with the highest level of educational attainment. People of color and Hispanics
are slightly less likely to receive a PIK than white non-Hispanics. Women and American
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citizens are more likely to receive a PIK, while respondents who report speaking English
“Well” or “Very Well” are more likely to receive a PIK than respondents who report speak-
ing English “Not Well” or “Not at All”. Finally, respondents who did not move residences
in the last year have a higher probability of receiving a PIK than those who did.
A.3 Details on Hourly/Nonhourly Imputation
Neither the ACS nor the LEHD datasets provide information on frequency or method of
pay for their earnings variables. This section describes the imputation of the probability
that an ACS respondent was not paid by the hour. This can include earnings or salaries
paid at annual, monthly, weekly or biweekly rate. This would also include workers who
are paid a piece rate. I use the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group
(CPS ORG) files, which asks respondents if they were paid by the hour or by some other
arrangement on their main job last week. I model the probability that a job is not paid
by the hour using a logit model, with covariates describing firm and job characteristics
common to both the CPS ORG and ACS. After fitting the model, I generate a predicted
probability for each cell of covariates. The final estimates are then attached to the ACS
using the common covariates. A more detailed explanation is offered below.
The CPS is a monthly survey of 60,000 households, which ask about labor market
activities during the previous week. Respondents are surveyed for four consecutive
months, they are then not interviewed for 8 months, and then they are reinterviewed
for another four months. The interviews conducted on the 4th and 8th months contain
additional questions on earnings and hours for jobs worked the previous week. I use
data from all months from 2010-2013, which corresponds to the ACS years in my sam-
ple. I include only records who worked in the private sector, state government, or local
government. This discards federal government workers, and the self-employed, neither
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of whom are included in the ACS-LEHD matched sample. Finally, I keep only records
for which the dependent variable, “Hourly/Non-hourly status” is neither edited nor al-
located.
To impute hourly/non-hourly pay, I fit a fully interacted least squares model with a
LASSO penalty. The LASSO provides a parsimonious model for both covariate shrinkage
and subset selection for an OLS model (Tibshirani, 1996). I use the LASSO in this set-
ting primarily as a tool for subset selection, using both five fold cross validation and the
Akaike information criterion (AIC) for selecting the LASSO parameter, which effectively
chooses the non-zero covariates in the model. Both methods return similar results, with
the best model including an indicator for whether a respondent has a Bachelor’s degree
or more, and an indicator for whether weekly earnings on the main job is in the top tercile
of earnings, as well as their interaction.
For the final imputation model I run a logit model interacting occupation, industry,
and tercile of weekly earnings. Although the LASSO indicated that a variable for Bache-
lor’s degree or higher should be included, I omit it from the final imputation model for
two reasons. First, although highly correlated with non-hourly pay, there is no a priori
reason for its inclusion. Unlike weekly earnings, education is not part of the duties test
for exemption from overtime. Second, although correlated, I would like to evaluate ed-
ucation separately in the statistical analysis. Including it in the non-hourly imputation
would make the results hard to identify and interpret. Finally, I include NAICS industry
sectors and major occupation groups in the final model. Job duties is one of the major tests
for exemption from overtime, which correlates highly with non-hourly status. Various in-
dustries carve out exemptions for overtime and determine pay norms, which argues for
its inclusion.
After fitting the model on the CPS, I attach the predicted probabilities for each cell
to the final analysis sample. Attaching major occupation groups and industry is straight
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forward. I do not observe weekly earning for either the ACS or the LEHD. I calculate
annual earnings terciles based on the LEHD, and use that as the tercile to which I map
weekly earnings. This assumes the same weekly earnings is earned each week, which
scales weekly earnings to an annual earnings measure.1 I then bin each observation in the
final analysis sample by quartile of their likelihood of non-hourly pay.
Summary statistics for the analysis sample by quartile of non-hourly pay are available
in Table A.3. Based on prior knowledge and casual observation, the results are largely
what one would expect. Observations in the highest quartile of probability they are not
paid by the hour have much higher reported hours worked compared to hours paid av-
eraging 14.3% assuming 52 weeks worked. In contrast, quartiles one through three are
relatively uniform with hours worked exceeding hours paid by 6.8%, 4.0%, and 6.3% for
quartiles one through three, respectively. The remaining stratifying variables change by
quartile as expected. Workers in the top quartile are much more likely to be white, male,
and have a Bachelor’s degree.
A.4 Additional Tables and Figures
1Recall the final analysis sample is only for full-year workers.
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Table A.1: The Effect of the Unemployment Rate on Hours Worked and Hours Paid
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Dependent Variable: Log Annual ACS Hours
Unemployment rate (β) -0.00126 -0.000917 -0.00206** -0.00213**
(0.00110) (0.00129) (0.000820) (0.000851)
Panel B. Dependent Variable: Log Annual ACS Hours, Winsorized 5%
Unemployment rate (β) -0.000763 -0.000275 -0.00138* -0.00146*
(0.001000) (0.00116) (0.000742) (0.000767)
Panel C. Dependent Variable: Log Annual LEHD Hours
Unemployment rate (β) 0.000121 0.000829 -0.000451 -0.000414
(0.00123) (0.00129) (0.000766) (0.000747)
Panel D. Dependent Variable: Log Annual LEHD Hours, Winsorized 5%
Unemployment rate (β) 0.000387 0.00123 1.10e-05 2.92e-05
(0.00109) (0.00113) (0.000610) (0.000604)
State FE X X X X
Commuting Zone Time Trends X X X
Firm & Job controls X X
Demographic controls X
Notes: N = 218, 000, with 58 commuting zones. Dependent variable indicated by panel title. All regressions estimated
using ordinary least squares using the specification outlined in equation 1.2. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by
commuting zone. Stars on standard errors accord to p-values as follows: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table A.2: Firm Size by Likely Exempt Status
(1) (2) (3)
Non-Supervisory Occ. Bottom Half Quartiles Bottom Three Quartiles
0-19 0.0294*** 0.0489*** 0.0412***
(0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0054)
20-49 0.00846 0.0190*** 0.0138**
(0.0114) (0.0072) (0.0067)
50-249 0.00647 0.00521 0.0009
(0.0059) (0.0062) (0.0050)
250-999 0.0000 0.00371 -0.0046
(0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0053)
1,000-2,499 0.0126 0.00596 0.00232
(0.0081) (0.0079) (0.0069)
Supervisory Occupations Top Half Quartiles Top Quartile
0-19 0.0599*** 0.0615*** 0.0591***
(0.0065) (0.0064) (0.00659)
20-49 0.0280*** 0.0460*** 0.0534***
(0.0099) (0.0133) (0.0163)
50-249 0.0384*** 0.0620*** 0.0870***
(0.0058) (0.0062) (0.00611)
250-999 0.0198*** 0.0457*** 0.0690***
(0.0060) (0.0068) (0.00756)
1,000-2,499 0.0202*** 0.0641*** 0.0902***
(0.0073) (0.0089) (0.0103)
+2,500 0.0391*** 0.0607*** 0.0823***
(0.0049) (0.0060) (0.00710)
Firm controls X X X
Year-Quarter FE X X X
State FE X X X
Demographic controls X X X
R2 0.098 0.119 0.124
Notes: N = 218, 000. Dependent variable in all columns is the difference between log annual ACS hours calculated
at 52 weeks and log annual LEHD hours. Each column is its own regression specification. All coefficients reported
in reference to largest firm size group (+2,500) interacted with top panel in each of the three regressions. For
column (1) that is non-supervisory occupations, column (2) is the bottom two quartiles of probability non-hourly
pay, and column (3) is the bottom three quarters of probability non-hourly pay. Cluster-robust standard errors
clustered by state employer of dominant job. Stars on standard errors accord to p-values as follows: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure A.1: Distribution of the Difference of Log Labor Earnings (ACS) and Log Labor
Earnings (LEHD) by Usual Weekly Hours
Notes: Variable is the difference in log ACS earnings from log LEHD earnings for the full sample,
winsorized at the 5% and 95% level. The variable is partitioned by whether an ACS respondent answers
that she usually works either 1) less than 40 hours per work (top panel) or 2) exactly 40 hours a week
(middle panel) or 3) more than 40 hours per week (bottom panel). Top panel N = 49, 000, middle panel
N = 108, 000, bottom panel N = 61, 000. Mean of bottom panel −0.094 [0.318], middle panel −0.077 [0.247]
and bottom panel −0.078 [0.248].
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Table A.4: Covariates in Inverse Probability Weighting Probit
Variable Description
Gender Indicator for whether male.
Age 16-19, 20-34, 35-49, 50-65, 65+
Education Less than high school, High School, Some College, BA+
White Indicator for whether race is white
Hispanic Indicator for hispanic ethnicity
Citizen Indicator for whether U.S. citizen
Married Indicator for whether married
Kids Indicator for presence of own children
Moved Indicator for whether moved in last year
Disability Indicator for whether has a disability
English Indicator for whether speaks English ”Very well” or ”Well”
Labor Force Indicator for whether in labor force
Notes: Variables used for reweighting sample weights to account for PIKs missing at random. All variables
are indicator variables unless otherwise noted. Construction and use of the weights is described in
appendix A.2.
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Figure A.2: Share of Wage and Salary Workers not Paid by the Hour, 1994-2015
Notes: Author’s Analysis of Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group data. Sample excludes
self-employed and those who worked without pay.
Figure A.3: Distribution of Year-over-year Change in Quarterly Unemployment rates by
Commuting Zone
Notes: N=218,000. Mean −0.568 [0.689].
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Table A.6: Regression Results for Firm Growth and Work Off the Clock
Single Establishment Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year/Year Firm Growth 0.00511 0.00585
(0.00465) (0.00531)
Year/Year Firm Growth Bins
Low 0.00523 0.00127
(0.00359) (0.00314)
Mid-low -0.00170 -0.00593*
(0.00327) (0.00310)
Mid-high -0.00612* -0.00930***
(0.00354) (0.00298)
High 0.00362 -0.000451
(0.00374) (0.00317)
Year/Year Establishment Growth -0.00510
(0.00331)
Year/Year Establishment Growth Bins
Low 0.00369
(0.00342)
Mid-low -0.00461
(0.00337)
Mid-high -0.00565*
(0.00317)
High -0.000300
(0.00353)
Observations 218,000 218,000 218,000 218,000 126,000 126,000
R2 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.114 0.115
Notes: N = 218, 000. Dependent variable is the difference between log annual ACS hours calculated at 52 weeks and log annual
LEHD hours. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered by state-firm. All year/year growth measures calculated using Haltiwanger
et al. (1996). Firm growth calculated using state-firm employment counts in ACS interview quarter and one year prior. Establish-
ment growth rates use the modal establishment from the LEHD unit-to-worker imputation. Firm and establishment growth
bins calculated as evenly spaced quintiles of the analysis sample according to firm and establishment growth rates, respectively.
Firm/Establishment growth rate bins interpreted in relation to middle quintile, which has mean approximately zero. Columns (5)
and (6) subset the sample to only single establishment firms negating use of unit-to-worker imputation. All results estimated with
OLS and include firm, job, demographic, and local labor market controls. Stars on standard errors accord to p-values as follows:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX: HOURS ADJUSTMENTS
B.1 Transitions
B.1.1 Full-Time Employment
Hires from Employment to Full-Time Employment
hires,ini, j,t (FT|E) =

1 if
yi, j,t−2 = 0 and yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0
yi, j′,t−2 > 0, for some j′ , j
hi, j,t ≥ 400
0 otherwise
Hires from Nonemployment to Full-Time Employment
hires,ini, j,t (FT|NE) =

1 if
yi, j,t−2 = 0 and yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0
yi, j′,t−2 = 0, ∀ j′
hi, j,t ≥ 400
0 otherwise
Stayer who transitions from Full-Time Employment to Full-Time Employment
stayers,ini, j,t (FT|FT) =

1 if
yi, j,t−2 > 0 and yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0
hi, j,t−1 ≥ 400
hi, j,t ≥ 400
0 otherwise
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Stayer who transitions from Part-Time Employment to Full-Time Employment
stayers,ini, j,t (FT|PT) =

1 if
yi, j,t−2 > 0 and yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0
hi, j,t−1 < 400
hi, j,t ≥ 400
0 otherwise
B.1.2 Part-Time Employment
Hires from Employment to Part-Time Employment
hires,ini, j,t (PT|E) =

1 if
yi, j,t−2 = 0 and yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0
yi, j′,t−2 > 0, for some j′ , j
hi, j,t < 400
0 otherwise
Hires from Nonemployment to Part-Time Employment
hires,ini, j,t (PT|NE) =

1 if
yi, j,t−2 = 0 and yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0
yi, j′,t−2 = 0, ∀ j′
hi, j,t < 400
0 otherwise
Stayer who transitions from Full-Time Employment to Part-Time Employment
stayers,ini, j,t (FT|FT) =

1 if
yi, j,t−2 > 0 and yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0
hi, j,t−1 ≥ 400
hi, j,t < 400
0 otherwise
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Stayer who transitions from Part-Time Employment to Part-Time Employment
stayers,ini, j,t (FT|PT) =

1 if
yi, j,t−2 > 0 and yi, j,t−1 > 0 and yi, j,t > 0 and yi, j,t+1 > 0
hi, j,t−1 < 400
hi, j,t < 400
0 otherwise
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B.2 Appendix Figures
(a) New Hires from Employment (b) New Hires from Nonemployment
(c) Stayers: Transitions from PT to FT (d) Stayers: Transitions from FT to FT
Figure B.1: Transitions to Full-Time Employment by Industry
Notes: Subplot (a) plots the share of full-time employment that are hires from employment. Subplot (b)
plots the share of full-time employment that are hires from nonemployment. Subplot (c) plots the share
of full-time employment that are transitions from part-time employment. Subplot (d) plots the share of
full-time employment that are transitions from full-time employment.
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(a) New Hires from Employment (b) New Hires from Nonemployment
(c) Stayers: Transitions from PT to PT (d) Stayers: Transitions from FT to PT
Figure B.2: Transitions into Part-Time Employment by Industry
Notes: Subplot (a) plots the share of part-time employment that are hires from employment. Subplot (b)
plots the share of part-time employment that are hires from nonemployment. Subplot (c) plots the share
of part-time employment that are transitions from part-time employment. Subplot (d) plots the share of
part-time employment that are transitions from full-time employment.
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B.3 Appendix Tables
Table B.1: BLS NAICS Supersectors
GOODS-PRODUCING
Natural resources and mining
11 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting
21 Mining
Construction
23 Construction
Manufacturing
31-33 Manufacturing
SERVICE-PRODIVING
Trade, transportation, and utilities
22 Utilities
42 Wholesale Trade
44-45 Retail Trade
48-49 Transportation and Warehousing
Information
51 Information
Financial activities
52 Finance and Insurance
53 Real Estate Rental and Leasing
Professional and business services
54 Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises
56 Administrative Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services
Education and health services
61 Educational Services
62 Health Care and Social Assistance
Leisure and hospitality
71 Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation
72 Accommodation and Food Services
Other services
81 Other Services (except Public Administration)
Government
92 Public Administration
Source: See http://www.bls.gov/sae/saesuper.htm.
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX: TOTAL VARIABILITY
C.1 Details of the Methodology for Imputing Missing Birth Date, Sex,
Race, Ethnicity, and Education1
The LEHD data come from state UI systems’ reports of a worker, a firm, and the worker’s
quarterly earnings. The data the Census Bureau receives from the states contain no infor-
mation on worker characteristics including age, sex, race, ethnicity, and education. These
individual characteristics are a unique attribute of the QWI and LODES. In order to pro-
vide the individual characteristics, the Census Bureau attaches its own surveys as well as
administrative data from other U.S. government agencies to the LEHD UI data. In cases
where the outside surveys and administrative data are not sufficient to account for all
characteristics for all workers, the characteristics are imputed.
This appendix documents the methodology for imputing missing individual charac-
teristics in the LEHD infrastructure files. The appendix describes the outside data sources
that provide the individual characteristics that form the basis of the imputation. The can-
didate imputation models and the basis for their selection are also documented. After
explaining the monotone missing data pattern and the final implementation of the im-
putation process, the quality of the imputation is assessed. At the end of the process,
the complete set of individual characteristics is stored in the Individual Characteristics
File (ICF), which stores the individual characteristics for all workers who appear in the
LEHD UI data including 10 draws of the imputation model for each characteristic that is
imputed.
1Portions of this appendix are based on an unpublished technical memo dated February 1, 2011 by John
Abowd, Henry Hyatt, Mark Kutzbach, Erika McEntarfer, Kevin McKinney, Michael Strain, Lars Vilhuber,
and Chen Zhao.
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The main source data for race and ethnicity is the 2000 Decennial Census of Popu-
lation and Housing (short form). For birth date and sex, the Census Numident – Cen-
sus Bureau version of the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) Social Security Number
(SSN) master database – is the only source. In cases where the race and ethnicity data are
incomplete (i.e. an individual’s response to the 2000 Census or ACS was not available)
an imputation of an individual’s race and ethnicity category was computed conditional
on the limited race and ethnicity information available in the Census Numident file (if
available). The source data for education is the 2000 Decennial Census of Population and
Housing Sample Data (long form). Since education is dynamic, particularly for young
workers, education data are only imputed for workers aged 25 and older.
The missing characteristics are imputed using a Bayesian version of the continuous-
discrete multivariate product kernel density (KDE) approach. In some instances a multi-
nomial model with Dirichlet priors was employed. These missing data follow a mono-
tone pattern. The characteristics are imputed in three stages, with data completed from
the previous stage used in the imputation model for the next stage. The end results is
10 implicates of completed data drawn from estimates of the posterior distribution of the
characteristics.
To assess the out-of-sample performance of the imputation model, two separate tests
are used. First, the completed race, ethnicity, and education variables were matched to
a sample of respondents from the ACS (2000-2010). These comparisons show highly ac-
curate imputation rates, particularly for the larger race and ethnicity groups: White (95%
accuracy), Black (90% accuracy), Asian (85% accuracy), and Hispanic (80% accuracy). For
education, the results are adequate, but they do not display the same level of accuracy.
In addition to conducting ACS comparisons, the geographic variability captured
by our education model was also assessed. Using a sub-sample of workers who
have a recorded 2000 Decennial Census (long form) education response, tabulations
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of beginning-of-quarter employment, full-quarter employment, and average quarterly
wages for full-quarter employees by both the actual and imputed value are calculated.
These comparisons show close correspondence, particularly for wages. At the statewide
level, the difference between full-quarter wages within education categories for reported
and imputed education ranges from -6.8% to +8.0% with some cells within 0.2%. The
share of beginning of quarter employment in each education category varies by a range
of -5.3 to 6.6 percentage points with most cells within 2 percentage points.
The rest of this appendix proceeds as follows. Section C.1.1 describes the selection
of the missing data model for imputing the individual characteristics, Section C.1.2 de-
tails the implementation of the models for each of the characteristics, and Section C.1.3
assesses the quality of the imputation.
C.1.1 Methodological Approach
Missing, birth date, sex, race, ethnicity, and education were imputed using multiple impu-
tation following Rubin (1987). The candidate imputation models were implemented and
tested before selecting a final procedure at each stage of the imputation. We compared
several different estimators: (i) the standard Li and Racine (2003) mixed continuous-
discrete KDE (LR); (ii) a Bayesian Li-Racine method based on an approach developed
by Zhang et al. (2006) for estimating the posterior of the bandwidth parameter (ZH); (iii)
a multinomial distribution with a Dirichlet prior combined with Bayesian bootstrap re-
sampling (BB); (iv) a cold deck (the equivalent of hot deck methods when all the data are
given) (CD); and (v) a naı¨ve method (modal imputations in sub groups) (NA).
To assess the performance of each candidate, a 3-dimensional distribution for birth
year, race/ethnicity, and education was created using data from the Current Population
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Survey (CPS).2 Using balanced half-sample cross validation, the research question exam-
ined was: with 100% imputation rates, what are the Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KL)
and Mean Squared Error (MSE) losses associated with each of these methods, assuming
ignorable missing data.
The combined CPS’s were treated as a synthetic population of 170,000 individuals.
For each of the candidates the KL and MSE criteria were estimated using the CPS data.
The KL was computed by comparing the actual and imputed distributions. Half-samples
were created randomly by assigning in-scope individuals permanently to A and B sub-
populations of equal sizes. All models were fit on sub-population A, then used to impute
sub-population B, subsequently the process was reversed with the estimates based on the
B sample used to impute A. Hence, every member of the population received imputed
values for every model based on an out-of-estimation-sample forecast. All the estima-
tors were compared for a variety of stratifying schemes. KL and MSE performances were
considered when adopting strategies for choosing stratifiers used in the final implemen-
tation.
The ZH and LR methods underestimated the KL and MSE losses, using BB as the
standard, but often by less than 10%. In many cases, the ZH and LR methods were effec-
tively indistinguishable from the BB. LR, ZH and BB substantially out-performed both the
cold-deck and naı¨ve models. Up to two levels of stratifiers, with a total of eight subpop-
ulations, were tested.3 There were large (one or two orders of magnitude) improvements
in the KL and MSE loss estimates as stratifiers were added. The BB, ZH, LR, and CD
methods all led to the same conclusions about which stratifiers to consider first, and to
the conclusion that with subpopulations of 20,000 from a population of 170,000, all strat-
ifiers improved the KL and MSE measurably. The NA model performed poorly, which
2Specifically, the 1998 through 2005 pooled March data.
3This approximately evenly stratified the CPS population into sub-populations of about 20,000 records
each.
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was expected. The BB, ZH, and LR models all outperformed the CD, and were roughly
comparable.
LR and ZH methods were implemented for birth date, sex, race and ethnicity, and
partly for education. A variant of BB was also implemented for education. The two KDE
methods perform well relative to BB, directly handle continuous data, and allow greater
flexibility in the actual implementation. Occasionally the cells created by the stratifiers
became too small to estimate with the KDE methods necessitating the use of BB.
C.1.2 Implementation
The missing data follow a special monotone pattern, allowing us to complete the data in
three stages. Birth date, sex and place of birth (completed but not used in any tabula-
tions) have the least missing data (about 5% of cases), and are (almost) always missing if
race, ethnicity or education are missing. Race and ethnicity are missing for about 18% of
the individuals, and are always missing if education is missing. The variables with the
least amount of missing data first (sex, birth date, and place of birth), were imputed first.
Missing race and ethnicity were imputed next, taking the imputed values for birth date,
sex, and place of birth as given. Finally, missing education was imputed.4
At each stage, the variables imputed in the previous stage(s) along with various de-
tailed work history, firm, and co-worker characteristics derived from the unemployment
insurance wage data were used to create cells. The design of this stratification scheme
was based on the tests described above using the CPS test synthetic population.
The models are fit using persons with complete information at each stage with a full
4The monotone missing data pattern is a result of the process by which SSNs are attached to the 2000
Decennial. Sex, date of birth, and place of birth are available on the Census Numident. These data are
virtually complete because they are necessary for the administration of the program. Only valid SSNs can
be attached to a given 2000 Decennial record, generating the monotone missing data pattern.
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set of interacted explanatory variables. Intuitively, the models partition observations by
stratifying variables (workers) into cells, and then estimate the distribution of interest for
each cell. For example, a model for education would estimate the education distribution
for a cell of white women ages 35-44 with non-missing education. Observations who are
white women ages 35-44, and who are missing education would then receive 10 draws
from the distribution fit on that cell.
Birth date, Sex, and Place of Birth
The Social Security Administrations Numident is the source for birth date and sex. The
Numident is the Social Security Administrations master file of issued SSNs, which con-
tains a near universe of birth date and sex information of U.S. workers. Approximately
97% of workers in the LEHD data can be matched to the Numident. Birth date and sex
are multiply imputed for approximately 7% of records.
A non-parametric KDE is used to estimate the joint distribution of sex and age con-
ditional on various observed characteristics. The model is state specific, and uses the
complete set of yearly earnings and employment indicator variables spanning the entire
time a states records are available. The estimated model parameters are used to calculate
a predicted probability the record is male. Age is imputed is a similar manner. QWI and
LODES report age in eight discrete categories. For the purpose of imputing birth date, a
record with missing birth date information is assigned into one of the eight age categories
using the KDE model similar to the sex imputation. Date of birth is then assigned based
on the distribution of ages within each of the eight age categories for entering workers. As
with sex, 10 independent draws assign 10 separate dates of birth for each record contain
missing date of birth.
The sex and place of birth variables are unordered categorical, and age is real numeric.
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For estimating the distributions, the following stratifiers were used. Stratifiers for stage
A:
• Modal place of birth non-native-born coworkers
• Proportion of coworkers that are male (> 50%).
• New worker indicator.
Race and Ethnicity
To implement the race and ethnicity imputation, the following steps were taken. First,
since the 2000 Census Short Form provided substantial respondent flexibility for report-
ing race and ethnicity, it was necessary to simplify the reporting for the imputation mod-
els. The vast majority of respondents chose single race and ethnicity categories. A small
fraction of the population (less than 3%) reported multiple race and/or ethnicity re-
sponses. In compliance with OMB statistical policy, the multiple race responses were
collapsed into a single category (two or more races), and ethnicity was collapsed to two
responses (Hispanic and not Hispanic). For the respondents who reported “some other
race,” the actual response was set to missing and they were imputed into one of the OMB-
approved race categories.
The non-parametric unordered KDE modeled the joint distribution of race and ethnic-
ity. The model incorporates the imputed age and sex information from the previous step.
The race variable is grouped into seven different categories, and the ethnicity variable
into just two: Hispanic and not Hispanic. The principal source for race and ethnicity in-
formation comes from the 2000 Census decennial short form. Subsequent iterations of the
model also incorporate race and ethnicity information from the American Community
Survey. Approximately 82% of persons found in the LEHD have valid race and ethnicity
information from either the decennial Census of the American Community Survey. For
147
the remaining records with missing race or ethnicity, the values are multiply imputed.
The ethnicity categories on the QWI tabulations by race and ethnicity are:
1. Hispanic or Latino
2. Not Hispanic or Latino
The race categories on the QWI tabulations by race and ethnicity are:
1. White Alone
2. Black or African American Alone
3. Asian Alone
4. Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander Alone
5. American Indian or Alaska Native Alone
6. Two or More Races.
Race and Ethnicity are both unordered categorical variables. The stratifiers for stage
B include both age and place of birth from stage A. In addition, there are:
• Collapsed race/ethnicity cells from the Census Numident
• Average yearly earnings quartiles.
• Coworker fraction white and coworker fraction Hispanic.
• Co-resident fraction white and co-resident fraction Hispanic.
Education
The data for the education imputation come from the 2000 Decennial Census Long Form.
Approximately 7% of LEHD workers have valid education information.5 The modal re-
5A recent update includes the ACS after 2000. This increases the number of workers with valid education
information to 15%.
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sponse “high school graduate, no college” was retained exactly. Three additional cate-
gories were created by collapsing the other responses from the 2000 Decennial Census
Long Form education variable. The education categories are:
1. Less than a high school diploma
2. High school graduate, no college
3. Some college or Associates degree
4. Bachelor’s degree or above.
Unlike race and ethnicity, which were modeled as time-invariant, a person is at risk
to accrue additional formal education after entering the workforce, however, this risk de-
clines with age. Individuals generally complete high school before age 20, while Bache-
lor’s degrees are disproportionately attained between the ages of 22 and 25. To ameliorate
concerns of younger workers attending post-secondary education, the QWI and LODES
only report and impute education data for workers at least age 25.
A Bachelor’s degree is almost always required to pursue a graduate degree. Associate
degree and some college were collapsed into a single category. The resulting ordered
categorical education variable allows the use of an informative kernel when estimating
the education density. The stage C stratifiers include the imputed variables from stages
A and B as well as:
• Place of birth by income quantile.
• Native and Non-native status.
• Modal NAICS (6 categories) for dominant job.
• Collapsed race and ethnicity cells.
• Coworker fraction male.
• Full-quarter earnings deciles.
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• Co-resident fraction white and co-resident fraction Hispanic.
For education, the multinomial-Dirichlet (called BB above, but with no final bootstrap
step) was used. Although the LR KDE has improved out of sample performance for
imputing education, in the current implementation a fully interacted log-linear model
with flat priors was used instead because of its superior performance in small geographic
cells. When using stratifiers with a large number of outcomes (detailed geography in
particular), the number of cells became too large relative to the sample size. To solve this
problem we estimated a log-linear model with a reduced set of parameters. This allows us
to include stratifiers as main effects only or with limited interactions, improving overall
performance. This is essentially a small-area estimator with mean vector given by the
main effects associated with the stratifiers and local effect estimated from the log-linear
model.
C.1.3 Quality of the Results
For imputations of race and ethnicity, the chief quality check is a detailed comparison of
the completed race and ethnicity variables to a matched sample of respondents on the
American Community Survey (ACS). Because the ACS was not used as an input for the
imputation models, the ACS provides an out-of-sample performance assessment.
The primary question posed by this analysis was: how frequently does the missing
data model impute individuals with no 2000 Census race or ethnicity information to the
same race or ethnicity category they indicate in the ACS? The results show very accurate
imputations for most race and ethnicity groups, although there is variation across ACS
race and ethnicity categories. The highest levels of accuracy, defined here as imputing
a response on the LEHD infrastructure consistent with ACS race/ethnicity response, are
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for the largest race and ethnicity groups: White (95% accuracy), African-American (90%
accuracy), Asian (85% accuracy), and Hispanic (80% accuracy).
Defining an accuracy measure for Native American populations (American Indian,
Alaska Native, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander) proved more problematic as a
matched sample of Census/ACS respondents indicated that a large share of these re-
spondents diverged in their race responses between the Census and the ACS. However,
for Native Americans that answer both surveys consistently, imputed LEHD race corre-
sponds to self-reported race well over half of the time. A sizable share of self-reported
Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders are imputed to Asian in the LEHD infrastructure,
in part because a key stratifier for the race imputation (the race variable on the Census
Numident) does not separate Pacific Islanders from Asians.
For imputations of education, multiple levels of quality checks were employed. In ad-
dition to comparisons with the ACS, a comparison of key QWI variables for three sample
states by education, and education x sex, was analyzed using both reported education
and imputed education. This analysis uses a sample of workers in the LEHD infras-
tructure that has a reported 2000 Census long form education response, for which an im-
puted response was also generated for this assessment. Beginning of quarter employment
(B), full-quarter employment (F), and average monthly wages for full-quarter employees
(Z W3) were studied using both respondent-supplied education and imputed education.
These indicators were computed for both the reported value of education and for each of
the 10 education implicates. The difference between the value of the QWI indicator using
reported education and the average value for the indicator using imputed education over
the 10 implicates was studied.
For B, F, and Z W3 analyzing the Education x Sex breakdown at the statewide level,
the correspondence is quite close. In statewide Education X Sex tabulations, the difference
between average full-quarter wages within categories for reported and imputed educa-
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tion ranges from -8.1% to +9.4%. The share of beginning of quarter employment in each
education category varies by a range of -5.3 to +6.6 percentage points with the smallest
difference being less than 0.001 percentage points at the statewide level. Differences in
male/female wage gaps and employment by education across states are largely retained
in the imputed results.6
ACS Results
To construct the review of imputation quality the results were merged with the ACS. First,
three years of person-level data from the ACS were appended together. The same ICF
variables used in the imputation were constructed from the unedited responses on the
ACS. The education, race, and ethnicity characteristics constructed form the ACS were
then merged into the newly created ICF by PIK. Due to the dynamic nature of education,
only records older than 25 years of age after April 1st 2000 (according to ICF variable
dob1) were retained for the analysis.
The ICF records were then stratified for each variable. The records were partitioned
by variable according to whether they contained a corresponding valid ACS response.
Records were then further subdivided into whether or not the ICF variable was imputed
creating four mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive groups. The group contain-
ing records for which there was no corresponding valid ACS variable, and in which the
value was not imputed, serves as the baseline distribution for each variable. For the two
groups for which a valid ACS response exits – ICF variable imputed, and not imputed –
the distribution of the ICF variable was computed conditional on the ACS response for
each of the two groups.
In addition to the conditional distribution means, confidence intervals were computed
6For disclosure limitation, all results are rounded to three significant digits.
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for each value of the distribution using the Rubin methodology (within and between im-
pute variance) to draw confidence intervals around the each category using all implicates
of the imputed data. Standard errors are calculated using the following formula (de-
scribed in U.S. Census Bureau (2003a)),
stnd error = D
√
S − 1
B
(
accpct
) (
1 − accpct
)
(C.1)
where D is the corresponding US design factor for the standard error, S is the number of
persons in each of the mutually exclusive categories corresponding to a particular vari-
able minus 1, and B is the population count over age 25 according to the 2000 Decennial
Census SF3 file for each category.
For the persons not imputed in the ICF and not matching to the ACS, variable-specific
design factors, to account for over-sampling of some populations, were taken from the
“Accuracy of Microdata Sample Estimates: Census 2000 PUMS Standard Error Design
Factors (U.S. Census Bureau, 2003a).” For Persons matching to the ACS, variable specific
design factors were taken from U.S. Census Bureau (2003b).
For each category of each race, ethnicity and education variable, the imputation model
was more informative than a random allocation across categories would have been. The
models assigned a higher share of individuals to the same category as those persons re-
sponded in the ACS than would be expected if the imputation models assigned categories
completely at random from the aggregate distribution. The analysis shows, however, that
there is considerable variation in imputation quality across variables.
Tables C.1, C.2, and C.3 show the results and 90-10 confidence intervals for the impu-
tation quality analysis for the variables education, ethnicity, and race, respectively. Each
table contains the results for each valuable broken out by the individual categories of the
variable as reported in the ACS. Table C.1 displays the results for education. The major
row heading has the categories for the four possible ACS responses as well as the cate-
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gory for ICF records who do not match to a valid education category. The latter group
is the first row in the table. The minor row heading for ”Not in ACS” indicates that in
addition to not matching to the ACS, this group includes only ICF records whose edu-
cation categories were not imputed. Moving across the first row, the remaining columns
give the education distribution for this group. The remaining rows of Table C.1 give the
distribution of education conditional on a particular ACS value of education. The minor
row headings indicate that these groups are further partitioned by whether the ICF value
was imputed.
Table C.1: Distribution of ICF Categories across ACS Response Categories, Education
Distribution of catagories in ICF 90% CI < High School High School Some College ≥ Bachelor
Not in ACS
Baseline: not imputed Upper 13.8% 29.6% 30.5% 26.2%
Mean 13.7% 29.6% 30.5% 26.2%
Lower 13.7% 29.6% 30.5% 26.2%
ACS: Less than High School
Impute: imputed, ACS is ‘< High School’ Upper 26.3% 33.8% 26.9% 14.3%
Mean 26.0% 33.5% 26.6% 14.0%
Lower 25.6% 33.1% 26.4% 13.6%
Target: not imputed, ACS is ‘< High School’ Upper 80.8% 15.0% 4.2% 1.1%
Mean 80.4% 14.7% 4.0% 1.0%
Lower 80.0% 14.3% 3.8% 0.9%
ACS: High School
Impute: imputed, ACS is ‘High School’ Upper 14.8% 35.6% 31.6% 18.8%
Mean 14.6% 35.4% 31.4% 18.6%
Lower 14.5% 35.1% 31.2% 18.4%
Target: not imputed, ACS is ‘High School’ Upper 6.5% 81.5% 12.0% 0.9%
Mean 6.3% 81.2% 11.7% 0.8%
Lower 6.1% 80.8% 11.4% 0.7%
ACS: Some College
Impute: imputed, ACS is ‘Some College’ Upper 11.0% 29.9% 33.5% 26.4%
Mean 10.8% 29.7% 33.3% 26.2%
Lower 10.7% 29.5% 33.1% 25.9%
Target: not imputed, ACS is ‘Some College’ Upper 1.4% 11.3% 85.2% 3.0%
Mean 1.3% 11.0% 84.8% 2.9%
Lower 1.2% 10.7% 84.5% 2.7%
ACS: ≥ Bachelors
Impute: imputed, ACS is ‘≥ Bachelors’ Upper 6.1% 19.0% 28.6% 47.2%
Mean 6.0% 18.8% 28.4% 46.9%
Lower 5.8% 18.6% 28.1% 46.6%
Target: not imputed, ACS is ‘≥ Bachelors Upper 0.3% 0.9% 4.8% 94.6%
Mean 0.2% 0.8% 4.6% 94.3%
Lower 0.2% 0.7% 4.4% 94.1%
Notes: 90% CI are 90% confidence intervals of the mean. Major row heading is the value of the ACS variable. Minor row heading is the
value of the ICF variable. Major row header “Not in ACS” denotes records that did not match to the ACS.
Figure C.1 depicts the two education distributions for each value of education in the
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ACS. This depicts graphically what is presented in Table C.1. Each sub-figure corresponds
to an ACS value. The blue bars give the distribution of those records, which were not
imputed. This serves as the target distribution. The red bar gives the distribution of the
records which were imputed. Ideally, this would line up perfectly with the blue bars, but
that is not always the case. The green bar shows the overall distribution for records, which
were not imputed, and which did not match to the ACS. This is the baseline distribution,
and it does not vary across ACS categories. In addition to education, figures depicting
impute quality by matching to the ACS are available for race and ethnicity. For each
category of each variable, the impute model should not be expected to be much better
than the matched ACS responses, so the red line is unlikely to be greater than the green
line. The green line does not always equal 1 (or 100%) for the specified ICF category
because some people responded differently on the Decennial Census or Numident than
they did on the ACS.
The education figures show the most accurate imputations were for the “High School”
and “Bachelor’s degree and above” categories. The blue line in Figure C.1(d) shows that a
little over 94% of records reporting “Bachelor’s degree and above” in the 2000 Decennial
also reported the same value in the ACS. Of the records imputed into the “Bachelor’s
degree and above” category and matched to the ACS (red bar), slightly less than 47% had
the same value in the ACS. The corresponding values for “High School,” Figure C.1(b),
are 81.2% (blue bar) and 35.4% (red bar).
The imputations for the education categories “Less than High School” and “Some Col-
lege” were somewhat less successful, as measured by correspondence with the ACS. The
red bar in Figure C.1(c) gives a rate of 84.8% correspondence between the Decennial and
ACS for records which were not imputed and had a value of “Some College.” The blue
bar depicting correspondence for records which were imputed shows a rate of 33.3%. For
“Less than High School” in Figure C.1(a), the two rates are 80.4% (red bar) and 26.0% (blue
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Figure C.1: Impute versus Target: Education
Notes: Sub-figure titles correspond to the value of the education variable in the ICF. The blue bars show the
distribution of education in the ICF among records that were not imputed. The red bars shows the
distribution of education in the ICF among imputed records. The green bars show the distribution of
education among records in the ICF that were not imputed and did not match to the ACS. The green bars
do not vary across sub-figures. See Table C.1 for more detail.
bar). The lower rate of correspondence for all education values compared to “Bachelor’s
degree and above” are expected, as some Decennial respondents will have completed
more schooling upon responding the ACS at a later date.
For ethnicity, the imputation procedure was more accurate than with education. The
population for ethnicity is 90.7% “not Hispanic” versus 9.3% “Hispanic” according to
the 2000 Decennial. Figure C.2(a) shows that conditional on reporting “not Hispanic” in
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Figure C.2: Impute versus Target: Ethnicity
Notes: Sub-figure titles correspond to the value of the ethnicity variable in the ICF. The blue bars show the
distribution of ethnicity in the ICF among records that were not imputed. The red bars shows the
distribution of ethnicity in the ICF among imputed records. The green bars show the distribution of
ethnicity among records in the ICF that were not imputed and did not match to the ACS. The green bars do
not vary across sub-figures. See Table C.2 for more detail.
the ACS, approximately 94.4% are imputed into the “not Hispanic” group compared to
99.6% of ACS respondents who were not imputed and report being “not Hispanic” in the
Decennial Census as well as the ACS. For the Hispanic group, depicted in Figure C.2(b),
these numbers are 80.0% and 94.8%, respectively.
For race, results vary by ACS category. White, Black, and Asian have highly accurate
imputations. For these groups, the results are depicted in Figure C.3. For White, Black,
and Asian, the rates imputed into those categories conditional on the same ACS response
is 94.5%, 89.5%, 83.7%, respectively. This shows relatively high quality as the target dis-
tributions are 99.3%, 96.7%, and 94.5%, for White, Black, and Asian, respectively.
For the race categories with much smaller populations, the comparison to the ACS
did not yield as accurate imputations. The groups Native American or Alaskan Native,
and Hawaiian or Pacific Islander are 0.8% and 0.1%, respectively, of the U.S. population
according to the 2000 Census. Conditional on having an ACS response in the same cate-
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Figure C.3: Impute versus Target: Race
Notes: Sub-figure titles correspond to the value of the race variable in the ICF. The blue bars show the
distribution of race in the ICF among records that were not imputed. The red bars shows the distribution
of race in the ICF among imputed records. The green bars show the distribution of race among records in
the ICF that were not imputed and did not match to the ACS. The green bars do not vary across
sub-figures. See Table C.3 for more detail.
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Table C.2: Distribution of ICF Categories across ACS Response Categories, Ethnicity
Distribution of catagories in ICF 90% CI Not Hispanic Hispanic
Not in ACS
Baseline: not imputed Upper 90.7% 9.3%
Mean 90.7% 9.3%
Lower 90.7% 9.3%
ACS: Not Hispanic
Impute: imputed, ACS is ‘Not Hispanic’ Upper 94.7% 6.0%
Mean 94.4% 5.6%
Lower 94.0% 5.3%
Target: not imputed, ACS is ‘Not Hispanic’ Upper 99.7% 0.4%
Mean 99.6% 0.4%
Lower 99.6% 0.3%
ACS: Hispanic
Impute: imputed, ACS is ‘Hispanic’ Upper 21.7% 81.7%
Mean 20.0% 80.0%
Lower 18.3% 78.3%
Target: not imputed, ACS is ‘Hispanic’ Upper 5.5% 95.0%
Mean 5.2% 94.8%
Lower 5.0% 94.5%
Notes: 90% CI are 90% confidence intervals of the mean. Major row heading is the value of the
ACS variable. Minor row heading is the value of the ICF variable. Major row header “Not in
ACS” denotes records that did not match to the ACS.
gory, 39.2% were imputed into the Native American or Alaskan Native category (Figure
C.3(d)), and 8.0% into Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (Figure C.3(e)). This is compared to
target shares of 71.3% and 47.0%, respectively. For the Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, the
majority of those responding as such on the ACS were imputed into the White and Asian
categories at approximately equal rates. For Native American or Alaska Native, Figure
C.3(d) shows the majority were imputed into the white category.
The category “Two or More Races” and “Some Other Race” also have inconsistent
responses across input data. Those responding as “Two or More Races” are 1.0% of the
population. Their target distribution is 34.5% of ACS respondents who report two or more
races and who have the same response in the 2000 Census. For the records imputed from
the 2000 Census who report two or more races in the ACS, only 4.7% were imputed into
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the two or more races category. The other records were mostly imputed into the White,
Black, and Asian categories as seen in Figure C.3(f). Note that “Some Other Race” is not
an imputation category. Respondents to the ACS who answered “Some Other Race” were
largely imputed to “White,” with a large portion to “Two or More Races.”
Comparison to the “D Sample”
The previous section examined the quality of the imputation at the person level. The next
set of results asks how the imputation model fairs when used to reproduce LEHD public-
use statistics. To do this, a simple comparison of key QWI variables is carried out for
three sample states by education, and education x sex, using both reported education and
imputed education. This analysis uses the “D sample,” a sample of workers in the ICF
that have a 2000 decennial long form education response. Here we compare beginning-
of-quarter employment, full-quarter employment, and average quarterly wages for full-
quarter employees using the QWI variables calculated using both respondent education
and imputed education. The question of interest posed here is a simple one: for the
sample of workers for whom reported education is known, do the QWI statistics show
substantially different patterns when imputed education is used to tabulate the statistics
rather than respondent education?
For this analysis beginning-of-quarter employment (B), full-quarter employment (F),
and wages for full-quarter employees (Z W3) are computed directly from the internal Em-
ployment History File, rather than the production system equivalent, using the standard
definitions but not the fuzz factors. These indicators are computed for both the reported
value of education and for each of the 10 implicates of the imputed education value. For
the sake of simplicity in interpretation, we report the difference between the value of the
indicator using reported education compared to the average value for the indicator using
imputed education over the 10 implicates. While this is a simplification, as the variation
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Table C.3: Distribution of ICF Categories across ACS Response Categories, Race
Distribution of catagories in ICF 90% CI White Black Native Amer. ≥ Asian Hawaiian & PI ≥ Two or More
Not in ACS
Baseline: not imputed Upper 83.1% 11.1% 0.8% 3.9% 0.1% 1.0%
Mean 83.1% 11.1% 0.8% 3.9% 0.1% 1.0%
Lower 83.1% 11.1% 0.8% 3.9% 0.1% 1.0%
ACS: White
Impute: imputed, ACS is ‘White’ Upper 94.8% 2.0% 1.2% 1.0% 0.4% 1.5%
Mean 94.5% 1.9% 1.1% 0.9% 0.3% 1.4%
Lower 94.2% 1.7% 0.9% 0.7% 0.3% 1.2%
Target: not imputed, ACS is ‘White’ Upper 99.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.4%
Mean 99.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3%
Lower 99.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.3%
ACS: Black
Impute: imputed, ACS is ‘Black’ Upper 7.3% 90.8% 1.0% 1.2% 0.6% 3.0%
Mean 6.3% 89.5% 0.6% 0.8% 0.4% 2.4%
Lower 5.3% 88.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.1% 1.7%
Target: not imputed, ACS is ‘Black’ Upper 2.4% 96.9% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.9%
Mean 2.2% 96.7% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.8%
Lower 2.0% 96.5% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.7%
ACS: Native American
Impute: imputed, ACS is ‘Native Amer.’ Upper 52.9% 8.6% 46.5% 7.6% 1.6% 8.5%
Mean 45.5% 5.3% 39.2% 4.5% 0.5% 5.1%
Lower 38.0% 2.0% 31.8% 1.4% 0.0% 1.6%
Target: not imputed, ACS is ‘Native Amer.’ Upper 18.1% 2.5% 73.4% 2.1% 0.3% 10.2%
Mean 16.4% 1.9% 71.3% 1.5% 0.1% 8.9%
Lower 14.7% 1.2% 69.2% 0.9% 0.0% 7.6%
ACS: Asian
Impute: imputed, ACS is ‘Asian’ Upper 10.7% 3.0% 1.5% 86.2% 1.6% 5.0%
Mean 8.8% 2.0% 0.8% 83.7% 0.9% 3.7%
Lower 6.9% 1.1% 0.2% 81.3% 0.3% 2.4%
Target: not imputed, ACS is ‘Asian’ Upper 2.6% 0.6% 0.2% 94.9% 0.2% 2.8%
Mean 2.3% 0.5% 0.2% 94.5% 0.1% 2.5%
Lower 2.0% 0.3% 0.1% 94.0% 0.1% 2.1%
ACS: Hawaiian & PI
Impute: imputed, ACS is ‘Hawaiian & PI’ Upper 53.1% 17.5% 6.3% 54.7% 18.5% 23.3%
Mean 35.1% 7.6% 1.5% 36.5% 8.1% 11.3%
Lower 17.1% 0.0% 0.0% 18.3% 0.0% 0.0%
Target: not imputed, ACS is ‘Hawaiian & PI’ Upper 13.7% 6.3% 1.4% 19.9% 53.0% 27.8%
Mean 10.1% 4.0% 0.5% 15.6% 47.0% 22.8%
Lower 6.5% 1.6% 0.0% 11.3% 41.1% 17.8%
ACS: Two or More
Impute: imputed, ACS is ‘Two or More’ Upper 89.4% 7.0% 3.3% 3.5% 1.0% 2.5%
Mean 87.3% 5.6% 2.3% 2.5% 0.6% 1.7%
Lower 85.2% 4.1% 1.4% 1.6% 0.1% 0.9%
Target: not imputed, ACS is ‘Two or More’ Upper 85.1% 6.4% 2.9% 4.6% 0.4% 2.9%
Mean 84.4% 5.9% 2.6% 4.2% 0.3% 2.6%
Lower 83.6% 5.5% 2.2% 3.9% 0.2% 2.3%
ACS: Some Other
Impute: imputed, ACS is ‘Some Other’ Upper 64.8% 19.5% 5.3% 15.0% 2.7% 6.4%
Mean 60.9% 16.5% 3.8% 12.4% 1.7% 4.7%
Lower 57.0% 13.6% 2.3% 9.8% 0.6% 3.0%
Target: not imputed, ACS is ‘Some Other’ Upper 41.0% 10.1% 8.0% 7.3% 2.8% 35.6%
Mean 39.8% 9.4% 7.3% 6.7% 2.4% 34.5%
Lower 38.6% 8.6% 6.7% 6.1% 2.0% 33.3%
Notes: 90% CI are 90% confidence intervals of the mean. Major row heading is the value of the ACS variable. Minor row heading is the value of the ICF variable.
Major row header “Not in ACS” denotes records that did not match to the ACS.
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over the implicates is typically small and generally much smaller than the difference be-
tween the average and reported values, it is consistent with the analysis done in the main
text of the paper.
As can be seen in Table C.4, the comparisons at the state level generally show close
correspondence between QWI values using reported education and imputed education,
particularly for wages. At the state level, the difference between average full-quarter
wages within education categories for reported and imputed education ranges from -6.7%
to +8.0% with the smallest difference being less than 0.2%. The share of beginning-of-
quarter employment in each education category varies by a range of -4.9 to 6.4 percentage
points with the smallest difference being -0.1 percentage points at the statewide level.
Overall, differences in the distribution of full-quarter employment between reported and
imputed education are similar to those for beginning-of-quarter employment.
Table C.4: Comparison of QWI Variables for the Decennial Sample (D Sample): Actual vs. Imputed Education
Average Full-quarter
Employment Counts B Employment Share F Employment Share wage, (Z W3)
Statewide Distribution B F Actual Imputed* Actual Imputed* Actual Imputed**
Delaware
Less than High School 3,510 2,950 10.0% 10.1% 9.7% 9.6% $6,100 $6,180
High School Graduate 11,400 9,910 32.7% 27.7% 32.4% 27.4% $7,590 $7,590
Some College or Associates Degree 10,200 8,920 29.3% 30.6% 29.2% 30.6% $8,950 $9,110
College Graduate or Greater 9,760 8,770 28.0% 31.5% 28.7% 32.4% $14,900 $13,800
Illinois
Less than High School 51,500 45,100 8.29% 9.16% 8.07% 8.90% $6,390 $6,390
High School Graduate 168,000 151,000 27.00% 28.40% 27.00% 28.20% $7,520 $7,730
Some College or Associates Degree 205,000 185,000 33.00% 31.40% 33.10% 31.50% $8,880 $9,530
College Graduate or Greater 197,000 178,000 31.80% 31.00% 31.90% 31.40% $15,700 $15,100
New Jersey
Less than High School 31,500 27,300 9.14% 8.42% 8.93% 8.12% $6,860 $6,510
High School Graduate 95,800 85,100 27.80% 21.40% 27.80% 21.10% $8,550 $8,360
Some College or Associates Degree 93,100 82,600 27.00% 29.20% 27.00% 29.20% $10,400 $10,500
College Graduate or Greater 125,000 111,000 36.10% 41.00% 36.30% 41.50% $17,700 $16,400
Notes: *Average share over ten implicats. **Average over ten implicates. Statics computed for year 2000 quarter 2. B denotes beginning-of-quarter employment, and
F denotes full-quarter employment.
For B, F, and Z W3 for education x sex at the state level, the correspondence is again
quite close. In Table C.5, the difference in education x sex tabulations between average
full-quarter wages within categories for reported and imputed education ranges from -
8.1% to +9.4% with the smallest difference being less than 0.09%. The share of beginning-
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of-quarter employment in each education category varies by a range of -5.3 to 6.6 per-
centage points with the smallest difference being less than 0.001 percentage points at the
statewide level. Differences in male/female wage gaps and employment by education
across states are largely retained in the imputed results. Generally and not surprisingly,
differences in state comparisons tend to be replicated in smaller cells as well. For instance
for IL, the differences between B and F for imputed vs. reported education are very small
at the state level and are also very small in the education x sex cells, while somewhat
larger discrepancies in NJ and IL between some education categories are seen in educa-
tion x sex cells for those two groups.
Table C.5: Comparison of QWI Variables for the Decennial Sample (D Sample) by Sex: Actual vs. Imputed Education
Average Full-quarter
Employment Counts B Employment Share F Employment Share wage, (Z W3)
Statewide Distribution by Sex B F Actual Imputed* Actual Imputed* Actual Imputed**
Delaware
Female Less than High School 1,420 1,100 8.45% 8.59% 8.08% 8.04% $4,470 $4,360
High School Graduate 5,450 4,750 32.50% 27.10% 32.40% 26.80% $5,810 $5,610
Some College or Associates Degree 5,320 4,640 31.80% 32.40% 31.70% 32.40% $7,120 $7,080
College Graduate or Greater 4,570 4,080 27.20% 31.90% 27.90% 32.70% $11,200 $10,600
Male Less than High School 2,100 1,780 11.50% 11.50% 11.10% 11.00% $7,190 $7,400
High School Graduate 5,980 5,170 32.90% 28.30% 32.40% 28.00% $9,220 $9,320
Some College or Associates Degree 4,910 4,300 27.00% 29.00% 27.00% 29.00% $10,900 $11,200
College Graduate or Greater 5,300 4,700 28.60% 31.20% 29.50% 32.00% $18,100 $16,900
Illinois
Female Less than High School 22,900 20,000 7.46% 8.35% 7.28% 8.11% $4,500 $4,510
High School Graduate 81,900 73,700 26.70% 28.90% 26.80% 28.80% $5,400 $5,490
Some College or Associates Degree 107,000 95,900 34.90% 33.30% 35.00% 33.40% $6,600 $6,960
College Graduate or Greater 95,000 84,900 31.00% 29.40% 30.90% 29.70% $10,900 $10,800
Male Less than High School 28,700 25,200 9.10% 9.96% 8.84% 9.66% $7,880 $7,900
High School Graduate 85,800 77,200 27.30% 28.00% 27.10% 27.70% $9,550 $9,990
Some College or Associates Degree 97,900 88,900 31.10% 29.60% 31.20% 29.60% $11,300 $12,300
College Graduate or Greater 102,000 93,400 32.50% 32.50% 32.80% 33.00% $20,100 $18,900
New Jersey
Female Less than High School 14,000 12,100 8.15% 7.80% 7.96% 7.52% $4,940 $4,730
High School Graduate 49,300 43,900 28.70% 22.10% 28.80% 21.90% $6,450 $6,070
Some College or Associates Degree 49,200 43,600 28.60% 31.10% 28.70% 31.10% $7,950 $7,890
College Graduate or Greater 59,500 52,600 34.60% 39.00% 34.60% 39.50% $12,700 $12,100
Male Less than High School 17,500 15,200 10.10% 9.03% 9.90% 8.71% $8,390 $8,040
High School Graduate 46,500 41,200 26.90% 20.60% 26.80% 20.30% $10,800 $10,800
Some College or Associates Degree 43,900 38,900 25.40% 27.40% 25.30% 27.40% $13,100 $13,600
College Graduate or Greater 65,100 58,400 37.60% 42.90% 38.00% 43.50% $22,100 $20,200
Notes: *Average share over ten implicats. **Average over ten implicates. Statics computed for year 2000 quarter 2. B denotes beginning-of-quarter employment, and F denotes
full-quarter employment.
163
C.2 Imputation Procedure to Match Research Snapshot and Public-use
Data
The research snapshot used to compute the total variance measures for the QWI differs
from the production system used to create the public-use QWI files. The production sys-
tem does not save the ten implicates to create the public-use QWI, but these implicates are
necessary for the creation of the total variability measures. The research snapshot does
not exactly replicate the production QWI statistics due to edits made to each snapshot,
which are never reconciled. Due to these edits and rounding, it is sometimes the case that
the computed statistics for a given cell do not exactly match. For cells with large employ-
ment counts this is a trivial concern as the variance for each statistic is already quite low,
and small changes in the magnitude of the statistic result in marginal changes to the coef-
ficient of variation. In cells with small employment counts (less than ten, say), this is not
the case. Small changes in the size of the of employment count lead to large changes in
the coefficient of variation. In this appendix we detail how we edit and scale the variance
measures to account for the occasional differences in the internal and public-use statistics.
Before proceeding to the edit and scaling algorithm, a brief discussion of the refer-
ence distribution for the coefficient of variation is necessary. The intuition for the edit
procedure is that our assumption of equivalent coefficient of variations for the public-
use and research snapshots is “reasonable.” For any cell with a given employment size,
what is reasonable depends on the state, the demographic characteristics and the level
of aggregation. We control for these confounding factors by performing the edit proce-
dure separately for each state by ownership type by characteristic crossing. Next, we
separate the data by beginning-of-quarter employment; full-quarter employment and av-
erage monthly full-quarter earnings; and flow employment and payroll. Within each of
the three separate edits, we further separate each cell by its level of aggregation. The edit
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algorithm is therefore run separately for each state by ownership type by characteristic
crossing, by each of the three employment definitions governing the five statistics and by
each level of aggregation.
After partitioning the data, the edit algorithm then proceeds as follows. First, we cal-
culate one percent quantiles of the internally calculated employment statistic from the
minimum to the maximum. We collapse bins where the employment count is the same
for consecutive quantiles leaving us with at most 100 bins for the internally calculated
employment statistic. For each bin we calculate the 5th and 95th percentile of the coeffi-
cient of variation for the employment statistic as well as average monthly earnings and
payroll for full-quarter employment and total employment, respectively. In addition, for
each of the five QWI statistics we calculate the median within and between variance as
well as the median statistic in the bin.
Once the bins are set, for each record we look-up the bin associated with each of the
three public-use employment statistics. If the coefficient of variation for the internally
calculated statistic falls either below the 5th percentile or above the 95th percentile of the
coefficient of variation in that bin, we use the median within-variance and the median
between-variance for that statistic and rescale them accordingly. We then make the total
variance, missingness ratio, and degrees of freedom calculations from our edited within-
and between-variance. An example will elucidate the procedure.
Suppose we have a cell with an internally calculated flow employment (M) count of
5 and due to edits and rounding the public-use statistic (EmpTotal)is 7. As is typical for
low-levels of aggregation and small employment counts, the bins consist of only cells
with the same employment counts. That is, the bins consist only of cells with counts of 5,
6, 7, etc. Our public-use flow employment total is 7, so we look at the bin of cells with flow
employment counts of 7 and compare our internally calculated coefficient of variation to
the distribution in that bin. The coefficient of variation for this cell was calculated from
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an internal count of 5 and the coefficient of variation is in this example greater than the
95th percentile in the cell. We therefore assign the public-use statistic the median within-
and between-variance from the bin, and we scale the two variances by the median flow
employment count in the bin, which in this example is simply 7. In this example the
median flow employment count in the bin is the same as the public-use statistic negating
any change in the variance from scaling, but we use a more reasonable estimate of the
within- and between-variance.
C.3 Handling Structural and Sampling Zeros
The public-use QWI files are sparse. If a given cell does not have at least one dollar from
a UI-covered job, the cell does not appear in the released data. However, just because
a cell does not appear in a particular quarter does not mean that it will not appear in a
subsequent quarter. If a cell contains zeros given quarter, for some combinations of strati-
fiers, but not others, then there are firms operating in that cell, and the zeros are sampling
zeros. If there no evidence of any firm activity in that cell–meaning all combinations of
stratifiers show zero employment, then those zeros are all structural zeros. We supple-
ment the unemployment insurance records used as the core inputs to the QWI with firm
reports from the QCEW. The QCEW are a firm-level virtual-census of employment and
wages comprising the universe of firms covered by state unemployment insurance sys-
tems and some federal employment. The universe of firm activity in the QWI and the
QCEW is quite similar but it does not perfectly overlap. To infer firm activity in a given
state, year, quarter, county, and NAICS Sector cell, which is the correct frame for distin-
guishing sampling from structural zeros, we use the union of firm activity from the QWI
and QCEW universes. If a cell does not appear in the unemployment insurance micro-
data, but we find evidence of firm activity – any positive employment in any month or
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positive wages – from the QCEW we add that cell to the public use file, including all
lower levels of aggregation. We flag all sampling zeros with the variable “sample zero.”
The five QWI statistics for all sampling zeros are set to zero, and we impute each of their
variability statistics.
We impute the variability measures for sampling zeros by exploiting the edit proce-
dure in Appendix C.2. Recall that in the edit procedure we calculate various moments of
the coefficient of variation, within-variance, and between-variance distributions by bins
of the internally calculated employment size. The bins are calculated separately for each
state, ownership type, characteristic crossing, and aggregation level. We use the median
within- and between-variance from the zero bin as the sample zero within- and between-
variance. In cases where the aggregation level is too high so as no zero bin exists, we drop
down to the next lowest level of aggregation where a zero bin is available and calculate
the ratio of the coefficient of variation for the one and zero bins. We scale the within- and
between-variance at our reference level of aggregation using the one bin and the ratio
calculated from the lower level of aggregation. To summarize, the median within- and
between- variance from the zero bin of the edit procedure are used as our imputation
of the within-and between variance for sampling zeros. We then derive the total vari-
ance, missingness ratio, and degrees of freedom estimates from the within- and between-
variance.
C.4 Data Notes
• North Carolina, Colorado, and Massachusetts are not in the R2012Q4 QWI release
and have not been included in the variability files.
• 720 records from the Georgia age by sex all employment file, 588 records from the
Georgia race by ethnicity all employment file, and 420 records from the Georgia sex
167
by education all employment file include the NAICS sector 99. This is an error in
the release, and these records have been removed from their respective variability
files.
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Table C.11: Between Variance of Beginning-of-Quarter (B) Population Counts
Coefficient of Variation
Cell Count Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
A: Establishment Type and Age Range
Population
All Valid QWI Ages, All Establishments 2,957 1.059E-05 6.175E-06 1.738E-06 5.334E-05
All Valid QWI Ages, Private Establishments 2,957 1.187E-05 6.911E-06 1.984E-06 6.670E-05
B: State
Postal Code
AK 188 6.521E-05 5.021E-05 6.874E-06 2.234E-04
AL 172 3.040E-05 2.319E-05 3.695E-06 8.993E-05
AR 148 3.248E-05 2.201E-05 7.540E-06 7.745E-05
AZ 124 4.091E-05 3.357E-05 6.086E-06 1.385E-04
CA 324 2.463E-05 2.074E-05 2.581E-06 9.171E-05
CT 252 3.362E-05 2.643E-05 5.869E-06 1.417E-04
DC 104 8.532E-05 5.890E-05 1.611E-05 1.984E-04
DE 212 6.939E-05 5.802E-05 8.776E-06 2.319E-04
FL 304 1.812E-05 1.435E-05 2.625E-06 7.097E-05
GA 220 3.069E-05 2.497E-05 3.249E-06 1.027E-04
HI 256 4.458E-05 4.397E-05 5.854E-06 2.369E-04
IA 208 2.941E-05 2.218E-05 4.336E-06 1.009E-04
ID 332 6.875E-05 5.681E-05 6.696E-06 3.292E-04
IL 348 2.606E-05 2.101E-05 2.660E-06 7.849E-05
IN 220 2.383E-05 1.818E-05 2.140E-06 6.173E-05
KS 300 3.931E-05 3.122E-05 5.063E-06 1.262E-04
KY 172 2.659E-05 1.998E-05 3.718E-06 7.896E-05
LA 268 2.138E-05 1.482E-05 4.411E-06 6.201E-05
MD 348 3.166E-05 2.787E-05 3.609E-06 1.276E-04
ME 248 3.069E-05 2.227E-05 5.408E-06 9.439E-05
MI 180 1.896E-05 1.498E-05 3.122E-06 5.559E-05
MN 276 2.373E-05 1.933E-05 3.230E-06 6.993E-05
MO 268 2.291E-05 1.892E-05 2.885E-06 6.340E-05
MS 132 3.457E-05 2.448E-05 5.182E-06 8.206E-05
MT 300 4.375E-05 3.270E-05 7.252E-06 1.399E-04
ND 220 4.782E-05 3.732E-05 6.366E-06 1.632E-04
NE 204 3.910E-05 3.037E-05 6.833E-06 1.090E-04
NH 140 4.042E-05 2.809E-05 7.394E-06 9.946E-05
NJ 252 2.982E-05 2.341E-05 3.494E-06 1.275E-04
NM 260 7.141E-05 6.564E-05 6.204E-06 3.728E-04
NV 220 6.333E-05 5.146E-05 6.337E-06 1.739E-04
NY 188 2.334E-05 2.095E-05 2.948E-06 1.143E-04
OH 188 1.475E-05 1.147E-05 2.241E-06 4.309E-05
OK 188 4.435E-05 3.440E-05 4.895E-06 1.131E-04
OR 332 3.848E-05 2.973E-05 5.838E-06 1.269E-04
PA 236 1.181E-05 8.594E-06 1.738E-06 3.660E-05
RI 268 6.231E-05 4.507E-05 6.479E-06 1.753E-04
SC 220 3.604E-05 2.772E-05 4.599E-06 9.803E-05
SD 220 5.157E-05 4.009E-05 6.421E-06 1.497E-04
TN 220 2.394E-05 1.913E-05 2.935E-06 8.213E-05
TX 268 1.945E-05 1.583E-05 2.284E-06 7.985E-05
UT 196 6.618E-05 5.351E-05 7.202E-06 1.792E-04
VA 220 2.814E-05 2.341E-05 4.003E-06 1.111E-04
VT 188 4.439E-05 3.280E-05 5.941E-06 1.317E-04
WA 348 3.202E-05 2.560E-05 4.074E-06 9.715E-05
WI 348 2.128E-05 1.751E-05 1.960E-06 7.021E-05
WV 236 2.298E-05 1.554E-05 3.872E-06 7.009E-05
WY 172 8.874E-05 6.879E-05 1.586E-05 2.701E-04
Notes: There is small amount of between-implicate variance of state counts for beginning-of-quarter employment. We summarize
the between variance using the coefficient of variation defined as the square root of the between-implicate variance divided by the
average between-implicate weighted counts. Panel A summarizes the coefficient of variation for the between variance for the four
different types of ownership type and age populations. The summary is taken across all state-year-quarters. Panel B summarizes
the coefficient of variation for all states across all year, quarters, and ownership types and age range combinations.
174
Table C.12: Between Variance of Full-Quarter (F) Population Counts
Coefficient of Variation
Cell Count Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
A: Establishment Type and Age Range
Population
All Valid QWI Ages, All Establishments 2,957 1.027E-05 5.891E-06 2.149E-06 5.356E-05
All Valid QWI Ages, Private Establishments 2,957 1.152E-05 6.592E-06 1.990E-06 5.403E-05
B: State
Postal Code
AK 188 5.625E-05 4.128E-05 7.485E-06 1.601E-04
AL 172 2.873E-05 2.214E-05 3.299E-06 8.659E-05
AR 148 3.144E-05 2.094E-05 6.305E-06 7.746E-05
AZ 124 4.139E-05 3.343E-05 5.211E-06 1.432E-04
CA 324 2.273E-05 1.914E-05 2.422E-06 8.591E-05
CT 252 3.258E-05 2.605E-05 5.610E-06 1.371E-04
DC 104 8.303E-05 5.866E-05 1.708E-05 2.181E-04
DE 212 6.386E-05 5.424E-05 5.393E-06 2.005E-04
FL 304 1.645E-05 1.296E-05 2.559E-06 6.220E-05
GA 220 2.916E-05 2.281E-05 3.254E-06 8.538E-05
HI 256 4.090E-05 4.112E-05 5.684E-06 2.272E-04
IA 208 2.801E-05 2.095E-05 4.748E-06 7.924E-05
ID 332 6.090E-05 4.640E-05 8.729E-06 1.853E-04
IL 348 2.404E-05 1.901E-05 2.408E-06 6.948E-05
IN 220 2.254E-05 1.722E-05 3.352E-06 6.253E-05
KS 300 3.776E-05 3.054E-05 5.557E-06 1.261E-04
KY 172 2.588E-05 1.884E-05 3.681E-06 8.234E-05
LA 268 2.087E-05 1.429E-05 3.630E-06 5.697E-05
MD 348 2.926E-05 2.510E-05 3.640E-06 1.148E-04
ME 248 2.783E-05 1.945E-05 4.771E-06 8.563E-05
MI 180 1.626E-05 1.206E-05 2.406E-06 4.997E-05
MN 276 2.264E-05 1.861E-05 2.661E-06 6.325E-05
MO 268 2.164E-05 1.737E-05 3.001E-06 6.110E-05
MS 132 3.374E-05 2.393E-05 4.847E-06 9.564E-05
MT 300 4.097E-05 2.925E-05 7.754E-06 1.329E-04
ND 220 4.407E-05 3.356E-05 5.709E-06 1.191E-04
NE 204 3.838E-05 2.992E-05 4.032E-06 1.109E-04
NH 140 3.957E-05 2.731E-05 6.623E-06 9.685E-05
NJ 252 2.814E-05 2.202E-05 4.148E-06 9.915E-05
NM 260 6.823E-05 5.648E-05 6.973E-06 2.258E-04
NV 220 5.935E-05 4.752E-05 6.652E-06 1.766E-04
NY 188 2.177E-05 1.894E-05 2.341E-06 9.451E-05
OH 188 1.402E-05 1.088E-05 2.160E-06 3.793E-05
OK 188 4.342E-05 3.421E-05 3.832E-06 1.146E-04
OR 332 3.542E-05 2.710E-05 5.739E-06 1.056E-04
PA 236 1.094E-05 7.845E-06 1.990E-06 3.553E-05
RI 268 5.713E-05 4.069E-05 9.523E-06 1.553E-04
SC 220 3.390E-05 2.587E-05 4.492E-06 1.016E-04
SD 220 4.917E-05 3.734E-05 7.047E-06 1.459E-04
TN 220 2.221E-05 1.741E-05 2.674E-06 6.856E-05
TX 268 1.757E-05 1.413E-05 2.003E-06 6.805E-05
UT 196 6.683E-05 5.510E-05 7.998E-06 1.977E-04
VA 220 2.636E-05 2.214E-05 3.717E-06 1.089E-04
VT 188 4.051E-05 2.909E-05 7.829E-06 1.249E-04
WA 348 2.724E-05 2.122E-05 3.714E-06 7.521E-05
WI 348 2.052E-05 1.673E-05 3.026E-06 6.773E-05
WV 236 2.199E-05 1.394E-05 3.598E-06 6.286E-05
WY 172 8.041E-05 6.154E-05 1.300E-05 2.730E-04
Notes: There is small amount of between-implicate variance of state counts for full-quarter employment. We summarize the
between variance using the coefficient of variation defined as the square root of the between-implicate variance divided by the
average between-implicate weighted counts. Panel A summarizes the coefficient of variation for the between variance for the four
different types of ownership type and age populations. The summary is taken across all state-year-quarters. Panel B summarizes
the coefficient of variation for all states across all year, quarters, and ownership types and age range combinations.
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